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authorNick Hadaway <raker@gentoo.org>2002-07-22 23:09:48 +0000
committerNick Hadaway <raker@gentoo.org>2002-07-22 23:09:48 +0000
commit05dc154ca1075d73dc18b1d7e129e5519e3d707b (patch)
tree68036c5dd1b8603abcb20467554b56f65b76169d /net-mail/postfix
parentadd mask for new postfix build which supports ipv6,tls, and saslv2 (diff)
downloadhistorical-05dc154ca1075d73dc18b1d7e129e5519e3d707b.tar.gz
historical-05dc154ca1075d73dc18b1d7e129e5519e3d707b.tar.bz2
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New ebuild with tls and ipv6 support. Also added support for saslv2.
Thanks to Philipp Morger for a start on the ebuilds and patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'net-mail/postfix')
-rw-r--r--net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog11
-rw-r--r--net-mail/postfix/files/digest-postfix-1.1.11.200206131
-rw-r--r--net-mail/postfix/files/saslv2.diff42
-rw-r--r--net-mail/postfix/files/tls+ipv6.diff10732
-rw-r--r--net-mail/postfix/postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild138
5 files changed, 10923 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog b/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog
index f41472e7f731..27b5433bc47d 100644
--- a/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog
+++ b/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
# ChangeLog for net-mail/postfix
# Copyright 2002 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.; Distributed under the GPL
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog,v 1.22 2002/07/21 17:16:28 blizzy Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-mail/postfix/ChangeLog,v 1.23 2002/07/22 23:09:48 raker Exp $
+
+*postfix-1.1.11.20020613 (22 Jul 2002)
+
+ 22 Jul 2002; Nick Hadaway <raker@gentoo.org>
+ postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild, files/digest-postfix-1.1.11.20020613,
+ files/tls+ipv6.diff, files/saslv2.diff
+
+ New ebuild with tls and ipv6 support. Also added support for saslv2.
+ Thanks to Philipp Morger for a start on the ebuilds and patches.
21 Jul 2002; Maik Schreiber <blizzy@gentoo.org> postfix-1.1.11-r4.ebuild,
ChangeLog:
diff --git a/net-mail/postfix/files/digest-postfix-1.1.11.20020613 b/net-mail/postfix/files/digest-postfix-1.1.11.20020613
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d3bf64ede9a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-mail/postfix/files/digest-postfix-1.1.11.20020613
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MD5 7c7f2f27463539c00c6bfe8bf50bc0d9 postfix-1.1.11-20020613.tar.gz 1249496
diff --git a/net-mail/postfix/files/saslv2.diff b/net-mail/postfix/files/saslv2.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..879b7640aabe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-mail/postfix/files/saslv2.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -urN postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/lmtp/lmtp.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.h Tue May 22 13:37:14 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/lmtp/lmtp.h Mon Jul 22 17:04:54 2002
+@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
+ * SASL library.
+ */
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+-#include <sasl.h>
+-#include <saslutil.h>
++#include <sasl/sasl.h>
++#include <sasl/saslutil.h>
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+diff -urN postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/smtp/smtp.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h Thu May 23 14:18:02 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/smtp/smtp.h Mon Jul 22 17:04:41 2002
+@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
+ * SASL library.
+ */
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+-#include <sasl.h>
+-#include <saslutil.h>
++#include <sasl/sasl.h>
++#include <sasl/saslutil.h>
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+diff -urN postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/smtpd/smtpd.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Fri Mar 29 15:10:13 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613-modified/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Mon Jul 22 17:04:22 2002
+@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
+ * SASL library.
+ */
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+-#include <sasl.h>
+-#include <saslutil.h>
++#include <sasl/sasl.h>
++#include <sasl/saslutil.h>
+ #endif
+
+ /*
diff --git a/net-mail/postfix/files/tls+ipv6.diff b/net-mail/postfix/files/tls+ipv6.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c85d32017337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-mail/postfix/files/tls+ipv6.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,10732 @@
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/Makefile.in Sat Jun 8 20:49:42 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
+ src/lmtp src/trivial-rewrite src/qmgr src/smtp src/bounce src/pipe \
+ src/showq src/postalias src/postcat src/postconf src/postdrop \
+ src/postkick src/postlock src/postlog src/postmap src/postqueue \
+- src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual
++ src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual \
++ src/tlsmgr
+ MANDIRS = proto man html
+
+ default: update
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/master.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/master.cf
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/master.cf Sat Jun 8 20:21:38 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/master.cf Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -70,11 +70,16 @@
+ # (yes) (yes) (yes) (never) (50)
+ # ==========================================================================
+ smtp inet n - n - - smtpd
++#smtps inet n - n - - smtpd
++# -o smtpd_tls_wrappermode=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
++#submission inet n - n - - smtpd
++# -o smtpd_enforce_tls=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
+ #628 inet n - n - - qmqpd
+ pickup fifo n - n 60 1 pickup
+ cleanup unix n - n - 0 cleanup
+ qmgr fifo n - n 300 1 qmgr
+ #qmgr fifo n - n 300 1 nqmgr
++#tlsmgr fifo - - n 300 1 tlsmgr
+ rewrite unix - - n - - trivial-rewrite
+ bounce unix - - n - 0 bounce
+ defer unix - - n - 0 bounce
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/postfix-files postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/postfix-files
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/postfix-files Sun May 26 23:27:31 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/postfix-files Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ $daemon_directory/smtp:f:root:-:755
+ $daemon_directory/smtpd:f:root:-:755
+ $daemon_directory/spawn:f:root:-:755
++$daemon_directory/tlsmgr:f:root:-:755
+ $daemon_directory/trivial-rewrite:f:root:-:755
+ $daemon_directory/virtual:f:root:-:755
+ $command_directory/postalias:f:root:-:755
+@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@
+ $manpage_directory/man8/smtp.8:f:root:-:644
+ $manpage_directory/man8/smtpd.8:f:root:-:644
+ $manpage_directory/man8/spawn.8:f:root:-:644
++$manpage_directory/man8/tlsmgr.8:f:root:-:644
+ $manpage_directory/man8/trivial-rewrite.8:f:root:-:644
+ $manpage_directory/man8/virtual.8:f:root:-:644
+ $sample_directory/sample-aliases.cf:f:root:-:644
+@@ -166,6 +168,7 @@
+ $sample_directory/sample-rewrite.cf:f:root:-:644
+ $sample_directory/sample-smtp.cf:f:root:-:644
+ $sample_directory/sample-smtpd.cf:f:root:-:644
++$sample_directory/sample-tls.cf:f:root:-:644
+ $sample_directory/sample-transport.cf:f:root:-:644
+ $sample_directory/sample-virtual.cf:f:root:-:644
+ $readme_directory/DB_README:f:root:-:644
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-auth.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-auth.cf
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-auth.cf Fri Mar 29 22:36:53 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-auth.cf Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -117,3 +117,15 @@
+ #
+ #smtp_sasl_security_options =
+ smtp_sasl_security_options = noplaintext
++
++# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
++# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
++# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
++# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
++# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
++# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
++# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
++# THIS OPTION ONLY WORKS WITH SSL/TLS SUPPORT COMPILED IN.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
++
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtp.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-smtp.cf
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtp.cf Tue Mar 26 22:46:30 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-smtp.cf Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -188,6 +188,14 @@
+ #
+ smtp_helo_timeout = 300s
+
++# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
++# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
++#
++# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
++# the mail exchanger list.
++#
++# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
++
+ # The smtp_mail_timeout parameter specifies the SMTP client timeout
+ # for sending the SMTP MAIL FROM command, and for receiving the server
+ # response.
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtpd.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-smtpd.cf
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtpd.cf Sat Jun 8 20:21:38 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-smtpd.cf Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@
+ #
+ strict_rfc821_envelopes = no
+
++# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
++# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
++#
++# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
++
+ #
+ # TARPIT CONTROLS
+ #
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-tls.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-tls.cf
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-tls.cf Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-tls.cf Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
++# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE. EDIT THE MAIN.CF FILE INSTEAD. THE STUFF
++# HERE JUST SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE.
++#
++# This file contains example settings of Postfix configuration
++# parameters that control the behaviour of the TLS extensions.
++#
++# We strictly seperate between server side TLS (smtpd_) and client side
++# TLS (smtp_), as for practical reasons we might choose differently.
++
++# Section with SMTPD specific settings
++
++# To use TLS we do need a certificate and a private key. Both must be in
++# "pem" format, the private key must not be encrypted, that does mean:
++# it must be accessable without password. Both parts (certificate and
++# private key) may be in the same file.
++#
++# Both RSA and DSA are certificates are supported. Typically you will only
++# have RSA certificates issued by a commercial CA, also the tools supplied
++# with OpenSSL will by default issue RSA certificates.
++# You can have both at the same time, in this case the cipher used decides,
++# which certificate is presented. For Netscape and OpenSSL clients without
++# special cipher choices, the RSA certificate is preferred.
++#
++# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
++# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
++# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
++# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
++#
++# Example: the certificate for "server.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
++# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the server.pem file by
++# 'cat server_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > server.pem'
++#
++# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
++# also add the CA-certificates to the smtpd_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
++# not necessary to have them in the smtpd_tls_[d]cert_file.
++#
++# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL server certificate and
++# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslserver ..." test.
++#
++smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/server.pem
++smtpd_tls_key_file = $smtpd_tls_cert_file
++#
++# Its DSA counterparts:
++smtpd_tls_dcert_file = /etc/postfix/server-dsa.pem
++smtpd_tls_dkey_file = $smtpd_tls_dcert_file
++
++# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
++# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
++# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
++# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
++# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
++
++# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
++# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
++# collected in a directory. The same CAs are offered to clients for
++# client verification. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
++# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
++# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
++# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
++#
++# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
++# must be inside the chroot jail. Please note also, that the CAs in this
++# directory are not listed to the client, so that e.g. Netscape might not
++# offer certificates issued by them.
++#
++# I therefore discourage the use of this option.
++#
++smtpd_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
++
++# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
++# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
++# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
++# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
++# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
++# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
++# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
++# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
++# discouraged.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_loglevel = 0
++
++# To include information about the protocol and cipher used as well as the
++# client and issuer CommonName into the "Received:" header, set the
++# smtpd_tls_received_header variable to true. The default is no, as the
++# information is not necessarily authentic. Only the final destination
++# is reliable, since the headers might have been changed in between.
++#
++#smtpd_tls_received_header = yes
++
++# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
++# Explicitely switch it on using "smtpd_use_tls". (Note: when invoked
++# via "sendmail -bs", STARTTLS is never offered due to insufficient
++# privileges to access the private key. This is intended behaviour.)
++#
++smtpd_use_tls = yes
++
++# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that no commands (except QUIT of course)
++# are allowed without TLS. According to RFC2487 this MUST NOT be applied
++# in case of a publicly-referenced SMTP server. So this option is off
++# by default and should only seldom be used. Using this option implies
++# smtpd_use_tls = yes. (Note: when invoked via "sendmail -bs", STARTTLS
++# is never offered due to insufficient privileges to access the private key.
++# This is intended behaviour.)
++#
++# smtpd_enforce_tls = no
++
++# Besides RFC2487 some clients, namely Outlook [Express] prefer to run the
++# non-standard "wrapper" mode, not the STARTTLS enhancement to SMTP.
++# This is true for OE (Win32 < 5.0 and Win32 >=5.0 when run on a port!=25
++# and OE (5.01 Mac on all ports).
++# It is strictly discouraged to use this mode from main.cf. If you want to
++# support this service, enable a special port in master.cf. Port 465 (smtps)
++# was once chosen for this feature.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_wrappermode = no
++
++# To receive a client certificate, the server must explicitly ask for one.
++# Hence netscape will either complain if no certificate is available (for
++# the list of CAs in /etc/postfix/certs) or will offer you client certificates
++# to choose from. This might be annoying, so this option is "off" by default.
++# You will however need the certificate if you want to to e.g. certificate
++# based relaying.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = no
++
++# You may also decide to REQUIRE a client certificate to allow TLS connections.
++# I don't think it will be necessary often, it is however included here for
++# completeness. This option implies smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes
++#
++# Please be aware, that this will inhibit TLS connections without a proper
++# certificate and only makes sense, when normal submission is disabled and
++# TLS is enforced (smtpd_enforce_tls). Otherwise clients may bypass by simply
++# not using STARTTLS at all. When TLS is not enforced, the connection will be
++# handled, as if only smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes would be set and an information
++# is logged.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_req_ccert = no
++
++# The verification depth for client certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
++# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
++# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
++# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
++#
++# smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth = 5
++
++# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
++# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
++# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
++# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
++# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
++# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
++# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
++
++# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
++# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
++# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
++# To share the session information between the smtpd processes, a disc based
++# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
++# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
++# can be used.
++#
++smtpd_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtpd_scache
++
++# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
++# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
++# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
++#
++# smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
++
++# Two additional options has been added for relay control to the UCE rules:
++# permit_tls_clientcerts (a)
++# and
++# permit_tls_all_clientcerts. (b)
++#
++# If one of these options is added to
++# smtpd_recipient_restrictions,
++# postfix will relay if
++# (a) a valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented
++# and its fingerprint is listed in the list of client certs
++# (relay_clientcerts),
++# (b) any valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented.
++#
++# Option (b) must only be used, if a special CA issues the certificates and
++# only this CA is listed as trusted CA. If other CAs are trusted, any owner
++# of a valid (SSL client)-certificate can relay. Option (b) can be practical
++# for a specically created email relay. It is however recommended to stay with
++# option (a) and list all certificates, as (b) does not permit any control
++# when a certificate must no longer be used (e.g. an employee leaving).
++#
++# smtpd_recipient_restrictions = ... permit_tls_clientcerts ...
++
++# The list of client certificates for which relaying will be allowed.
++# Unfortunately the routines for lists in postfix use whitespaces as
++# seperators and choke on special chars. So using the certificate
++# X509ONELINES is quite impractical. We will use the fingerprints at
++# this point, as they are difficult to fake but easy to use for lookup.
++# As postmap (when using e.g. db) insists of having a pair of key and value,
++# but we only need the key, the value can be chosen freely, e.g. the name
++# of the user or host:
++# D7:04:2F:A7:0B:8C:A5:21:FA:31:77:E1:41:8A:EE:80 lutzpc.at.home
++#
++# relay_clientcerts = hash:/etc/postfix/relay_clientcerts
++
++# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
++# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
++# documentation.
++# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
++# (openssl-)compiled in default!
++#
++# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
++#
++# smtpd_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
++
++# If you want to take advantage of ciphers with EDH, DH parameters are needed.
++# There are built in DH parameters for both 1025bit and 512bit available. It
++# is however better to have "own" parameters, since otherwise it would "pay"
++# for a possible attacker to start a brute force attack against these
++# parameters commonly used by everybody. For this reason, the parameters
++# chosen are already different from those distributed with other TLS packages.
++#
++# To generate your own set of parameters, use
++# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 1024
++# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 512
++# (your source for "entropy" might vary; on Linux there is /dev/random, on
++# other system, you might consider the "Entropy Gathering Daemon EGD",
++# available at http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/.
++#
++smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem
++smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem
++
++# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
++# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
++#
++# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
++
++# Section with SMTP specific settings
++
++# During the startup negotiation we might present a certificate to the server.
++# Netscape is rather clever here and lets the user select between only those
++# certs that will match the CAs accepted from the server. As I simply use
++# the integrated "SSL_connect()" from the OpenSSL package, this is not
++# possible by now and we have to chose just one cert.
++# So for now the default is to use _no_ cert and key unless explictly
++# set here. It is possible to use the same key/cert pair as for the server.
++# If a cert is to be presented, it must be in "pem" format, the private key
++# must not be encrypted, that does mean: it must be accessable without
++# password. Both parts (certificate and private key) may be in the
++# same file.
++#
++# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
++# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
++# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
++# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
++#
++# Example: the certificate for "client.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
++# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the client.pem file by
++# 'cat client_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > client.pem'
++#
++# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
++# also add the CA-certificates to the smtp_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
++# not necessary to have them in the smtp_tls_[d]cert_file.
++#
++# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL client certificate and
++# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslclient ..." test.
++#
++smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/client.pem
++smtp_tls_key_file = $smtp_tls_cert_file
++
++# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
++# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
++# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
++# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
++# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
++#
++smtp_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
++
++# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
++# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
++# collected in a directory. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
++# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
++# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
++# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
++#
++# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
++# must be inside the chroot jail.
++#
++smtp_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
++
++# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
++# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
++# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
++# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
++# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
++# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
++# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
++# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
++# discouraged.
++#
++smtp_tls_loglevel = 0
++
++# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
++# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
++# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
++# To share the session information between the smtp processes, a disc based
++# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
++# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
++# can be used.
++#
++smtp_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtp_scache
++
++# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
++# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
++# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
++#
++# smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
++
++# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
++# If you enable TLS it will be used when offered by the server.
++# WARNING: I didn't have access to other software (except those explicitely
++# listed) to test the interaction. On corresponding mailing list
++# there was a discussion going on about MS exchange servers offering
++# STARTTLS even if it is not configured, so it might be wise to not
++# use this option on your central mail hub, as you don't know in advance
++# whether you are going to hit such host. Use the recipient/site specific
++# options instead.
++# HINT: I have it switched on on my mailservers and did experience one
++# single failure since client side TLS is implemented. (There was one
++# misconfired MS Exchange server; I contacted ths admin.) Hence, I am happy
++# with it running all the time, but I am interested in testing anyway.
++# You have been warned, however :-)
++#
++# In case of failure, a "4xx" code is issued and the mail stays in the queue.
++#
++# Explicitely switch it on here, if you want it.
++#
++smtp_use_tls = yes
++
++# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that only connections with TLS will
++# be accepted. Additionally, the hostname of the receiving host is matched
++# against the CommonName in the certificate. Also, the certificate must
++# be verified "Ok", so that a CA trusted by the client must have issued
++# the certificate. If the certificate doesn't verify or the hostname doesn't
++# match, a "4xx" will be issued and the mail stays in the queue.
++# The hostname used in the check is beyond question, as it must be the
++# principle hostname (no CNAME allowed here).
++# The behaviour may be changed with the smtp_tls_enforce_peername option
++#
++# This option is useful only if you are definitely sure that you will only
++# connect to servers supporting RFC2487 _and_ with valid certificates.
++# I use it for my clients which will only send email to one mailhub, which
++# does offer the necessary STARTTLS support.
++#
++# smtp_enforce_tls = no
++
++# As of RFC2487 the requirements for hostname checking for MTA clients are
++# not set. When in smtp_enforce_tls mode, the option smtp_tls_enforce_peername
++# can be set to "no" to disable strict peername checking. In this case, the
++# mail delivery will be continued, if a TLS connection was established
++# _and_ the peer certificate passed verification _but_ regardless of the
++# CommonName listed in the certificate. This option only applies to the
++# default setting smtp_enforce_tls_mode, special settings in the
++# smtp_tls_per_site table override smtp_tls_enforce_peername.
++#
++# This can make sense in closed environment where special CAs are created.
++# If not used carefully, this option opens the danger of a "man-in-the-middle"
++# attack (the CommonName of this attacker is logged).
++#
++# smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes
++
++# As generally trying TLS can be a bad idea (some hosts offer STARTTLS but
++# the negotiation will fail leading to unexplainable failures, it may be
++# a good idea to decide based on the recipient or the mailhub to which you are
++# connecting.
++#
++# Deciding per recipient may be difficult, since a singe email can have
++# several recipients. We use the "nexthop" mechanism inside postfix.
++# When an email is to be delivered, the "nexthop" is obtained. If it matches
++# an entry in the smtp_tls_per_site list, appropriate action is taken.
++# Since entries in the transport table or the use of a relay_host override
++# the nexthop setting, in these cases the relay_host etc must be listed
++# in the table. In any case, the hostname of the peer to be contacted is
++# looked up (that is: the MX or the name of the host, if no MX is given).
++#
++# Special hint for enforcement mode:
++# Since there is no secure mechanism for DNS lookups available, the
++# recommended setup is: put the sensible domains with their mailhost
++# into the transport table (since you can asure security of this table
++# unlike DNS), then set MUST mode for this mailhost.
++#
++# Format of the table:
++# The keys entries are on the left hand side, no wildcards allowed. On the
++# right hand side the keywords NONE (don't use TLS at all), MAY (try to use
++# STARTTLS if offered, no problem if not), MUST (enforce usage of STARTTLS,
++# check server certificate CommonName against server FQDN), MUST_NOPEERMATCH
++# (enforce usage of STARTTLS and verify certificate, but ignore differences
++# between CommonName and server FQDN).
++# dom.ain NONE
++# host.dom.ain MAY
++# important.host MUST
++# some.host.dom.ain MUST_NOPEERMATCH
++#
++# If an entry is not matched, the default policy is applied; if the default
++# policy is "enforce", NONE explicitely switches it off, otherwise the
++# "enforce" mode is used even for MAY entries.
++#
++smtp_tls_per_site = hash:/etc/postfix/tls_per_site
++
++# The verification depth for server certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
++# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
++# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
++# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
++#
++# smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth = 5
++
++# As we decide on a "per site" basis, wether to use TLS or not, it would be
++# good to have a list of sites, that offered "STARTTLS'. We can collect it
++# ourselves with this option.
++#
++# If activated and TLS is not already enabled for this host, a line is added
++# to the logfile:
++# postfix/smtp[pid]: Host offered STARTTLS: [name.of.host]
++#
++smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer = yes
++
++# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
++# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
++# documentation.
++# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
++# (openssl-)compiled in default!
++#
++# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
++#
++# smtp_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
++
++# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
++# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
++#
++# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
++# the mail exchanger list.
++#
++# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
++
++# In order to seed the PRNG Pseude Random Number Generator, random data is
++# needed. The PRNG pool is maintained by the "tlsmgr" daemon and is used
++# (read) by the smtp[d] processes after adding some more entropy by stirring
++# in time and process id.
++# The file, which is from time to time rewritten by the tlsmgr, is created
++# if not existant. A default value is given; the default should probably
++# be on the /var partition but _not_ inside chroot jail.
++#
++# tls_random_exchange_name = /etc/postfix/prng_exch
++
++# To feed the PRNG pool, entropy is being read from an external source,
++# both at startup and during run.
++# Specify a good entropy source here, like EGD or /dev/urandom; make sure
++# to only use non-blocking sources.
++# In both cases, 32 bytes are read at each re-seeding event (which is an
++# amount of 256bits and hence good enough for 128bit symmetric keys).
++# You must specify the type of source: "dev:" for a device special file
++# or "egd:" for a source with EGD compatible socket interface. A maximum
++# 255 bytes is read from these sources in each step.
++# If you specify a normal file, a larger amount of data can be read.
++#
++# The entropy source is queried again after a certain amount of time. The
++# time is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time specified,
++# default is a maximum of 1 hour.
++#
++# tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
++tls_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
++# tls_random_bytes = 32
++# tls_random_reseed_period = 3600s
++
++# The PRNG pool inside tlsmgr is used to re-generate the 1024 byte file
++# being read by smtp[d]. The time, after which the exchange file is
++# rewritten is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time
++# specified, default is a maximum of 60 seconds.
++#
++# tls_random_upd_period = 60s
++
++# If you have a entropy source available, that is not easily drained (like
++# /dev/urandom), the daemons can also load additional entropy on startup from
++# the source specified. By default an amount of 32 bytes is read, the
++# equivalent to 256 bits. This is more than enough to generate a 128bit
++# (or 168bit) session key, but we may have to generate more than one.
++# Usage of this option may drain EGD (consider the case of 50 smtp starting
++# up with a full queue and "postfix start", which will request 1600bytes
++# of entropy). This is however not fatal, as long as "entropy" data could
++# be read from the exchange file.
++#
++# tls_daemon_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
++tls_daemon_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
++# tls_daemon_random_bytes = 32
++
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/makedefs postfix-1.1.11-20020613/makedefs
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/makedefs Sat May 4 15:36:19 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/makedefs Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -52,6 +52,21 @@
+ SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`
+ RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null`
+ VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null`
++if test -f /usr/include/netinet6/in6.h; then
++ grep __KAME__ /usr/include/netinet6/in6.h 2>&1 >/dev/null
++ if [ $? = 1 ]; then
++ INET6=
++ else
++ if [ -f /usr/local/v6/lib/libinet6.a ]; then
++ INET6=kame
++ else
++ INET6=kame-merged
++ fi
++ fi
++fi
++if [ -z "$INET6" -a -f /usr/include/netinet/ip6.h -a -f /usr/include/linux/icmpv6.h ]; then
++ INET6=linux
++fi
+
+ case "$VERSION" in
+ dcosx*) SYSTEM=$VERSION;;
+@@ -295,6 +310,26 @@
+ esac
+
+ : ${CC='gcc $(WARN)'} ${OPT='-O'} ${DEBUG='-g'} ${AWK=awk}
++
++case "$INET6" in
++kame)
++ CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family -D__ss_len=ss_len"
++ if test -f /usr/local/v6/lib/libinet6.a; then
++ SYSLIBS="$SYSLIBS -L/usr/local/v6/lib -linet6"
++ fi
++ ;;
++kame-merged)
++ CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family -D__ss_len=ss_len"
++ ;;
++linux)
++ CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family"
++ if test -f /usr/include/libinet6/netinet/ip6.h -a \
++ -f /usr/lib/libinet6.a; then
++ CCARGS="$CCARGS -I/usr/include/libinet6 -DUSAGI_LIBINET6"
++ SYSLIBS="$SYSLIBS -linet6"
++ fi
++ ;;
++esac
+
+ export SYSTYPE AR ARFL RANLIB SYSLIBS CC OPT DEBUG AWK OPTS
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 postfix-1.1.11-20020613/man/man8/tlsmgr.8
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH TLSMGR 8
++.ad
++.fi
++.SH NAME
++tlsmgr
++\-
++Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++.na
++.nf
++\fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++.ad
++.fi
++The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
++files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
++and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
++
++The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
++OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
++is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
++/dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
++run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
++using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
++[0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
++having a default of 1 hour.
++
++Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
++connect to the entropy source at startup.
++
++The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
++session cache and timevalues.
++
++Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
++entropy already collected during previous runs.
++
++From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
++sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
++periodically with the time changing randomly from
++[0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
++.SH STANDARDS
++.na
++.nf
++.SH SECURITY
++.na
++.nf
++.ad
++.fi
++Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
++to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
++cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
++touch the contents of the cached data.
++.SH DIAGNOSTICS
++.ad
++.fi
++Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
++.SH BUGS
++.ad
++.fi
++There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
++session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
++.SH CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
++.na
++.nf
++.ad
++.fi
++The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
++this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
++and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
++a configuration change.
++.SH Session Cache
++.ad
++.fi
++.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
++Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
++cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
++.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
++older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
++performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
++.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
++Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
++cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
++.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
++older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
++performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
++.SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
++.ad
++.fi
++.IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
++Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
++from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
++name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
++dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
++tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
++\fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
++.IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
++Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
++Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
++.IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
++Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
++startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
++/etc/postfix/prng_exch.
++.IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
++Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
++This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
++with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
++value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
++.IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
++Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
++pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
++in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
++between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
++.SH SEE ALSO
++.na
++.nf
++smtp(8) SMTP client
++smtpd(8) SMTP server
++.SH LICENSE
++.na
++.nf
++.ad
++.fi
++The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
++.SH AUTHOR(S)
++.na
++.nf
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/dns/dns_lookup.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/dns/dns_lookup.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/dns/dns_lookup.c Sun Feb 4 19:16:20 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/dns/dns_lookup.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@
+ } DNS_REPLY;
+
+ #define INET_ADDR_LEN 4 /* XXX */
++#ifdef INET6
++#define INET6_ADDR_LEN 16
++#endif
+
+ /* dns_query - query name server and pre-parse the reply */
+
+@@ -337,6 +340,19 @@
+ memcpy(temp, pos, fixed->length);
+ data_len = fixed->length;
+ break;
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ if (fixed->length != INET6_ADDR_LEN) {
++ msg_warn("extract_answer: bad IPv6 address length: %d", fixed->length);
++ return (0);
++ }
++ if (fixed->length > sizeof(temp))
++ msg_panic("dns_get_rr: length %d > DNS_NAME_LEN",
++ fixed->length);
++ memcpy(temp, pos, fixed->length);
++ data_len = fixed->length;
++ break;
++#endif
+ case T_TXT:
+ data_len = MIN2(pos[0] + 1, MIN2(fixed->length + 1, sizeof(temp)));
+ for (src = pos + 1, dst = (unsigned char *) (temp);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/Makefile.in Tue Jun 11 03:13:13 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ tok822_resolve.c tok822_rewrite.c tok822_tree.c xtext.c bounce_log.c \
+ flush_clnt.c mail_conf_time.c mbox_conf.c mbox_open.c abounce.c \
+ verp_sender.c match_parent_style.c mime_state.c header_token.c \
+- strip_addr.c
++ strip_addr.c pfixtls.c wildcard_inet_addr.c
+ OBJS = been_here.o bounce.o canon_addr.o cleanup_strerror.o clnt_stream.o \
+ debug_peer.o debug_process.o defer.o deliver_completed.o \
+ deliver_flock.o deliver_pass.o deliver_request.o domain_list.o \
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
+ tok822_resolve.o tok822_rewrite.o tok822_tree.o xtext.o bounce_log.o \
+ flush_clnt.o mail_conf_time.o mbox_conf.o mbox_open.o abounce.o \
+ verp_sender.o match_parent_style.o mime_state.o header_token.o \
+- strip_addr.o
++ strip_addr.o pfixtls.o wildcard_inet_addr.o
+ HDRS = been_here.h bounce.h canon_addr.h cleanup_user.h clnt_stream.h \
+ config.h debug_peer.h debug_process.h defer.h deliver_completed.h \
+ deliver_flock.h deliver_pass.h deliver_request.h domain_list.h \
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
+ sys_exits.h timed_ipc.h tok822.h xtext.h bounce_log.h flush_clnt.h \
+ mbox_conf.h mbox_open.h abounce.h qmqp_proto.h verp_sender.h \
+ match_parent_style.h quote_flags.h mime_state.h header_token.h \
+- lex_822.h strip_addr.h
++ lex_822.h strip_addr.h pfixtls.h wildcard_inet_addr.h
+ TESTSRC = rec2stream.c stream2rec.c recdump.c
+ WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
+ -Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
+@@ -1160,3 +1160,16 @@
+ xtext.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+ xtext.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+ xtext.o: xtext.h
++pfixtls.o: pfixtls.c
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstring.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstream.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/dict.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/myflock.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/stringops.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/msg.h
++pfixtls.o: ../../include/connect.h
++pfixtls.o: mail_params.h
++pfixtls.o: pfixtls.h
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_params.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.c Sat Jun 8 20:21:40 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_params.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -223,6 +223,31 @@
+ int var_in_flow_delay;
+ char *var_par_dom_match;
+ char *var_config_dirs;
++char *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
++int var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
++char *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
++int var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
++char *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
++char *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
++char *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
++char *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
++char *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
++char *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
++char *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
++int var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
++char *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
++int var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
++char *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
++int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+
+ char *var_import_environ;
+ char *var_export_environ;
+@@ -467,6 +492,26 @@
+ VAR_SHOWQ_SERVICE, DEF_SHOWQ_SERVICE, &var_showq_service, 1, 0,
+ VAR_ERROR_SERVICE, DEF_ERROR_SERVICE, &var_error_service, 1, 0,
+ VAR_FLUSH_SERVICE, DEF_FLUSH_SERVICE, &var_flush_service, 1, 0,
++ VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, &var_tls_rand_exch_name, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtp_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtp_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtp_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
++ VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_daemon_rand_source, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_STR_FN_TABLE function_str_defaults_2[] = {
+@@ -489,6 +534,9 @@
+ VAR_TOKEN_LIMIT, DEF_TOKEN_LIMIT, &var_token_limit, 1, 0,
+ VAR_MIME_MAXDEPTH, DEF_MIME_MAXDEPTH, &var_mime_maxdepth, 1, 0,
+ VAR_MIME_BOUND_LEN, DEF_MIME_BOUND_LEN, &var_mime_bound_len, 1, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtp_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
++ VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_defaults[] = {
+@@ -499,6 +547,8 @@
+ VAR_FORK_DELAY, DEF_FORK_DELAY, &var_fork_delay, 1, 0,
+ VAR_FLOCK_DELAY, DEF_FLOCK_DELAY, &var_flock_delay, 1, 0,
+ VAR_FLOCK_STALE, DEF_FLOCK_STALE, &var_flock_stale, 1, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
+ VAR_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, DEF_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, &var_daemon_timeout, 1, 0,
+ VAR_IN_FLOW_DELAY, DEF_IN_FLOW_DELAY, &var_in_flow_delay, 0, 10,
+ 0,
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_params.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.h Mon Jun 10 19:49:56 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_params.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -458,6 +458,34 @@
+ #define DEF_DUP_FILTER_LIMIT 1000
+ extern int var_dup_filter_limit;
+
++#define VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME "tls_random_exchange_name"
++#define DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME "${config_directory}/prng_exch"
++extern char *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE "tls_random_source"
++#define DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE ""
++extern char *var_tls_rand_source;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES "tls_random_bytes"
++#define DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES 32
++extern int var_tls_rand_bytes;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE "tls_daemon_random_source"
++#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE ""
++extern char *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES "tls_daemon_random_bytes"
++#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES 32
++extern int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD "tls_random_reseed_period"
++#define DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD "3600s"
++extern int var_tls_reseed_period;
++
++#define VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD "tls_random_prng_update_period"
++#define DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD "60s"
++extern int var_tls_prng_upd_period;
++
+ /*
+ * Queue manager: relocated databases.
+ */
+@@ -678,6 +706,10 @@
+ #define DEF_SMTP_HELO_TMOUT "300s"
+ extern int var_smtp_helo_tmout;
+
++#define VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT "smtp_starttls_timeout"
++#define DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT "300s"
++extern int var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
++
+ #define VAR_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT "smtp_mail_timeout"
+ #define DEF_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT "300s"
+ extern int var_smtp_mail_tmout;
+@@ -734,6 +766,12 @@
+ #define DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR ""
+ extern char *var_smtp_bind_addr;
+
++#ifdef INET6
++#define VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6 "smtp_bind_address6"
++#define DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6 ""
++extern char *var_smtp_bind_addr6;
++#endif
++
+ #define VAR_SMTP_HELO_NAME "smtp_helo_name"
+ #define DEF_SMTP_HELO_NAME "$myhostname"
+ extern char *var_smtp_helo_name;
+@@ -767,6 +805,10 @@
+ #define DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT "300s"
+ extern int var_smtpd_tmout;
+
++#define VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "smtpd_starttls_timeout"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "300s"
++extern int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
++
+ #define VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT "smtpd_recipient_limit"
+ #define DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT 1000
+ extern int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
+@@ -795,6 +837,150 @@
+ #define DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS ""
+ extern char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
+
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER "smtpd_tls_wrappermode"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS "smtpd_use_tls"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_use_tls;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS "smtpd_enforce_tls"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY "smtpd_tls_auth_only"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT "smtpd_tls_ask_ccert"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT "smtpd_tls_req_ccert"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD "smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD 5
++extern int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE "smtpd_tls_cert_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE "smtpd_tls_key_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE "$smtpd_tls_cert_file"
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE "smtpd_tls_dkey_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE "$smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE "smtpd_tls_CAfile"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH "smtpd_tls_CApath"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST "smtpd_tls_cipherlist"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE "smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE "smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL "smtpd_tls_loglevel"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL 0
++extern int var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD "smtpd_tls_received_header"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD 0
++extern bool var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB "smtpd_tls_session_cache_database"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB ""
++extern char *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
++
++#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME "smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout"
++#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME "3600s"
++extern int var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE "smtp_tls_per_site"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS "smtp_use_tls"
++#define DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS 0
++extern bool var_smtp_use_tls;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS "smtp_enforce_tls"
++#define DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS 0
++extern bool var_smtp_enforce_tls;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN "smtp_tls_enforce_peername"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN 1
++extern bool var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD "smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD 5
++extern int var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE "smtp_tls_cert_file"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE "smtp_tls_key_file"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE "$smtp_tls_cert_file"
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtp_tls_dcert_file"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE "smtp_tls_dkey_file"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE "$smtp_tls_dcert_file"
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE "smtp_tls_CAfile"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH "smtp_tls_CApath"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST "smtp_tls_cipherlist"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL "smtp_tls_loglevel"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL 0
++extern int var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER "smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER 0
++extern bool var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB "smtp_tls_session_cache_database"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB ""
++extern char *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
++
++#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME "smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout"
++#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME "3600s"
++extern int var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
++
+ /*
+ * SASL authentication support, SMTP server side.
+ */
+@@ -953,6 +1139,16 @@
+ #define DEF_LMTP_QUIT_TMOUT "300s"
+ extern int var_lmtp_quit_tmout;
+
++#define VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR "lmtp_bind_address"
++#define DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR ""
++extern char *var_lmtp_bind_addr;
++
++#ifdef INET6
++#define VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6 "lmtp_bind_address6"
++#define DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6 ""
++extern char *var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Cleanup service. Header info that exceeds $header_size_limit bytes forces
+ * the start of the message body.
+@@ -1088,6 +1284,10 @@
+ #define DEF_RELAY_DOMAINS "$mydestination"
+ extern char *var_relay_domains;
+
++#define VAR_RELAY_CCERTS "relay_clientcerts"
++#define DEF_RELAY_CCERTS ""
++extern char *var_relay_ccerts;
++
+ #define VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS "smtpd_client_restrictions"
+ #define DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS ""
+ extern char *var_client_checks;
+@@ -1167,6 +1367,8 @@
+ #define PERMIT_AUTH_DEST "permit_auth_destination"
+ #define REJECT_UNAUTH_DEST "reject_unauth_destination"
+ #define CHECK_RELAY_DOMAINS "check_relay_domains"
++#define PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS "permit_tls_clientcerts"
++#define PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS "permit_tls_all_clientcerts"
+ #define VAR_RELAY_CODE "relay_domains_reject_code"
+ #define DEF_RELAY_CODE 554
+ extern int var_relay_code;
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_proto.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_proto.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_proto.h Sun May 12 16:46:59 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_proto.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_LOCAL "local"
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_PICKUP "pickup"
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_QUEUE "qmgr"
++#define MAIL_SERVICE_TLSMGR "tlsmgr"
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_RESOLVE "resolve"
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_REWRITE "rewrite"
+ #define MAIL_SERVICE_VIRTUAL "virtual"
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mynetworks.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mynetworks.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mynetworks.c Sun Feb 25 02:46:07 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mynetworks.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
+ #include <vstring.h>
+ #include <inet_addr_list.h>
+ #include <name_mask.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
++#endif
+
+ /* Global library. */
+
+@@ -75,6 +80,9 @@
+ const char *mynetworks(void)
+ {
+ static VSTRING *result;
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++#endif
+
+ if (result == 0) {
+ char *myname = "mynetworks";
+@@ -87,6 +95,9 @@
+ int junk;
+ int i;
+ int mask_style;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++#endif
+
+ mask_style = name_mask("mynetworks mask style", mask_styles,
+ var_mynetworks_style);
+@@ -96,8 +107,19 @@
+ my_mask_list = own_inet_mask_list();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < my_addr_list->used; i++) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr_list->addrs[i];
++ if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET) {
++ if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6)
++ vstring_sprintf_append(result, "XAATODOmynetworks ");
++ continue;
++ }
++ addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr.s_addr);
++ mask = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)&my_mask_list->addrs[i])->sin_addr.s_addr);
++#else
+ addr = ntohl(my_addr_list->addrs[i].s_addr);
+ mask = ntohl(my_mask_list->addrs[i].s_addr);
++#endif
+
+ switch (mask_style) {
+
+@@ -119,8 +141,15 @@
+ mask = IN_CLASSD_NET;
+ shift = IN_CLASSD_NSHIFT;
+ } else {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST))
++ strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
++ msg_fatal("%s: bad address class: %s", myname, hbuf);
++#else
+ msg_fatal("%s: bad address class: %s",
+ myname, inet_ntoa(my_addr_list->addrs[i]));
++#endif
+ }
+ break;
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.c Tue Jul 31 20:38:29 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
+@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
+ #include <strings.h>
+@@ -101,10 +105,11 @@
+ */
+ else {
+ bufp = hosts = mystrdup(var_inet_interfaces);
+- while ((host = mystrtok(&bufp, sep)) != 0)
++ while ((host = mystrtok(&bufp, sep)) != 0) {
+ if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, host) == 0)
+ msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
+ VAR_INET_INTERFACES, host);
++ }
+ myfree(hosts);
+
+ /*
+@@ -121,15 +126,39 @@
+ msg_fatal("could not find any active network interfaces");
+ for (nvirtual = 0; nvirtual < addr_list->used; nvirtual++) {
+ for (nlocal = 0; /* see below */ ; nlocal++) {
+- if (nlocal >= local_addrs.used)
++ if (nlocal >= local_addrs.used) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr_list->addrs[nvirtual],
++ SS_LEN(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]), hbuf,
++ sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
++ strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
++ msg_fatal("parameter %s: no local interface found for %s",
++ VAR_INET_INTERFACES, hbuf);
++#else
+ msg_fatal("parameter %s: no local interface found for %s",
+ VAR_INET_INTERFACES,
+ inet_ntoa(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]));
++#endif
++ }
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (addr_list->addrs[nvirtual].ss_family ==
++ local_addrs.addrs[nlocal].ss_family &&
++ SS_LEN(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]) ==
++ SS_LEN(local_addrs.addrs[nlocal]) &&
++ memcmp(&addr_list->addrs[nvirtual],
++ &local_addrs.addrs[nlocal],
++ SS_LEN(local_addrs.addrs[nlocal])) == 0) {
++ inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, (struct sockaddr *)&local_masks.addrs[nlocal]);
++ break;
++ }
++#else
+ if (addr_list->addrs[nvirtual].s_addr
+ == local_addrs.addrs[nlocal].s_addr) {
+ inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, &local_masks.addrs[nlocal]);
+ break;
+ }
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+ inet_addr_list_free(&local_addrs);
+@@ -139,6 +168,42 @@
+
+ /* own_inet_addr - is this my own internet address */
+
++#ifdef INET6
++int own_inet_addr(struct sockaddr * addr)
++{
++ int i;
++ char *p, *q;
++ int l;
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++
++ if (addr_list.used == 0)
++ own_inet_addr_init(&addr_list, &mask_list);
++
++ for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
++ if (addr->sa_family != sa->sa_family)
++ continue;
++ switch (addr->sa_family) {
++ case AF_INET:
++ p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr;
++ q = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr_list.addrs[i])->sin_addr;
++ l = sizeof(struct in_addr);
++ break;
++ case AF_INET6:
++ /* XXX scope */
++ p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_addr;
++ q = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr_list.addrs[i])->sin6_addr;
++ l = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
++ break;
++ default:
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (memcmp(p, q, l) == 0)
++ return (1);
++ }
++ return (0);
++}
++#else
+ int own_inet_addr(struct in_addr * addr)
+ {
+ int i;
+@@ -149,8 +214,8 @@
+ for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++)
+ if (addr->s_addr == addr_list.addrs[i].s_addr)
+ return (1);
+- return (0);
+ }
++#endif
+
+ /* own_inet_addr_list - return list of addresses */
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.h Sat Feb 24 02:25:32 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -15,11 +15,18 @@
+ * System library.
+ */
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * External interface.
+ */
++#ifdef INET6
++extern int own_inet_addr(struct sockaddr *);
++#else
+ extern int own_inet_addr(struct in_addr *);
++#endif
+ extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *own_inet_addr_list(void);
+ extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *own_inet_mask_list(void);
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/peer_name.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.c Sun Jan 28 16:23:02 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/peer_name.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -69,12 +69,32 @@
+ PEER_NAME *peer_name(int sock)
+ {
+ static PEER_NAME peer;
+- struct sockaddr_in sin;
+- SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
++ union sockunion {
++ struct {
++ u_char si_len;
++ u_char si_family;
++ u_short si_port;
++ } su_si;
++ struct sockaddr peer_un;
++ struct sockaddr_in peer_un4;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in6 peer_un6;
++#endif
++ } p_un;
++#define sun p_un.peer_un
++#define sin p_un.peer_un4
++#ifdef INET6
++#define sin6 p_un.peer_un6
++ static char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ static char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++#else
+ struct hostent *hp;
++#endif
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(p_un);
+
+- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) == 0) {
+- switch (sin.sin_family) {
++ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&p_un, &len) == 0) {
++ switch (p_un.peer_un.sa_family) {
++#ifndef INET6
+ case AF_INET:
+ peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET;
+ hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
+@@ -83,6 +103,24 @@
+ hp->h_name : "unknown");
+ peer.addr = inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr);
+ return (&peer);
++#else
++ case AF_INET:
++ peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET;
++ if (getnameinfo(&sun, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0)
++ peer.name = "unknown";
++ else
++ peer.name = hbuf;
++ peer.addr = abuf;
++ return (&peer);
++ case AF_INET6:
++ peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET6;
++ if (getnameinfo(&sun, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0)
++ peer.name = "unknown";
++ else
++ peer.name = hbuf;
++ peer.addr = abuf;
++ return (&peer);
++#endif
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ peer.type = PEER_TYPE_LOCAL;
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/peer_name.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.h Fri Dec 11 19:55:32 1998
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/peer_name.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
+ #define PEER_TYPE_UNKNOWN 0
+ #define PEER_TYPE_INET 1
+ #define PEER_TYPE_LOCAL 2
++#ifdef INET6
++#define PEER_TYPE_INET6 3
++#endif
+
+ extern PEER_NAME *peer_name(int);
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/pfixtls.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,2742 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* pfixtls
++/* SUMMARY
++/* interface to openssl routines
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <pfixtls.h>
++/*
++/* const long scache_db_version;
++/* const long openssl_version;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_serverengine;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_clientengine;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_timed_read(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context)
++/* int fd;
++/* void *buf;
++/* unsigned len;
++/* int timeout;
++/* void *context;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_timed_write(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context);
++/* int fd;
++/* void *buf;
++/* unsigned len;
++/* int timeout;
++/* void *context;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_init_serverengine(verifydepth, askcert);
++/* int verifydepth;
++/* int askcert;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_start_servertls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
++/* tls_info, requirecert);
++/* VSTREAM *stream;
++/* int timeout;
++/* const char *peername;
++/* const char *peeraddr;
++/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
++/* int requirecert;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_stop_servertls(stream, failure, tls_info);
++/* VSTREAM *stream;
++/* int failure;
++/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_init_clientengine(verifydepth);
++/* int verifydepth;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_start_clienttls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
++/* tls_info);
++/* VSTREAM *stream;
++/* int timeout;
++/* const char *peername;
++/* const char *peeraddr;
++/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
++/*
++/* int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(stream, failure, tls_info);
++/* VSTREAM *stream;
++/* int failure;
++/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
++/*
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* This module is the interface between Postfix and the OpenSSL library.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_timed_read() reads the requested number of bytes calling
++/* SSL_read(). pfixtls_time_read() will only be called indirect
++/* as a VSTREAM_FN function.
++/* pfixtls_timed_write() is the corresponding write function.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_init_serverengine() is called once when smtpd is started
++/* in order to initialize as much of the TLS stuff as possible.
++/* The certificate handling is also decided during the setup phase,
++/* so that a peer specific handling is not possible.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_init_clientengine() is the corresponding function called
++/* in smtp. Here we take the peer's (server's) certificate in any
++/* case.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_start_servertls() activates the TLS feature for the VSTREAM
++/* passed as argument. We expect that all buffers are flushed and the
++/* TLS handshake can begin immediately. Information about the peer
++/* is stored into the tls_info structure passed as argument.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_stop_servertls() sends the "close notify" alert via
++/* SSL_shutdown() to the peer and resets all connection specific
++/* TLS data. As RFC2487 does not specify a seperate shutdown, it
++/* is supposed that the underlying TCP connection is shut down
++/* immediately afterwards, so we don't care about additional data
++/* coming through the channel.
++/* If the failure flag is set, the session is cleared from the cache.
++/*
++/* pfixtls_start_clienttls() and pfixtls_stop_clienttls() are the
++/* corresponding functions for smtp.
++/*
++/* Once the TLS connection is initiated, information about the TLS
++/* state is available via the tls_info structure:
++/* protocol holds the protocol name (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1),
++/* tls_info->cipher_name the cipher name (e.g. RC4/MD5),
++/* tls_info->cipher_usebits the number of bits actually used (e.g. 40),
++/* tls_info->cipher_algbits the number of bits the algorithm is based on
++/* (e.g. 128).
++/* The last two values may be different when talking to a crippled
++/* - ahem - export controled peer (e.g. 40/128).
++/*
++/* The status of the peer certificate verification is available in
++/* pfixtls_peer_verified. It is set to 1, when the certificate could
++/* be verified.
++/* If the peer offered a certifcate, part of the certificate data are
++/* available as:
++/* tls_info->peer_subject X509v3-oneline with the DN of the peer
++/* tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the peer
++/* tls_info->peer_issuer X509v3-oneline with the DN of the issuer
++/* tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the issuer
++/* tls_info->PEER_FINGERPRINT fingerprint of the certificate
++/*
++/* DESCRIPTION (SESSION CACHING)
++/* In order to achieve high performance when using a lot of connections
++/* with TLS, session caching is implemented. It reduces both the CPU load
++/* (less cryptograpic operations) and the network load (the amount of
++/* certificate data exchanged is reduced).
++/* Since postfix uses a setup of independent processes for receiving
++/* and sending email, the processes must exchange the session information.
++/* Several connections at the same time between the identical peers can
++/* occur, so uniqueness and race conditions have to be taken into
++/* account.
++/* I have checked both Apache-SSL (Ben Laurie), using a seperate "gcache"
++/* process and Apache mod_ssl (Ralf S. Engelshall), using shared memory
++/* between several identical processes spawned from one parent.
++/*
++/* Postfix/TLS uses a database approach based on the internal "dict"
++/* interface. Since the session cache information is approximately
++/* 1300 bytes binary data, it will not fit into the dbm/ndbm model.
++/* It also needs write access to the database, ruling out most other
++/* interface, leaving Berkeley DB, which however cannot handle concurrent
++/* access by several processes. Hence a modified SDBM (public domain DBM)
++/* with enhanced buffer size is used and concurrent write capability
++/* is used. SDBM is part of Postfix/TLS.
++/*
++/* Realization:
++/* Both (client and server) session cache are realized by individual
++/* cache databases. A common database would not make sense, since the
++/* key criteria are different (session ID for server, peername for
++/* client).
++/*
++/* Server side:
++/* Session created by OpenSSL have a 32 byte session id, yielding a
++/* 64 char file name. I consider these sessions to be unique. If they
++/* are not, the last session will win, overwriting the older one in
++/* the database. Remember: everything that is lost is a temporary
++/* information and not more than a renegotiation will happen.
++/* Originating from the same client host, several sessions can come
++/* in (e.g. from several users sending mail with Netscape at the same
++/* time), so the session id is the correct identifier; the hostname
++/* is of no importance, here.
++/*
++/* Client side:
++/* We cannot recall sessions based on their session id, because we would
++/* have to check every session on disk for a matching server name, so
++/* the lookup has to be done based on the FQDN of the peer (receiving
++/* host).
++/* With regard to uniqueness, we might experience several open connections
++/* to the same server at the same time. This is even very likely to
++/* happen, since we might have several mails for the same destination
++/* in the queue, when a queue run is started. So several smtp's might
++/* negotiate sessions at the same time. We can however only save one
++/* session for one host.
++/* Like on the server side, the "last write" wins. The reason is
++/* quite simple. If we don't want to overwrite old sessions, an old
++/* session file will just stay in place until it is expired. In the
++/* meantime we would lose "fresh" session however. So we will keep the
++/* fresh one instead to avoid unnecessary renegotiations.
++/*
++/* Session lifetime:
++/* RFC2246 recommends a session lifetime of less than 24 hours. The
++/* default is 300 seconds (5 minutes) for OpenSSL and is also used
++/* this way in e.g. mod_ssl. The typical usage for emails might be
++/* humans typing in emails and sending them, which might take just
++/* a while, so I think 3600 seconds (1 hour) is a good compromise.
++/* If the environment is save (the cached session contains secret
++/* key data), one might even consider using a longer timeout. Anyway,
++/* since everlasting sessions must be avoided, the session timeout
++/* is done based on the creation date of the session and so each
++/* session will timeout eventually.
++/*
++/* Connection failures:
++/* RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong.
++/* Since the in-memory session cache of other smtp[d] processes cannot
++/* be controlled by simple means, we completely rely on the disc
++/* based session caching and remove all sessions from memory after
++/* connection closure.
++/*
++/* Cache cleanup:
++/* Since old entries have to be removed from the session cache, a
++/* cleanup process is needed that runs through the collected session
++/* files on regular basis. The task is performed by tlsmgr based on
++/* the timestamp created by pfixtls and included in the saved session,
++/* so that tlsmgr has not to care about the SSL_SESSION internal data.
++/*
++/* BUGS
++/* The memory allocation policy of the OpenSSL library is not well
++/* documented, especially when loading sessions from disc. Hence there
++/* might be memory leaks.
++/*
++/* LICENSE
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Lutz Jaenicke
++/* BTU Cottbus
++/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
++/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
++/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
++/*--*/
++
++/* System library. */
++
++#include <sys_defs.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/time.h> /* gettimeofday, not in POSIX */
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include <iostuff.h>
++#include <mymalloc.h>
++#include <vstring.h>
++#include <vstream.h>
++#include <dict.h>
++#include <myflock.h>
++#include <stringops.h>
++#include <msg.h>
++#include <connect.h>
++
++/* Application-specific. */
++
++#include "mail_params.h"
++#include "pfixtls.h"
++
++#define STR vstring_str
++
++const tls_info_t tls_info_zero = {
++ 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0
++};
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++
++/* OpenSSL library. */
++
++#include <openssl/lhash.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/ssl.h>
++
++/* We must keep some of the info available */
++static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
++
++/*
++ * When saving sessions, we want to make sure, that the lenght of the key
++ * is somehow limited. When saving client sessions, the hostname is used
++ * as key. According to HP-UX 10.20, MAXHOSTNAMELEN=64. Maybe new standards
++ * will increase this value, but as this will break compatiblity with existing
++ * implementations, we won't see this for long. We therefore choose a limit
++ * of 64 bytes.
++ * The length of the (TLS) session id can be up to 32 bytes according to
++ * RFC2246, so it fits well into the 64bytes limit.
++ */
++#define ID_MAXLENGTH 64 /* Max ID length in bytes */
++
++/*
++ * The session_id_context is set, such that the client knows which services
++ * on a host share the same session information (on the postfix host may
++ * as well run a TLS-enabled webserver.
++ */
++static char server_session_id_context[] = "Postfix/TLS"; /* anything will do */
++static int TLScontext_index = -1;
++static int TLSpeername_index = -1;
++static int do_dump = 0;
++static DH *dh_512 = NULL, *dh_1024 = NULL;
++static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++
++static int rand_exch_fd = -1;
++
++static DICT *scache_db = NULL;
++const long scache_db_version = 0x00000003L;
++const long openssl_version = OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER;
++
++
++int pfixtls_serverengine = 0;
++static int pfixtls_serveractive = 0; /* available or not */
++
++int pfixtls_clientengine = 0;
++static int pfixtls_clientactive = 0; /* available or not */
++
++/*
++ * Define a maxlength for certificate onelines. The length is checked by
++ * all routines when copying.
++ */
++#define CCERT_BUFSIZ 256
++
++typedef struct {
++ SSL *con;
++ BIO *internal_bio; /* postfix/TLS side of pair */
++ BIO *network_bio; /* netsork side of pair */
++ char peer_subject[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
++ char peer_issuer[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
++ char peer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
++ char issuer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
++ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3];
++ char peername_save[129];
++ int enforce_verify_errors;
++ int enforce_CN;
++} TLScontext_t;
++
++typedef struct {
++ int pid;
++ struct timeval tv;
++} randseed_t;
++
++static randseed_t randseed;
++
++/*
++ * Finally some "backup" DH-Parameters to be loaded, if no parameters are
++ * explicitely loaded from file.
++ */
++static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
++ 0x88, 0x3F, 0x00, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x8A, 0xB8, 0x35, 0xCD, 0xE5, 0xC2,
++ 0x0F, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x06, 0x3F, 0x16, 0x07, 0xBF, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x35, 0xE4,
++ 0x1C, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x50, 0x63, 0x67, 0x3E,
++ 0x10, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0xB4, 0xEB, 0x46, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x91, 0xA5,
++ 0x6E, 0x01, 0x45, 0xDE, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0x1F, 0x64, 0x54, 0xFA, 0xD9, 0xAB,
++ 0x4F, 0x70, 0xBA, 0x5B,
++};
++
++static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
++ 0x02,
++};
++
++static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
++ 0xB0, 0xFE, 0xB4, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x55, 0x07, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x88, 0x59, 0x0D,
++ 0x17, 0x26, 0xC5, 0x0C, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x92, 0x23, 0x81, 0x78, 0xDA, 0x88,
++ 0xAA, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x06, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xB8, 0x51,
++ 0x00, 0x9D, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x75, 0xAD, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x7E, 0x71, 0x4F,
++ 0x3F, 0x91, 0x54, 0x14, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1C, 0xEB, 0xDF, 0x72,
++ 0x9C, 0x4C, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x68, 0x3F, 0x94, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x76,
++ 0x89, 0x18, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x16, 0x90, 0x01, 0x99, 0x66, 0x8C, 0x53, 0x81,
++ 0x4E, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x99, 0xE7, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xD5, 0xEC, 0xE2, 0x7E,
++ 0xFA, 0xED, 0x01, 0x18, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x25, 0x59, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x39, 0xF6,
++ 0xCD, 0x49, 0x54, 0xAF, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xDF,
++ 0x6D, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0x9B,
++};
++
++static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
++ 0x02,
++};
++
++/*
++ * DESCRIPTION: Keeping control of the network interface using BIO-pairs.
++ *
++ * When the TLS layer is active, all input/output must be filtered through
++ * it. On the other hand to handle timeout conditions, full control over
++ * the network socket must be kept. This rules out the "normal way" of
++ * connecting the TLS layer directly to the socket.
++ * The TLS layer is realized with a BIO-pair:
++ *
++ * postfix | TLS-engine
++ * | |
++ * +--------> SSL_operations()
++ * | /\ ||
++ * | || \/
++ * | BIO-pair (internal_bio)
++ * +--------< BIO-pair (network_bio)
++ * | |
++ * socket |
++ *
++ * The normal postfix operations connect to the SSL operations to send
++ * and retrieve (cleartext) data. Inside the TLS-engine the data are converted
++ * to/from TLS protocol. The TLS functionality itself is only connected to
++ * the internal_bio and hence only has status information about this internal
++ * interface.
++ * Thus, if the SSL_operations() return successfully (SSL_ERROR_NONE) or want
++ * to read (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) there may as well be data inside the buffering
++ * BIO-pair. So whenever an SSL_operation() returns without a fatal error,
++ * the BIO-pair internal buffer must be flushed to the network.
++ * NOTE: This is especially true in the SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ case: the TLS-layer
++ * might want to read handshake data, that will never come since its own
++ * written data will only reach the peer after flushing the buffer!
++ *
++ * The BIO-pair buffer size has been set to 8192 bytes, this is an arbitrary
++ * value that can hold more data than the typical PMTU, so that it does
++ * not force the generation of packets smaller than necessary.
++ * It is also larger than the default VSTREAM_BUFSIZE (4096, see vstream.h),
++ * so that large write operations could be handled within one call.
++ * The internal buffer in the network/network_bio handling layer has been
++ * set to the same value, since this seems to be reasonable. The code is
++ * however able to handle arbitrary values smaller or larger than the
++ * buffer size in the BIO-pair.
++ */
++
++const ssize_t BIO_bufsiz = 8192;
++
++/*
++ * The interface layer between network and BIO-pair. The BIO-pair buffers
++ * the data to/from the TLS layer. Hence, at any time, there may be data
++ * in the buffer that must be written to the network. This writing has
++ * highest priority because the handshake might fail otherwise.
++ * Only then a read_request can be satisfied.
++ */
++static int network_biopair_interop(int fd, int timeout, BIO *network_bio)
++{
++ int want_write;
++ int num_write;
++ int write_pos;
++ int from_bio;
++ int want_read;
++ int num_read;
++ int to_bio;
++#define NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE 8192
++ char buffer[8192];
++
++ while ((want_write = BIO_ctrl_pending(network_bio)) > 0) {
++ if (want_write > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
++ want_write = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
++ from_bio = BIO_read(network_bio, buffer, want_write);
++
++ /*
++ * Write the complete contents of the buffer. Since TLS performs
++ * underlying handshaking, we cannot afford to leave the buffer
++ * unflushed, as we could run into a deadlock trap (the peer
++ * waiting for a final byte and we already waiting for his reply
++ * in read position).
++ */
++ write_pos = 0;
++ do {
++ if (timeout > 0 && write_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
++ return (-1);
++ num_write = write(fd, buffer + write_pos, from_bio - write_pos);
++ if (num_write <= 0)
++ return (-1); /* something happened to the socket */
++ write_pos += num_write;
++ } while (write_pos < from_bio);
++ }
++
++ while ((want_read = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(network_bio)) > 0) {
++ if (want_read > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
++ want_read = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
++ if (timeout > 0 && read_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
++ return (-1);
++ num_read = read(fd, buffer, want_read);
++ if (num_read <= 0)
++ return (-1); /* something happened to the socket */
++ to_bio = BIO_write(network_bio, buffer, num_read);
++ if (to_bio != num_read)
++ msg_fatal("to_bio != num_read");
++ }
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++static void pfixtls_print_errors(void);
++
++ /*
++ * Function to perform the handshake for SSL_accept(), SSL_connect(),
++ * and SSL_shutdown() and perform the SSL_read(), SSL_write() operations.
++ * Call the underlying network_biopair_interop-layer to make sure the
++ * write buffer is flushed after every operation (that did not fail with
++ * a fatal error).
++ */
++static int do_tls_operation(int fd, int timeout, TLScontext_t *TLScontext,
++ int (*hsfunc)(SSL *),
++ int (*rfunc)(SSL *, void *, int),
++ int (*wfunc)(SSL *, const void *, int),
++ char *buf, int num)
++{
++ int status;
++ int err;
++ int retval = 0;
++ int biop_retval;
++ int done = 0;
++
++ while (!done) {
++ if (hsfunc)
++ status = hsfunc(TLScontext->con);
++ else if (rfunc)
++ status = rfunc(TLScontext->con, buf, num);
++ else
++ status = wfunc(TLScontext->con, (const char *)buf, num);
++ err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
++
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090581fL)
++ /*
++ * There is a bug up to and including OpenSSL-0.9.5a: if an error
++ * occurs while checking the peers certificate due to some certificate
++ * error (e.g. as happend with a RSA-padding error), the error is put
++ * onto the error stack. If verification is not enforced, this error
++ * should be ignored, but the error-queue is not cleared, so we
++ * can find this error here. The bug has been fixed on May 28, 2000.
++ *
++ * This bug so far has only manifested as
++ * 4800:error:0407006A:rsa routines:RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1:block type is not 01:rsa_pk1.c:100:
++ * 4800:error:04067072:rsa routines:RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT:padding check failed:rsa_eay.c:396:
++ * 4800:error:0D079006:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_verify:bad get asn1 object call:a_verify.c:109:
++ * so that we specifically test for this error. We print the errors
++ * to the logfile and automatically clear the error queue. Then we
++ * retry to get another error code. We cannot do better, since we
++ * can only retrieve the last entry of the error-queue without
++ * actually cleaning it on the way.
++ *
++ * This workaround is secure, as verify_result is set to "failed"
++ * anyway.
++ */
++ if (err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
++ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0x0407006AL) {
++ pfixtls_print_errors(); /* Keep information for the logfile */
++ msg_info("OpenSSL <= 0.9.5a workaround called: certificate errors ignored");
++ err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++ switch (err) {
++ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* success */
++ retval = status;
++ done = 1; /* no break, flush buffer before */
++ /* leaving */
++ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
++ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
++ biop_retval = network_biopair_interop(fd, timeout,
++ TLScontext->network_bio);
++ if (biop_retval < 0)
++ return (-1); /* fatal network error */
++ break;
++ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* connection was closed cleanly */
++ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
++ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
++ default:
++ retval = status;
++ done = 1;
++ ;
++ }
++ };
++ return retval;
++}
++
++int pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned buf_len, int timeout,
++ void *context)
++{
++ int i;
++ int ret;
++ char mybuf[40];
++ char *mybuf2;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
++ if (!TLScontext)
++ msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_read() without TLS-context");
++
++ ret = do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, SSL_read, NULL,
++ (char *)buf, buf_len);
++ if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
++ (pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
++ mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
++ if (ret > 0) {
++ i = 0;
++ while ((i < 39) && (i < ret) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
++ mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
++ i++;
++ }
++ mybuf[i] = '\0';
++ msg_info("Read %d chars: %s", ret, mybuf);
++ }
++ }
++ return (ret);
++}
++
++int pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
++ void *context)
++{
++ int i;
++ char mybuf[40];
++ char *mybuf2;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
++ if (!TLScontext)
++ msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_write() without TLS-context");
++
++ if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
++ (pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
++ mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
++ if (len > 0) {
++ i = 0;
++ while ((i < 39) && (i < len) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
++ mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
++ i++;
++ }
++ mybuf[i] = '\0';
++ msg_info("Write %d chars: %s", len, mybuf);
++ }
++ }
++ return (do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, NULL, SSL_write,
++ buf, len));
++}
++
++/* Add some more entropy to the pool by adding the actual time */
++
++static void pfixtls_stir_seed(void)
++{
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
++ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
++}
++
++/*
++ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL crypto/err/err_prn.c.
++ * Query the error stack and print the error string into the logging facility.
++ * Clear the error stack on the way.
++ */
++
++static void pfixtls_print_errors(void)
++{
++ unsigned long l;
++ char buf[256];
++ const char *file;
++ const char *data;
++ int line;
++ int flags;
++ unsigned long es;
++
++ es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
++ while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
++ if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
++ msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
++ file, line, data);
++ else
++ msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
++ file, line);
++ }
++}
++
++ /*
++ * Set up the cert things on the server side. We do need both the
++ * private key (in key_file) and the cert (in cert_file).
++ * Both files may be identical.
++ *
++ * This function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
++ */
++
++static int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX * ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
++{
++ if (cert_file != NULL) {
++ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file) <= 0) {
++ msg_info("unable to get certificate from '%s'", cert_file);
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (0);
++ }
++ if (key_file == NULL)
++ key_file = cert_file;
++ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file,
++ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
++ msg_info("unable to get private key from '%s'", key_file);
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (0);
++ }
++ /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
++ * the SSL context */
++ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
++ msg_info("Private key does not match the certificate public key");
++ return (0);
++ }
++ }
++ return (1);
++}
++
++/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
++
++static RSA *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL * s, int export, int keylength)
++{
++ static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
++
++ if (rsa_tmp == NULL) {
++ rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
++ }
++ return (rsa_tmp);
++}
++
++
++static DH *get_dh512(void)
++{
++ DH *dh;
++
++ if (dh_512 == NULL) {
++ /* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
++ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
++ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
++ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
++ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
++ return(NULL);
++ else
++ dh_512 = dh;
++ }
++ return (dh_512);
++}
++
++static DH *get_dh1024(void)
++{
++ DH *dh;
++
++ if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
++ /* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
++ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
++ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
++ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
++ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
++ return(NULL);
++ else
++ dh_1024 = dh;
++ }
++ return (dh_1024);
++}
++
++/* partly inspired by mod_ssl */
++
++static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
++{
++ DH *dh_tmp = NULL;
++
++ if (export) {
++ if (keylength == 512)
++ dh_tmp = get_dh512(); /* export cipher */
++ else if (keylength == 1024)
++ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* normal */
++ else
++ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* not on-the-fly (too expensive) */
++ /* so use the 1024bit instead */
++ }
++ else {
++ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* sign-only certificate */
++ }
++ return (dh_tmp);
++}
++
++
++/*
++ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
++ *
++ * The verify_callback is called several times (directly or indirectly) from
++ * crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It is called as a last check for several issues,
++ * so this verify_callback() has the famous "last word". If it does return "0",
++ * the handshake is immediately shut down and the connection fails.
++ *
++ * Postfix/TLS has two modes, the "use" mode and the "enforce" mode:
++ *
++ * In the "use" mode we never want the connection to fail just because there is
++ * something wrong with the certificate (as we would have sent happily without
++ * TLS). Therefore the return value is always "1".
++ *
++ * In the "enforce" mode we can shut down the connection as soon as possible.
++ * In server mode TLS itself may be enforced (e.g. to protect passwords),
++ * but certificates are optional. In this case the handshake must not fail
++ * if we are unhappy with the certificate and return "1" in any case.
++ * Only if a certificate is required the certificate must pass the verification
++ * and failure to do so will result in immediate termination (return 0).
++ * In the client mode the decision is made with respect to the peername
++ * enforcement. If we strictly enforce the matching of the expected peername
++ * the verification must fail immediatly on verification errors. We can also
++ * immediatly check the expected peername, as it is the CommonName at level 0.
++ * In all other cases, the problem is logged, so the SSL_get_verify_result()
++ * will inform about the verification failure, but the handshake (and SMTP
++ * connection will continue).
++ *
++ * The only error condition not handled inside the OpenSSL-Library is the
++ * case of a too-long certificate chain, so we check inside verify_callback().
++ * We only take care of this problem, if "ok = 1", because otherwise the
++ * verification already failed because of another problem and we don't want
++ * to overwrite the other error message. And if the verification failed,
++ * there is no such thing as "more failed", "most failed"... :-)
++ */
++
++static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
++{
++ char buf[256];
++ char *CN_lowercase;
++ char *peername_left;
++ X509 *err_cert;
++ int err;
++ int depth;
++ int verify_depth;
++ int hostname_matched;
++ SSL *con;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++
++ err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
++
++ con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
++ TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);
++
++ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
++ if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
++ ((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
++ msg_info("Peer cert verify depth=%d %s", depth, buf);
++
++ verify_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con);
++ if (ok && (verify_depth >= 0) && (depth > verify_depth)) {
++ ok = 0;
++ err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
++ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
++ }
++ if (!ok) {
++ msg_info("verify error:num=%d:%s", err,
++ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
++ }
++
++ if (ok && (depth == 0) && pfixtls_clientengine) {
++ /*
++ * Check out the name certified against the hostname expected.
++ * In case it does not match, print an information about the result.
++ * If a matching is enforced, bump out with a verification error
++ * immediately.
++ */
++ buf[0] = '\0';
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
++ NID_commonName, buf, 256)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ CN_lowercase = lowercase(buf);
++ hostname_matched = 0;
++ if (!strcmp(TLScontext->peername_save, CN_lowercase))
++ hostname_matched = 1;
++ else if ((strlen(CN_lowercase) > 2) &&
++ (CN_lowercase[0] == '*') && (CN_lowercase[1] == '.')) {
++ /*
++ * Allow wildcard certificate matching. The proposed rules in
++ * RFCs (2818: HTTP/TLS, 2830: LDAP/TLS) are different, RFC2874
++ * does not specify a rule, so here the strict rule is applied.
++ * An asterisk '*' is allowed as the leftmost component and may
++ * replace the left most part of the hostname. Matching is done
++ * by removing '*.' from the wildcard name and the `name.` from
++ * the peername and compare what is left.
++ */
++ peername_left = strchr(TLScontext->peername_save, '.');
++ if (peername_left) {
++ if (!strcmp(peername_left + 1, CN_lowercase + 2))
++ hostname_matched = 1;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!hostname_matched) {
++ msg_info("Peer verification: CommonName in certificate does not match: %s != %s", CN_lowercase, TLScontext->peername_save);
++ if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN) {
++ err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
++ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
++ msg_info("Verify failure: Hostname mismatch");
++ ok = 0;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ switch (ctx->error) {
++ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
++ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
++ msg_info("issuer= %s", buf);
++ break;
++ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
++ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
++ msg_info("cert not yet valid");
++ break;
++ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
++ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
++ msg_info("cert has expired");
++ break;
++ }
++ if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
++ ((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
++ msg_info("verify return:%d", ok);
++
++ if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors)
++ return (ok);
++ else
++ return (1);
++}
++
++/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
++
++static void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL * s, int where, int ret)
++{
++ char *str;
++ int w;
++
++ w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
++
++ if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
++ str = "SSL_connect";
++ else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
++ str = "SSL_accept";
++ else
++ str = "undefined";
++
++ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
++ msg_info("%s:%s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
++ } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
++ str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
++ if ((ret & 0xff) != SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
++ msg_info("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", str,
++ SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
++ SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
++ } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
++ if (ret == 0)
++ msg_info("%s:failed in %s",
++ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
++ else if (ret < 0) {
++ msg_info("%s:error in %s",
++ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
++ }
++ }
++}
++
++/*
++ * taken from OpenSSL crypto/bio/b_dump.c, modified to save a lot of strcpy
++ * and strcat by Matti Aarnio.
++ */
++
++#define TRUNCATE
++#define DUMP_WIDTH 16
++
++static int pfixtls_dump(const char *s, int len)
++{
++ int ret = 0;
++ char buf[160 + 1];
++ char *ss;
++ int i;
++ int j;
++ int rows;
++ int trunc;
++ unsigned char ch;
++
++ trunc = 0;
++
++#ifdef TRUNCATE
++ for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
++ trunc++;
++#endif
++
++ rows = (len / DUMP_WIDTH);
++ if ((rows * DUMP_WIDTH) < len)
++ rows++;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
++ buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
++ ss = buf;
++
++ sprintf(ss, "%04x ", i * DUMP_WIDTH);
++ ss += strlen(ss);
++ for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
++ if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len) {
++ strcpy(ss, " ");
++ } else {
++ ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j))
++ & 0xff;
++ sprintf(ss, "%02x%c", ch, j == 7 ? '|' : ' ');
++ ss += 3;
++ }
++ }
++ ss += strlen(ss);
++ *ss++ = ' ';
++ for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
++ if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len)
++ break;
++ ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j)) & 0xff;
++ *ss++ = (((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
++ if (j == 7) *ss++ = ' ';
++ }
++ *ss = 0;
++ /*
++ * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that
++ * we will move the selection point in the debug window
++ */
++ msg_info("%s", buf);
++ ret += strlen(buf);
++ }
++#ifdef TRUNCATE
++ if (trunc > 0) {
++ sprintf(buf, "%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", len + trunc);
++ msg_info("%s", buf);
++ ret += strlen(buf);
++ }
++#endif
++ return (ret);
++}
++
++
++
++/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
++
++static long bio_dump_cb(BIO * bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
++ long argl, long ret)
++{
++ if (!do_dump)
++ return (ret);
++
++ if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
++ msg_info("read from %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))",
++ (unsigned int)bio, (unsigned long)argp, argi,
++ ret, (unsigned int)ret);
++ pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
++ return (ret);
++ } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
++ msg_info("write to %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))",
++ (unsigned int)bio, (unsigned long)argp, argi,
++ ret, (unsigned int)ret);
++ pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
++ }
++ return (ret);
++}
++
++
++ /*
++ * Callback to retrieve a session from the external session cache.
++ */
++static SSL_SESSION *get_session_cb(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *SessionID,
++ int length, int *copy)
++{
++ SSL_SESSION *session;
++ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
++ int n;
++ int uselength;
++ int hex_length;
++ const char *session_hex;
++ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
++ unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
++
++ if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
++ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
++ else
++ uselength = length;
++
++ for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
++ sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", SessionID[n]);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
++
++ session = NULL;
++
++ session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
++ if (session_hex) {
++ hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
++ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
++ if (!data) {
++ msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
++ return(NULL);
++ }
++
++ memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
++ for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
++ if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
++ nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
++ else
++ nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
++ if (n % 2)
++ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
++ else
++ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
++ * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
++ */
++ memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
++ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
++ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
++ (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
++ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
++ else {
++ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
++ session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
++ hex_length / 2 - sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
++ if (!session)
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ myfree((char *)data);
++ }
++
++ if (session && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3))
++ msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
++
++ return (session);
++}
++
++
++static SSL_SESSION *load_clnt_session(const char *hostname,
++ int enforce_peername)
++{
++ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
++ char idstring[ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
++ int n;
++ int uselength;
++ int length;
++ int hex_length;
++ const char *session_hex;
++ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
++ unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
++
++ length = strlen(hostname);
++ if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
++ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
++ else
++ uselength = length;
++
++ for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
++ idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
++ idstring[uselength] = '\0';
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
++
++ session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
++ if (session_hex) {
++ hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
++ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
++ if (!data) {
++ msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
++ return(NULL);
++ }
++
++ memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
++ for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
++ if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
++ nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
++ else
++ nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
++ if (n % 2)
++ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
++ else
++ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
++ * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
++ * When we enforce_peername, we may find an old session, that was
++ * saved when enforcement was not set. In this case the session will
++ * be removed and a fresh session will be negotiated.
++ */
++ memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
++ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
++ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
++ (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
++ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
++ else if (enforce_peername && (!scache_info.enforce_peername))
++ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
++ else {
++ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
++ session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
++ hex_length / 2 - sizeof(time_t));
++ strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
++ idstring, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
++ if (!session)
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ myfree((char *)data);
++ }
++
++ if (session && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3))
++ msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
++
++ return (session);
++}
++
++
++static void create_client_lookup_id(char *idstring, char *hostname)
++{
++ int n, len, uselength;
++
++ len = strlen(hostname);
++ if (len > ID_MAXLENGTH)
++ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
++ else
++ uselength = len;
++
++ for (n = 0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
++ idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
++ idstring[uselength] = '\0';
++}
++
++
++static void create_server_lookup_id(char *idstring, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++ int n, uselength;
++
++ if (session->session_id_length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
++ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
++ else
++ uselength = session->session_id_length;
++
++ for(n = 0; n < uselength ; n++)
++ sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", session->session_id[n]);
++}
++
++
++static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
++ char *hostname;
++
++ if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
++ hostname = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index);
++ create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
++ }
++ else {
++ create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
++ }
++
++ if (scache_db)
++ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
++}
++
++
++/*
++ * We need space to save the peername into the SSL_SESSION, as we must
++ * look up the external database for client sessions by peername, not
++ * by session id. We therefore allocate place for the peername string,
++ * when a new SSL_SESSION is generated. It is filled later.
++ */
++static int new_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
++ int idx, long argl, void *argp)
++{
++ char *peername;
++
++ peername = (char *)mymalloc(ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
++ if (!peername)
++ return 0;
++ peername[0] = '\0'; /* initialize */
++ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, idx, peername);
++}
++
++/*
++ * When the SSL_SESSION is removed again, we must free the memory to avoid
++ * leaks.
++ */
++static void free_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
++ int idx, long argl, void *argp)
++{
++ myfree(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, idx));
++}
++
++/*
++ * Duplicate application data, when a SSL_SESSION is duplicated
++ */
++static int dup_peername_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
++ void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
++{
++ char *peername_old, *peername_new;
++
++ peername_old = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, idx);
++ peername_new = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, idx);
++ if (!peername_old || !peername_new)
++ return 0;
++ memcpy(peername_new, peername_old, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
++ return 1;
++}
++
++
++ /*
++ * Save a new session to the external cache
++ */
++static int new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
++ int n;
++ int dsize;
++ int len;
++ unsigned char *data, *sess_data;
++ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
++ char *hexdata, *hostname;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++
++ if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
++ TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index);
++ hostname = TLScontext->peername_save;
++ create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
++ strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
++ hostname, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
++ /*
++ * Remember, whether peername matching was enforced when the session
++ * was created. If later enforce mode is enabled, we do not want to
++ * reuse a session that was not sufficiently checked.
++ */
++ scache_info.enforce_peername =
++ (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN);
++
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to save session for hostID to disc: %s", idstring);
++
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
++ /*
++ * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
++ * result in sessions for the client side.
++ * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
++ * but this bug is version specific, too.
++ *
++ * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
++ * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
++ * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
++ * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
++ */
++ session->verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
++#endif
++
++ }
++ else {
++ create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Trying to save Session to disc: %s", idstring);
++ }
++
++
++ /*
++ * Get the session and convert it into some "database" useable form.
++ * First, get the length of the session to allocate the memory.
++ */
++ dsize = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
++ if (dsize < 0) {
++ msg_info("Could not access session");
++ return 0;
++ }
++ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(dsize + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
++ if (!data) {
++ msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * OpenSSL is not robust against wrong session data (might SEGFAULT),
++ * so we secure it against version ids (session cache structure as well
++ * as OpenSSL version).
++ */
++ scache_info.scache_db_version = scache_db_version;
++ scache_info.openssl_version = openssl_version;
++
++ /*
++ * Put a timestamp, so that expiration can be checked without
++ * analyzing the session data itself. (We would need OpenSSL funtions,
++ * since the SSL_SESSION is a private structure.)
++ */
++ scache_info.timestamp = time(NULL);
++
++ memcpy(data, &scache_info, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
++ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
++
++ /*
++ * Now, obtain the session. Unfortunately, it is binary and dict_update
++ * cannot handle binary data (it could contain '\0' in it) directly.
++ * To save memory we could use base64 encoding. To make handling easier,
++ * we simply use hex format.
++ */
++ len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &sess_data);
++ len += sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
++
++ hexdata = (char *)mymalloc(2 * len + 1);
++
++ if (!hexdata) {
++ msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session (HEX)");
++ myfree((char *)data);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
++ hexdata[n * 2] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0xf0) >> 4];
++ hexdata[(n * 2) + 1] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0x0f)];
++ }
++ hexdata[len * 2] = '\0';
++
++ /*
++ * The session id is a hex string, all uppercase. We are using SDBM as
++ * compiled into Postfix with 8kB maximum entry size, so we set a limit
++ * when caching. If the session is not cached, we have to renegotiate,
++ * not more, not less. For a real session, this limit should never be
++ * met
++ */
++ if (strlen(idstring) + strlen(hexdata) < 8000)
++ dict_put(scache_db, idstring, hexdata);
++
++ myfree(hexdata);
++ myfree((char *)data);
++ return (1);
++}
++
++
++ /*
++ * pfixtls_exchange_seed: read bytes from the seed exchange-file (expect
++ * 1024 bytes)and immediately write back random bytes. Do so with EXCLUSIVE
++ * lock, so * that each process will find a completely different (and
++ * reseeded) file.
++ */
++static void pfixtls_exchange_seed(void)
++{
++ unsigned char buffer[1024];
++
++ if (rand_exch_fd == -1)
++ return;
++
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
++ msg_info("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++
++ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
++ if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
++ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
++
++ RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
++ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
++ if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
++ msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
++
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
++ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++}
++
++ /*
++ * This is the setup routine for the SSL server. As smtpd might be called
++ * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
++ *
++ * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_server.c.
++ */
++
++int pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert)
++{
++ int off = 0;
++ int verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
++ int rand_bytes;
++ int rand_source_dev_fd;
++ int rand_source_socket_fd;
++ unsigned char buffer[255];
++ char *CApath;
++ char *CAfile;
++ char *s_cert_file;
++ char *s_key_file;
++ char *s_dcert_file;
++ char *s_dkey_file;
++ FILE *paramfile;
++
++ if (pfixtls_serverengine)
++ return (0); /* already running */
++
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ msg_info("starting TLS engine");
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
++ * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
++ * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
++ * load the error_strings.
++ */
++ SSL_load_error_strings();
++ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
++
++ /*
++ * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
++ * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
++ * is not stored with the session data).
++ */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
++ needs_openssl_095_or_later();
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
++ */
++ randseed.pid = getpid();
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
++ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
++
++ /*
++ * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
++ * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
++ * the prng-exchange file anyway.
++ * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
++ * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
++ * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
++ * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
++ * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
++ */
++ if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
++ if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a random device
++ */
++ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
++ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
++ msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
++ read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ close(rand_source_dev_fd);
++ }
++ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
++ */
++ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
++ BLOCKING, 10);
++ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
++ msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
++ buffer[0] = 1;
++ buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
++ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
++ msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
++ msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
++ read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ }
++ close(rand_source_socket_fd);
++ }
++ } else {
++ RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
++ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
++ if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++ }
++
++ randseed.pid = getpid();
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
++ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
++
++ /*
++ * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
++ * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
++ * understands in the message.
++ * Netscape communicator can still communicate with SSLv2 servers, so it
++ * sends out a SSLv2 client hello. To deal with it, our server must be
++ * SSLv2 aware (even if we don't like SSLv2), so we need to have the
++ * SSLv23 server here. If we want to limit the protocol level, we can
++ * add an option to not use SSLv2/v3/TLSv1 later.
++ */
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
++ if (ctx == NULL) {
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ };
++
++ /*
++ * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
++ * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
++ * defined for TLS, but we also want to accept Netscape communicator
++ * requests, and it only supports SSLv3.
++ */
++ off |= SSL_OP_ALL; /* Work around all known bugs */
++ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
++
++ /*
++ * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
++ * communication on demand.
++ */
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
++
++ /*
++ * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
++ * (reasonable) default list is kept.
++ */
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
++ if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A server key, a
++ * server certificate, and the CA certificates for both the server
++ * cert and the verification of client certificates.
++ * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
++ * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
++ * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
++ * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
++ * values of the certificate.
++ * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
++ * read at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain
++ * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
++ * hand, the file is not really readable.
++ */
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CAfile) == 0)
++ CAfile = NULL;
++ else
++ CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CApath) == 0)
++ CApath = NULL;
++ else
++ CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
++
++ if (CAfile || CApath) {
++ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Now we load the certificate and key from the files and check,
++ * whether the cert matches the key (internally done by set_cert_stuff().
++ * We cannot run without (we do not support ADH anonymous Diffie-Hellman
++ * ciphers as of now).
++ * We can use RSA certificates ("cert") and DSA certificates ("dcert"),
++ * both can be made available at the same time. The CA certificates for
++ * both are handled in the same setup already finished.
++ * Which one is used depends on the cipher negotiated (that is: the first
++ * cipher listed by the client which does match the server). A client with
++ * RSA only (e.g. Netscape) will use the RSA certificate only.
++ * A client with openssl-library will use RSA first if not especially
++ * changed in the cipher setup.
++ */
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file) == 0)
++ s_cert_file = NULL;
++ else
++ s_cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_key_file) == 0)
++ s_key_file = NULL;
++ else
++ s_key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
++
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file) == 0)
++ s_dcert_file = NULL;
++ else
++ s_dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file) == 0)
++ s_dkey_file = NULL;
++ else
++ s_dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
++
++ if (s_cert_file) {
++ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_cert_file, s_key_file)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load RSA cert/key data");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ }
++ if (s_dcert_file) {
++ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_dcert_file, s_dkey_file)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load DSA cert/key data");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ }
++ if (!s_cert_file && !s_dcert_file) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: do need at least RSA _or_ DSA cert/key data");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
++ * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
++ * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
++ * just do it.
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
++
++ /*
++ * We might also need dh parameters, which can either be loaded from
++ * file (preferred) or we simply take the compiled in values.
++ * First, set the callback that will select the values when requested,
++ * then load the (possibly) available DH parameters from files.
++ * We are generous with the error handling, since we do have default
++ * values compiled in, so we will not abort but just log the error message.
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, tmp_dh_cb);
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file) != 0) {
++ if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
++ dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ }
++ else {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
++ var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, strerror(errno));
++ }
++ }
++ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file) != 0) {
++ if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
++ dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ if (dh_512 == NULL) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ }
++ else {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
++ var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, strerror(errno));
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we want to check client certificates, we have to indicate it
++ * in advance. By now we only allow to decide on a global basis.
++ * If we want to allow certificate based relaying, we must ask the
++ * client to provide one with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The client now can
++ * decide, whether it provides one or not. We can enforce a failure
++ * of the negotiation with SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, if we
++ * do not allow a connection without one.
++ * In the "server hello" following the initialization by the "client hello"
++ * the server must provide a list of CAs it is willing to accept.
++ * Some clever clients will then select one from the list of available
++ * certificates matching these CAs. Netscape Communicator will present
++ * the list of certificates for selecting the one to be sent, or it will
++ * issue a warning, if there is no certificate matching the available
++ * CAs.
++ *
++ * With regard to the purpose of the certificate for relaying, we might
++ * like a later negotiation, maybe relaying would already be allowed
++ * for other reasons, but this would involve severe changes in the
++ * internal postfix logic, so we have to live with it the way it is.
++ */
++ if (askcert)
++ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
++ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
++ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
++ * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
++ * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we won't cache at all.
++ * The recall of old sessions "get" and save to disk of just created
++ * sessions "new" is handled by the appropriate callback functions.
++ *
++ * We must not forget to set a session id context to identify to which
++ * kind of server process the session was related. In our case, the
++ * context is just the name of the patchkit: "Postfix/TLS".
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
++ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
++ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void*)&server_session_id_context,
++ sizeof(server_session_id_context));
++
++ /*
++ * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
++ * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
++ * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
++ * size limit that is by far to small.
++ */
++ if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db) {
++ /*
++ * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
++ * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
++ */
++ if (strncmp(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
++ msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
++ var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
++ else
++ scache_db = dict_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
++ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
++ if (scache_db) {
++ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
++ SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, get_session_cb);
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, remove_session_cb);
++ }
++ else
++ msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
++ var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
++ * inside verify_callback.
++ */
++ TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
++ NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++ pfixtls_serverengine = 1;
++ return (0);
++}
++
++ /*
++ * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
++ * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
++ * send to the client, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
++ * handshake process.
++ */
++int pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
++ const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info, int requirecert)
++{
++ int sts;
++ int j;
++ int verify_flags;
++ unsigned int n;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++ SSL_SESSION *session;
++ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
++ X509 *peer;
++
++ if (!pfixtls_serverengine) { /* should never happen */
++ msg_info("tls_engine not running");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
++ msg_info("setting up TLS connection from %s[%s]", peername, peeraddr);
++
++ /*
++ * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
++ * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
++ * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
++ */
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
++ if (!TLScontext) {
++ msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
++ }
++ if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
++ msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
++ msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
++ */
++ if (requirecert) {
++ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
++ verify_flags |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
++ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
++ SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
++ }
++ else {
++ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
++ }
++ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
++ */
++ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
++ &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
++ msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
++ * more.
++ */
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the SSL connection to accept state. This should not be
++ * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
++ * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
++ */
++ SSL_set_accept_state(TLScontext->con);
++
++ /*
++ * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
++ * reading and writing.
++ */
++ SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
++ TLScontext->internal_bio);
++
++ /*
++ * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
++ * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
++ *
++ * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
++ * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
++ * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
++ */
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
++
++
++ /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ do_dump = 1;
++
++ /*
++ * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
++ * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
++ * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
++ * by choosing our own callbacks for session caching and certificate
++ * verification.
++ *
++ * Error handling:
++ * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
++ * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
++ * because RFC2246 requires it.
++ */
++ sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
++ SSL_accept, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ if (sts <= 0) {
++ msg_info("SSL_accept error from %s[%s]: %d", peername, peeraddr, sts);
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel < 4)
++ do_dump = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
++ * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
++ */
++ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
++ if (peer != NULL) {
++ if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
++ tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
++
++ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
++ TLScontext->peer_subject, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ msg_info("subject=%s", TLScontext->peer_subject);
++ tls_info->peer_subject = TLScontext->peer_subject;
++ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
++ TLScontext->peer_issuer, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ msg_info("issuer=%s", TLScontext->peer_issuer);
++ tls_info->peer_issuer = TLScontext->peer_issuer;
++ if (X509_digest(peer, EVP_md5(), TLScontext->md, &n)) {
++ for (j = 0; j < (int) n; j++) {
++ TLScontext->fingerprint[j * 3] =
++ hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0xf0) >> 4];
++ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 1] =
++ hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0x0f)];
++ if (j + 1 != (int) n)
++ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = ':';
++ else
++ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = '\0';
++ }
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
++ msg_info("fingerprint=%s", TLScontext->fingerprint);
++ tls_info->peer_fingerprint = TLScontext->fingerprint;
++ }
++
++ TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
++ NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse client's subject CN");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
++
++ TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
++ NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer CN");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
++ /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
++ NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer Organization");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ }
++ tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
++
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
++ if (tls_info->peer_verified)
++ msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
++ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
++ else
++ msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
++ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
++ }
++
++ X509_free(peer);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * At this point we should have a certificate when required.
++ * We may however have a cached session, so the callback would never
++ * be called. We therefore double-check to make sure and remove the
++ * session, if applicable.
++ */
++ if (requirecert) {
++ if (!tls_info->peer_verified || !tls_info->peer_CN) {
++ msg_info("Re-used session without peer certificate removed");
++ session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
++ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
++ */
++ tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
++ cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
++ tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
++ tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
++ &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
++
++ pfixtls_serveractive = 1;
++
++ /*
++ * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
++ * functions and store the context.
++ */
++ vstream_control(stream,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
++
++ msg_info("TLS connection established from %s[%s]: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
++ peername, peeraddr,
++ tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
++ tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++ /*
++ * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
++ * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtpd is to
++ * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
++ * be reported.
++ * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
++ * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
++ * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
++ * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
++ * indicated by the "failure" value, so we remove it from the external
++ * cache, too.
++ */
++int pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info)
++{
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++ int retval;
++
++ if (pfixtls_serveractive) {
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
++ /*
++ * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
++ * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
++ * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
++ * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
++ * again.
++ * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
++ * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
++ * bad.
++ */
++ if (!failure) {
++ retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
++ TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ if (retval == 0)
++ do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
++ SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ }
++ /*
++ * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
++ * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
++ * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
++ * Only free the network_bio.
++ */
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ vstream_control(stream,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
++ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
++
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++
++ *tls_info = tls_info_zero;
++ pfixtls_serveractive = 0;
++
++ }
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++
++ /*
++ * This is the setup routine for the SSL client. As smtpd might be called
++ * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
++ *
++ * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_client.c.
++ */
++
++int pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth)
++{
++ int off = 0;
++ int verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
++ int rand_bytes;
++ int rand_source_dev_fd;
++ int rand_source_socket_fd;
++ unsigned char buffer[255];
++ char *CApath;
++ char *CAfile;
++ char *c_cert_file;
++ char *c_key_file;
++
++
++ if (pfixtls_clientengine)
++ return (0); /* already running */
++
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ msg_info("starting TLS engine");
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
++ * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
++ * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
++ * load the error_strings.
++ */
++ SSL_load_error_strings();
++ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
++
++ /*
++ * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
++ * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
++ * is not stored with the session data).
++ */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
++ needs_openssl_095_or_later();
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
++ */
++ randseed.pid = getpid();
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
++ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
++
++ /*
++ * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
++ * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
++ * the prng-exchange file anyway.
++ * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
++ * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
++ * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
++ * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
++ * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
++ */
++ if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
++ if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a random device
++ */
++ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
++ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
++ msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
++ read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ close(rand_source_dev_fd);
++ }
++ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
++ */
++ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
++ BLOCKING, 10);
++ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
++ msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
++ buffer[0] = 1;
++ buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
++ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
++ msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
++ msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
++ else {
++ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
++ read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ }
++ close(rand_source_socket_fd);
++ }
++ } else {
++ RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
++ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
++ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
++ if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++ }
++
++ randseed.pid = getpid();
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
++ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
++
++ /*
++ * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
++ * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
++ * understands in the message.
++ * RFC2487 is only specified for TLSv1, but we want to be as compatible
++ * as possible, so we will start off with a SSLv2 greeting allowing
++ * the best we can offer: TLSv1.
++ * We can restrict this with the options setting later, anyhow.
++ */
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
++ if (ctx == NULL) {
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ };
++
++ /*
++ * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
++ * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
++ * defined for TLS, but we don't know what is out there. So leave things
++ * completely open, as of today.
++ */
++ off |= SSL_OP_ALL; /* Work around all known bugs */
++ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
++
++ /*
++ * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
++ * communication on demand.
++ */
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
++
++ /*
++ * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
++ * (reasonable) default list is kept.
++ */
++ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
++ if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A client key, a
++ * client certificate, and the CA certificates for both the client
++ * cert and the verification of server certificates.
++ * In fact, we do not need a client certificate, so the certificates
++ * are only loaded (and checked), if supplied. A clever client would
++ * handle multiple client certificates and decide based on the list
++ * of acceptable CAs, sent by the server, which certificate to submit.
++ * OpenSSL does however not do this and also has no callback hoods to
++ * easily realize it.
++ *
++ * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
++ * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
++ * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
++ * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
++ * values of the certificate.
++ * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
++ * read at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain
++ * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
++ * hand, the file is not really readable.
++ */
++ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CAfile) == 0)
++ CAfile = NULL;
++ else
++ CAfile = var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
++ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CApath) == 0)
++ CApath = NULL;
++ else
++ CApath = var_smtp_tls_CApath;
++ if (CAfile || CApath) {
++ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cert_file) == 0)
++ c_cert_file = NULL;
++ else
++ c_cert_file = var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
++ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_key_file) == 0)
++ c_key_file = NULL;
++ else
++ c_key_file = var_smtp_tls_key_file;
++ if (c_cert_file || c_key_file)
++ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, c_cert_file, c_key_file)) {
++ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load cert/key data");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
++ * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
++ * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
++ * just do it.
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
++
++ /*
++ * Finally, the setup for the server certificate checking, done
++ * "by the book".
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
++ * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
++ * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we won't cache at all.
++ *
++ * In case of the client, there is no callback used in OpenSSL, so
++ * we must call the session cache functions manually during the process.
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
++ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
++
++ /*
++ * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
++ * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
++ * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
++ * size limit that is by far to small.
++ */
++ if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db) {
++ /*
++ * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
++ * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
++ */
++ if (strncmp(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
++ msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
++ var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
++ else
++ scache_db = dict_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
++ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
++ if (!scache_db)
++ msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
++ var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
++ /*
++ * It is practical to have OpenSSL automatically save newly created
++ * sessions for us by callback. Therefore we have to enable the
++ * internal session cache for the client side. Disable automatic
++ * clearing, as smtp has limited lifetime anyway and we can call
++ * the cleanup routine at will.
++ */
++ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
++ SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
++ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
++ * inside verify_callback.
++ */
++ TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
++ NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ TLSpeername_index = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0,
++ "TLSpeername ex_data index",
++ new_peername_func,
++ dup_peername_func,
++ free_peername_func);
++
++ pfixtls_clientengine = 1;
++ return (0);
++}
++
++ /*
++ * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
++ * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
++ * received by us, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
++ * handshake process.
++ */
++int pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
++ int enforce_peername,
++ const char *peername,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info)
++{
++ int sts;
++ SSL_SESSION *session, *old_session;
++ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
++ X509 *peer;
++ int verify_flags;
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++
++ if (!pfixtls_clientengine) { /* should never happen */
++ msg_info("tls_engine not running");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
++ msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", peername);
++
++ /*
++ * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
++ * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
++ * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
++ */
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
++ if (!TLScontext) {
++ msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
++ }
++ if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
++ msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
++ msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
++ */
++ if (enforce_peername) {
++ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
++ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
++ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 1;
++ SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
++ }
++ else {
++ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
++ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
++ */
++ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
++ &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
++ msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ old_session = NULL;
++
++ /*
++ * Find out the hashed HostID for the client cache and try to
++ * load the session from the cache.
++ */
++ strncpy(TLScontext->peername_save, peername, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
++ TLScontext->peername_save[ID_MAXLENGTH] = '\0'; /* just in case */
++ (void)lowercase(TLScontext->peername_save);
++ if (scache_db) {
++ old_session = load_clnt_session(peername, enforce_peername);
++ if (old_session) {
++ SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, old_session);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
++ /*
++ * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
++ * result in sessions for the client side.
++ * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
++ * but this bug is version specific, too.
++ *
++ * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
++ * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
++ * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
++ * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
++ */
++ SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, old_session->verify_result);
++#endif
++
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
++ * more.
++ */
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++
++ /*
++ * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
++ * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
++ * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
++ */
++ SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
++
++ /*
++ * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
++ * reading and writing.
++ */
++ SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
++ TLScontext->internal_bio);
++
++ /*
++ * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
++ * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
++ *
++ * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
++ * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
++ * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
++ */
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
++
++
++ /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ do_dump = 1;
++
++ /*
++ * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
++ * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
++ * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
++ * by choosing our own callback certificate verification.
++ *
++ * Error handling:
++ * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
++ * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
++ * because RFC2246 requires it.
++ */
++ sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
++ SSL_connect, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ if (sts <= 0) {
++ msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", peername, sts);
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
++ if (session) {
++ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
++ msg_info("SSL session removed");
++ }
++ if ((old_session) && (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)))
++ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); /* Must also be removed */
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ if (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)) {
++ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); /* Remove unused session */
++ }
++ else if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
++ msg_info("Reusing old session");
++
++ /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel < 4)
++ do_dump = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
++ * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
++ */
++ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
++ if (peer != NULL) {
++ if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
++ tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
++
++ TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
++ NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
++
++ TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
++ NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer CN");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
++ /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
++ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
++ NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
++ msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer Organization");
++ pfixtls_print_errors();
++ }
++ }
++ tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
++
++ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
++ if (tls_info->peer_verified)
++ msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
++ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
++ else
++ msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
++ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
++ }
++ X509_free(peer);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
++ */
++ tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
++ cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
++ tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
++ tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
++ &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
++
++ pfixtls_clientactive = 1;
++
++ /*
++ * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
++ * functions.
++ */
++ vstream_control(stream,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
++
++ msg_info("TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
++ peername,
++ tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
++ tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
++
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++ /*
++ * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
++ * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtp is to
++ * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
++ * be reported.
++ * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
++ * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
++ * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
++ * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
++ * indicated by the "failure" value,so we remove it from the external
++ * cache, too.
++ */
++int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info)
++{
++ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
++ int retval;
++
++ if (pfixtls_clientactive) {
++ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
++ /*
++ * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
++ * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
++ * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
++ * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
++ * again.
++ * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
++ * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
++ * bad.
++ */
++ if (!failure) {
++ retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
++ TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ if (retval == 0)
++ do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
++ SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++ }
++ /*
++ * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
++ * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
++ * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
++ * Only free the network_bio.
++ */
++ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
++ BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
++ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
++ vstream_control(stream,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
++ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
++ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
++
++ pfixtls_stir_seed();
++ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
++
++ *tls_info = tls_info_zero;
++ pfixtls_clientactive = 0;
++
++ }
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++
++#endif /* HAS_SSL */
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* pfixtls 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* TLS routines
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* include "pfixtls.h"
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* .nf
++/*--*/
++
++#ifndef PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
++#define PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
++
++typedef struct {
++ int peer_verified;
++ char *peer_subject;
++ char *peer_issuer;
++ char *peer_fingerprint;
++ char *peer_CN;
++ char *issuer_CN;
++ const char *protocol;
++ const char *cipher_name;
++ int cipher_usebits;
++ int cipher_algbits;
++} tls_info_t;
++
++extern const tls_info_t tls_info_zero;
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++
++typedef struct {
++ long scache_db_version;
++ long openssl_version;
++ time_t timestamp; /* We could add other info here... */
++ int enforce_peername;
++} pfixtls_scache_info_t;
++
++extern const long scache_db_version;
++extern const long openssl_version;
++
++int pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timout,
++ void *unused_timeout);
++int pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
++ void *unused_timeout);
++
++extern int pfixtls_serverengine;
++int pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert);
++int pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
++ const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info, int require_cert);
++int pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info);
++
++extern int pfixtls_clientengine;
++int pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth);
++int pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
++ int enforce_peername,
++ const char *peername,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info);
++int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
++ tls_info_t *tls_info);
++
++#endif /* PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED */
++#endif
++
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Lutz Jaenicke
++/* BTU Cottbus
++/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
++/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
++/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
++/*--*/
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/resolve_local.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/resolve_local.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/resolve_local.c Thu Jan 31 20:56:29 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/resolve_local.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
+
+ #ifndef INADDR_NONE
+ #define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff
+@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@
+ {
+ char *saved_addr = mystrdup(addr);
+ char *dest;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
++ int error;
++#else
+ struct in_addr ipaddr;
++#endif
+ int len;
+
+ #define RETURN(x) { myfree(saved_addr); return(x); }
+@@ -111,9 +117,25 @@
+ if (*dest == '[' && dest[len - 1] == ']') {
+ dest++;
+ dest[len -= 2] = 0;
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(dest, NULL, &hints, &res0);
++ if (!error) {
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if (own_inet_addr(res->ai_addr)) {
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ RETURN(1);
++ }
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ }
++#else
+ if ((ipaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(dest)) != INADDR_NONE
+ && own_inet_addr(&ipaddr))
+ RETURN(1);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
++/* System library. */
++
++#include <sys_defs.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <arpa/inet.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#endif
++#include <netdb.h>
++
++#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
++#include <strings.h>
++#endif
++
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include <msg.h>
++#include <mymalloc.h>
++#include <inet_addr_list.h>
++#include <inet_addr_local.h>
++#include <inet_addr_host.h>
++#include <stringops.h>
++
++/* Global library. */
++
++#include <mail_params.h>
++#include <wildcard_inet_addr.h>
++
++/* Application-specific. */
++static INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
++
++/* wildcard_inet_addr_init - initialize my own address list */
++
++static void wildcard_inet_addr_init(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list)
++{
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ int error;
++#ifdef NI_WITHSCOPEID
++ const int niflags = NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_WITHSCOPEID;
++#else
++ const int niflags = NI_NUMERICHOST;
++#endif
++
++ inet_addr_list_init(addr_list);
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
++ error = getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &res0);
++ if (error)
++ msg_fatal("could not get list of wildcard addresses");
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if (res->ai_family != AF_INET && res->ai_family != AF_INET6)
++ continue;
++ if (getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf),
++ NULL, 0, niflags) != 0)
++ continue;
++ if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, hbuf) == 0)
++ continue; /* msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
++ VAR_INET_INTERFACES, hbuf); */
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++#else
++ if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, "0.0.0.0") == 0)
++ msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
++ VAR_INET_INTERFACES, "0.0.0.0");
++#endif
++}
++
++/* wildcard_inet_addr_list - return list of addresses */
++
++INET_ADDR_LIST *wildcard_inet_addr_list(void)
++{
++ if (addr_list.used == 0)
++ wildcard_inet_addr_init(&addr_list);
++
++ return (&addr_list);
++}
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
++#ifndef _WILDCARD_INET_ADDR_H_INCLUDED_
++#define _WILDCARD_INET_ADDR_H_INCLUDED_
++
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* wildcard_inet_addr_list 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* grab the list of wildcard IP addresses.
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <own_inet_addr.h>
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* .nf
++/*--*/
++
++ /*
++ * System library.
++ */
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * External interface.
++ */
++extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *wildcard_inet_addr_list(void);
++
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* foo
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
++/*--*/
++
++#endif
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp.c Sat May 11 02:07:05 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -190,6 +190,12 @@
+ /* .IP \fBlmtp_quit_timeout\fR
+ /* Timeout for sending the \fBQUIT\fR command, and for
+ /* receiving the server response.
++/* .IP \fBlmtp_bind_address\fR
++/* Numerical source network address (IPv4) to bind to when making
++/* a connection.
++/* .IP \fBlmtp_bind_address6\fR
++/* Numerical source network address (IPv6) to bind to when making
++/* a connection.
+ /* SEE ALSO
+ /* bounce(8) non-delivery status reports
+ /* local(8) local mail delivery
+@@ -276,6 +282,8 @@
+ char *var_lmtp_sasl_opts;
+ char *var_lmtp_sasl_passwd;
+ bool var_lmtp_sasl_enable;
++char *var_lmtp_bind_addr;
++char *var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
+
+ /*
+ * Global variables.
+@@ -514,6 +522,10 @@
+ VAR_ERROR_RCPT, DEF_ERROR_RCPT, &var_error_rcpt, 1, 0,
+ VAR_LMTP_SASL_PASSWD, DEF_LMTP_SASL_PASSWD, &var_lmtp_sasl_passwd, 0, 0,
+ VAR_LMTP_SASL_OPTS, DEF_LMTP_SASL_OPTS, &var_lmtp_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
++ VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, &var_lmtp_bind_addr, 0, 0,
++#ifdef INET6
++ VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6, DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6, &var_lmtp_bind_addr6, 0, 0,
++#endif
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c Thu Mar 22 02:01:46 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@
+ #include <iostuff.h>
+ #include <timed_connect.h>
+ #include <stringops.h>
++#include <inet_addr_list.h>
+
+ /* Global library. */
+
+ #include <mail_params.h>
+ #include <mail_proto.h>
++#include <own_inet_addr.h>
+
+ /* DNS library. */
+
+@@ -166,13 +168,42 @@
+ const char *destination, VSTRING *why)
+ {
+ char *myname = "lmtp_connect_addr";
+- struct sockaddr_in sin;
+- int sock;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
++#else
++ struct sockaddr ss;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++ struct sockaddr_in *sin;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
++#endif
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++#else
++ char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++#endif
++ int sock = -1;
++ INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list;
++ char *bind_addr;
++
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
++ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
++#ifdef INET6
++ sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity checks.
+ */
+- if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (((addr->type==T_A) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))) ||
++ ((addr->type==T_AAAA) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr))))
++#else
++ if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))
++#endif
++ {
+ msg_warn("%s: skip address with length %d", myname, addr->data_len);
+ lmtp_errno = LMTP_RETRY;
+ return (0);
+@@ -181,25 +212,168 @@
+ /*
+ * Initialize.
+ */
+- memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+- sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++ switch (addr->type) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ bind_addr = var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
++ memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
++ sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin6);
++ break;
++#endif
++ default: /* T_A: */
++ bind_addr = var_lmtp_bind_addr;
++ memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
++ sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin);
++ break;
++ };
++#ifdef HAS_SALEN
++ sa->sa_len = salen;
++#endif
+
+- if ((sock = socket(sin.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
++ if ((sock = socket(sa->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
+
+ /*
++ * Allow the sysadmin to specify the source address
++ */
++
++ if (*bind_addr) {
++#ifndef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
++ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
++#endif
++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(bind_addr);
++ if (sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE)
++ msg_fatal("%s: bad %s parameter: %s",
++ myname, VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, var_smtp_bind_addr);
++ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++#else
++ char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ snprintf(hbufl, sizeof(hbufl)-1, "%s", bind_addr);
++ if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) {
++ (void)getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbufl,
++ sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
++ }
++#endif
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If running on a virtual host, start connections from the
++ * right address.
++ */
++
++ else if ((addr_list = own_inet_addr_list())->used == 1) {
++#ifndef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++ unsigned long inaddr; /* XXX BAD!*/
++
++ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
++ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
++#endif
++ memcpy((char *)&sin.sin_addr, addr_list->addrs, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
++ inaddr = (unsigned long)ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
++ if (!IN_CLASSA(inaddr)
++ /* XXX Are the two following lines correct? */
++ || !(((inaddr & IN_CLASSA_NET) >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) ==
++ IN_LOOPBACKNET)) {
++ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ }
++#else
++ char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL, *loopback = NULL;
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ if (getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &loopback) != 0)
++ loopback = NULL;
++
++ /*
++ * getnameinfo -> getaddrinfo loop is here so that we can
++ * get rid of port
++ */
++ (void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs,
++ SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs),
++ hbufl, sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++ hbufl[sizeof(hbufl) - 1] = 0;
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0 &&
++ !(res->ai_addrlen == loopback->ai_addrlen &&
++ memcmp(res->ai_addr, loopback->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) == 0)) {
++ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
++ }
++ if (res)
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ if (loopback)
++ freeaddrinfo(loopback);
++#endif
++ }
++
++ /*
+ * Connect to the LMTP server.
+ */
+- sin.sin_port = port;
+- memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
++ switch (addr->type) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ /* XXX scope-unfriendly */
++ memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
++ sin6->sin6_port = port;
++ sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin6);
++ memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++ break;
++#endif
++ default: /* T_A: */
++ memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
++ sin->sin_port = port;
++ sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin6);
++ memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++ break;
++ }
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sa->sa_len = salen;
++#endif
+
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: trying: %s[%s] port %d...",
+- myname, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(port));
++ myname, addr->name, hbuf, ntohs(port));
+
+- return (lmtp_connect_sock(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin),
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr),
+- destination, why));
++ return (lmtp_connect_sock(sock, (struct sockaddr *)sa, salen,
++ addr->name, hbuf, destination, why));
+ }
+
+ /* lmtp_connect_sock - connect a socket over some transport */
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_ent.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_ent.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_ent.c Sun Dec 23 20:08:58 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_ent.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -284,8 +284,13 @@
+ inet_addr_host(MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv), host);
+ serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(var_inet_interfaces, DEF_INET_INTERFACES) == 0) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = wildcard_inet_addr_list();
++ serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
++#else
+ MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = 0; /* wild-card */
+ serv->listen_fd_count = 1;
++#endif
+ } else {
+ MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = own_inet_addr_list(); /* virtual */
+ serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_listen.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_listen.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_listen.c Tue May 1 00:47:57 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_listen.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -64,13 +64,22 @@
+
+ #include "master.h"
+
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <netdb.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#endif
++
+ /* master_listen_init - enable connection requests */
+
+ void master_listen_init(MASTER_SERV *serv)
+ {
+ char *myname = "master_listen_init";
+ char *end_point;
+- int n;
++ int n,m,tmpfd;
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Find out what transport we should use, then create one or more
+@@ -111,18 +120,31 @@
+ serv->listen_fd[0] =
+ inet_listen(MASTER_INET_PORT(serv),
+ serv->max_proc > var_proc_limit ?
+- serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING);
++ serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING, 1);
+ close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[0], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+ } else { /* virtual or host:port */
+- for (n = 0; n < serv->listen_fd_count; n++) {
++ for (m = n = 0; n < serv->listen_fd_count; n++) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n],
++ SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)&MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n]),
++ hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
++ strncpy(hbuf, "?????", sizeof(hbuf));
++ }
++ end_point = concatenate(hbuf, ":", MASTER_INET_PORT(serv), (char *) 0);
++#else
+ end_point = concatenate(inet_ntoa(MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n]),
+ ":", MASTER_INET_PORT(serv), (char *) 0);
+- serv->listen_fd[n]
++#endif
++ tmpfd
+ = inet_listen(end_point, serv->max_proc > var_proc_limit ?
+- serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING);
+- close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[n], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
++ serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING, 0);
++ if (tmpfd >= 0) {
++ serv->listen_fd[m] = tmpfd;
++ close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[m++], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
++ }
+ myfree(end_point);
+ }
++ serv->listen_fd_count=m;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c Tue Jun 11 01:55:20 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -507,7 +507,11 @@
+ * every front-ent program.
+ */
+ if ((at = strrchr(recipient->address, '@')) != 0
++#ifdef INET6
++ && (at + 1)[strspn(at + 1, "[]0123456789.:abcdef")] != 0
++#else
+ && (at + 1)[strspn(at + 1, "[]0123456789.")] != 0
++#endif
+ && valid_hostname(at + 1, DONT_GRIPE) == 0) {
+ qmgr_bounce_recipient(message, recipient,
+ "bad host/domain syntax: \"%s\"", at + 1);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c Thu Jul 5 22:09:35 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c Wed Jun 26 15:29:19 2002
+@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@
+ )
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef INET6
++#define GAI_STRERROR(error) \
++ ((error = EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(error) : strerror(errno))
++#endif
++
+ /* Utility library. */
+
+ #include <msg.h>
+@@ -79,7 +84,6 @@
+
+ /* Global library. */
+
+-
+ /* Application-specific. */
+
+ #include "qmqpd.h"
+@@ -88,16 +92,23 @@
+
+ void qmqpd_peer_init(QMQPD_STATE *state)
+ {
+- struct sockaddr_in sin;
+- SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
++#else
++ struct sockaddr ss;
++ struct in_addr *in;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+- int i;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE len;
++
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
++ len = sizeof(ss);
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the peer address information.
+ */
+- if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client),
+- (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) >= 0) {
++ if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client), sa, &len) >= 0) {
+ errno = 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -112,16 +123,50 @@
+ /*
+ * Look up and "verify" the client hostname.
+ */
+- else if (errno == 0 && sin.sin_family == AF_INET) {
+- state->addr = mystrdup(inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+- hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
+- sizeof(sin.sin_addr), AF_INET);
+- if (hp == 0) {
++ else if (errno == 0 && (sa->sa_family == AF_INET
++#ifdef INET6
++ || sa->sa_family == AF_INET6
++#endif
++ )) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *rnull = NULL;
++#else
++ char abuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++ char *hbuf;
++#endif
++ int error = -1;
++
++#ifdef INET6
++ (void)getnameinfo(sa, len, abuf, sizeof(abuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST);
++#else
++ in = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET, in, abuf, sizeof(abuf));
++#endif
++
++ state->addr = mystrdup(abuf);
++#ifdef INET6
++ error = getnameinfo(sa, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NAMEREQD);
++#else
++ hbuf = NULL;
++ hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)in, sizeof(*in), AF_INET);
++ if (hp) {
++ error = 0;
++ hbuf = mystrdup(hp->h_name);
++ state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
++ } else {
++ error = 1;
++ }
++#endif
++ if (error) {
+ state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
+- } else if (!valid_hostname(hp->h_name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
++ } else if (!valid_hostname(hbuf, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+ state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
+ } else {
+- state->name = mystrdup(hp->h_name); /* hp->name is clobbered!! */
++ state->name = mystrdup(hbuf); /* hp->name is clobbered!! */
+
+ /*
+ * Reject the hostname if it does not list the peer address.
+@@ -131,16 +176,31 @@
+ state->name = mystrdup("unknown"); \
+ }
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(state->name, NULL, &hints, &rnull);
++ if (error) {
++ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
++ state->addr, state->name, GAI_STRERROR(error));
++ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
++ }
++ /* memcmp() isn't needed if we use getaddrinfo */
++ if (rnull)
++ freeaddrinfo(rnull);
++#else
+ hp = gethostbyname(state->name); /* clobbers hp->name!! */
+ if (hp == 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
+ state->addr, state->name, HSTRERROR(h_errno));
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
+- } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
++ } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(*in)) {
+ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: bad address size %d",
+ state->addr, state->name, hp->h_length);
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
+ } else {
++ int i;
+ for (i = 0; /* void */ ; i++) {
+ if (hp->h_addr_list[i] == 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: address not listed for hostname %s",
+@@ -148,12 +208,12 @@
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
+ break;
+ }
+- if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i],
+- (char *) &sin.sin_addr,
+- sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) == 0)
++ if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], (char *)in,
++ sizeof(*in)) == 0)
+ break; /* keep peer name */
+ }
+ }
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/Makefile.in Tue Jun 11 03:14:03 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
+ smtp.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
+ smtp.o: ../../include/attr.h
+ smtp.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
++smtp.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp.o: smtp.h
+ smtp.o: smtp_sasl.h
+ smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.c
+@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
+ smtp_addr.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_addr.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
+ smtp_addr.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
++smtp_addr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.h
+ smtp_chat.o: smtp_chat.c
+ smtp_chat.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@
+ smtp_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
+ smtp_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
+ smtp_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
++smtp_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_chat.o: smtp.h
+ smtp_connect.o: smtp_connect.c
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+@@ -139,10 +142,12 @@
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/own_inet_addr.h
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/dns.h
++smtp_connect.o: ../../include/get_port.h
+ smtp_connect.o: smtp.h
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
+ smtp_connect.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
++smtp_connetc.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_connect.o: smtp_addr.h
+ smtp_proto.o: smtp_proto.c
+ smtp_proto.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+@@ -174,6 +179,7 @@
+ smtp_proto.o: ../../include/attr.h
+ smtp_proto.o: ../../include/mime_state.h
+ smtp_proto.o: ../../include/header_opts.h
++smtp_proto.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_proto.o: smtp.h
+ smtp_proto.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_proto.o: smtp_sasl.h
+@@ -219,9 +225,12 @@
+ smtp_session.o: ../../include/stringops.h
+ smtp_session.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+ smtp_session.o: smtp.h
++smtp_session.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
++smtp_session.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_session.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_session.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
+ smtp_session.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
++smtp_session.o: ../../include/maps.h
+ smtp_state.o: smtp_state.c
+ smtp_state.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+ smtp_state.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+@@ -235,6 +244,7 @@
+ smtp_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_state.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
+ smtp_state.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
++smtp_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_state.o: smtp_sasl.h
+ smtp_trouble.o: smtp_trouble.c
+ smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+@@ -254,6 +264,7 @@
+ smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
+ smtp_trouble.o: smtp.h
+ smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/argv.h
++smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtp_unalias.o: smtp_unalias.c
+ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/htable.h
+@@ -266,3 +277,4 @@
+ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
+ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
++smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
++--- smtp_proto.c.old Wed May 15 14:01:56 2002
+++++ smtp_proto.c Fri May 24 21:13:50 2002
++@@ -372,8 +372,13 @@
++ else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
++ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
++- else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
+++ else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0) {
+++ if (state->sasl_mechanism_list) {
+++ myfree(state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+++ state->sasl_mechanism_list = 0;
+++ }
++ smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
+++ }
++ #endif
++ }
++ }
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.c Mon May 27 01:07:04 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@
+ /* .IP \fBsmtp_never_send_ehlo\fR
+ /* Never send EHLO at the start of a connection.
+ /* .IP \fBsmtp_bind_address\fR
+-/* Numerical source network address to bind to when making a connection.
++/* Numerical source network address (IPv4) to bind to when making
++/* a connection.
++/* .IP \fBsmtp_bind_address6\fR
++/* Numerical source network address (IPv6) to bind to when making
++/* a connection.
+ /* .IP \fBsmtp_line_length_limit\fR
+ /* Length limit for SMTP message content lines. Zero means no limit.
+ /* Some SMTP servers misbehave on long lines.
+@@ -240,6 +244,7 @@
+ #include <debug_peer.h>
+ #include <mail_error.h>
+ #include <deliver_pass.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /* Single server skeleton. */
+
+@@ -256,6 +261,7 @@
+ */
+ int var_smtp_conn_tmout;
+ int var_smtp_helo_tmout;
++int var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
+ int var_smtp_mail_tmout;
+ int var_smtp_rcpt_tmout;
+ int var_smtp_data0_tmout;
+@@ -277,11 +283,20 @@
+ char *var_smtp_sasl_passwd;
+ bool var_smtp_sasl_enable;
+ char *var_smtp_bind_addr;
++#ifdef INET6
++char *var_smtp_bind_addr6;
++#endif
+ bool var_smtp_rand_addr;
+ int var_smtp_pix_thresh;
+ int var_smtp_pix_delay;
+ int var_smtp_line_limit;
+ char *var_smtp_helo_name;
++int var_smtp_use_tls;
++int var_smtp_enforce_tls;
++int var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
++char *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
++int var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
++int var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
+
+ /*
+ * Global variables. smtp_errno is set by the address lookup routines and by
+@@ -391,6 +406,7 @@
+
+ static void pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+ {
++
+ debug_peer_init();
+
+ if (var_smtp_sasl_enable)
+@@ -400,6 +416,14 @@
+ msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
+ VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE);
+ #endif
++ /*
++ * Initialize the TLS data before entering the chroot jail
++ */
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (var_smtp_use_tls || var_smtp_enforce_tls || var_smtp_tls_per_site[0])
++ pfixtls_init_clientengine(var_smtp_tls_scert_vd);
++ smtp_tls_list_init();
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
+@@ -434,7 +458,11 @@
+ VAR_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, DEF_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, &var_smtp_sasl_passwd, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtp_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, &var_smtp_bind_addr, 0, 0,
++#ifdef INET6
++ VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6, DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6, &var_smtp_bind_addr6, 0, 0,
++#endif
+ VAR_SMTP_HELO_NAME, DEF_SMTP_HELO_NAME, &var_smtp_helo_name, 1, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, &var_smtp_tls_per_site, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
+@@ -448,6 +476,7 @@
+ VAR_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, &var_smtp_quit_tmout, 1, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, DEF_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, &var_smtp_pix_thresh, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, DEF_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, &var_smtp_pix_delay, 1, 0,
++ VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
+@@ -463,6 +492,10 @@
+ VAR_SMTP_NEVER_EHLO, DEF_SMTP_NEVER_EHLO, &var_smtp_never_ehlo,
+ VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtp_sasl_enable,
+ VAR_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, &var_smtp_rand_addr,
++ VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS, &var_smtp_use_tls,
++ VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtp_enforce_tls,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, &var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername,
++ VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, &var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer,
+ 0,
+ };
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.h Thu May 23 21:18:02 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ * Global library.
+ */
+ #include <deliver_request.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /*
+ * State information associated with each SMTP delivery. We're bundling the
+@@ -79,9 +80,14 @@
+ char *addr; /* mail exchanger */
+ char *namaddr; /* mail exchanger */
+ int best; /* most preferred host */
++ int tls_use_tls; /* can do TLS */
++ int tls_enforce_tls; /* must do TLS */
++ int tls_enforce_peername; /* cert must match */
++ tls_info_t tls_info; /* TLS connection state */
+ } SMTP_SESSION;
+
+-extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
++extern void smtp_tls_list_init(void);
++extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *, VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
+ extern void smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *);
+
+ /*
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c Sun Jul 8 17:05:26 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -134,18 +134,68 @@
+ static void smtp_print_addr(char *what, DNS_RR *addr_list)
+ {
+ DNS_RR *addr;
+- struct in_addr in_addr;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
++#else
++ struct sockaddr ss;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr_in *sin;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++#else
++ char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++#endif
+
+ msg_info("begin %s address list", what);
+ for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
+- if (addr->data_len > sizeof(addr)) {
+- msg_warn("skipping address length %d", addr->data_len);
+- } else {
+- memcpy((char *) &in_addr, addr->data, sizeof(in_addr));
+- msg_info("pref %4d host %s/%s",
+- addr->pref, addr->name,
+- inet_ntoa(in_addr));
++ if (addr->class != C_IN) {
++ msg_warn("skipping unsupported address (class=%u)", addr->class);
++ continue;
+ }
++ switch (addr->type) {
++ case T_A:
++ if (addr->data_len != sizeof(sin->sin_addr)) {
++ msg_warn("skipping invalid address (AAAA, len=%u)",
++ addr->data_len);
++ continue;
++ }
++ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
++ memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
++ sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin);
++#endif
++ memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
++ break;
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ if (addr->data_len != sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)) {
++ msg_warn("skipping invalid address (AAAA, len=%u)",
++ addr->data_len);
++ continue;
++ }
++ sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
++ memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
++ sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6);
++#endif
++ memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
++ break;
++#endif
++ default:
++ msg_warn("skipping unsupported address (type=%u)", addr->type);
++ continue;
++ }
++
++#ifdef INET6
++ (void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&ss, SS_LEN(ss),
++ hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++#else
++ (void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++#endif
++ msg_info("pref %4d host %s/%s", addr->pref, addr->name, hbuf);
+ }
+ msg_info("end %s address list", what);
+ }
+@@ -155,15 +205,23 @@
+ static DNS_RR *smtp_addr_one(DNS_RR *addr_list, char *host, unsigned pref, VSTRING *why)
+ {
+ char *myname = "smtp_addr_one";
++#ifndef INET6
+ struct in_addr inaddr;
+- DNS_FIXED fixed;
+ DNS_RR *addr = 0;
+ DNS_RR *rr;
+ struct hostent *hp;
++#else
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res0, *res;
++ int error = -1;
++ char *addr;
++ size_t addrlen;
++#endif
++ DNS_FIXED fixed;
+
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: host %s", myname, host);
+
++#ifndef INET6
+ /*
+ * Interpret a numerical name as an address.
+ */
+@@ -216,6 +274,48 @@
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
++#else
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res0);
++ if (error) {
++ switch (error) {
++ case EAI_AGAIN:
++ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
++ break;
++ default:
++ vstring_sprintf(why, "[%s]: %s",host,gai_strerror(error));
++ smtp_errno = SMTP_FAIL;
++ break;
++ }
++ return (addr_list);
++ }
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ memset((char *) &fixed, 0, sizeof(fixed));
++ switch(res->ai_family) {
++ case AF_INET6:
++ /* XXX not scope friendly */
++ fixed.type = T_AAAA;
++ addr = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr;
++ addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
++ break;
++ case AF_INET:
++ fixed.type = T_A;
++ addr = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
++ addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
++ break;
++ default:
++ msg_warn("%s: unknown address family %d for %s",
++ myname, res->ai_family, host);
++ continue;
++ }
++ addr_list = dns_rr_append(addr_list,
++ dns_rr_create(host, &fixed, pref, addr, addrlen));
++ }
++ if (res0)
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++#endif
+ return (addr_list);
+ }
+
+@@ -251,6 +351,9 @@
+ INET_ADDR_LIST *self;
+ DNS_RR *addr;
+ int i;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Find the first address that lists any address that this mail system is
+@@ -260,12 +363,36 @@
+
+ self = own_inet_addr_list();
+ for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
+- for (i = 0; i < self->used; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < self->used; i++) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&self->addrs[i];
++ switch(addr->type) {
++ case T_AAAA:
++ /* XXX scope */
++ if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)
++ break;
++ if (memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr,
++ addr->data, sizeof(struct in6_addr)) == 0) {
++ return(addr);
++ }
++ break;
++ case T_A:
++ if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
++ break;
++ if (memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr,
++ addr->data, sizeof(struct in_addr)) == 0) {
++ return(addr);
++ }
++ break;
++ }
++#else
+ if (INADDRP(addr->data)->s_addr == self->addrs[i].s_addr) {
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: found at pref %d", myname, addr->pref);
+ return (addr);
+ }
++#endif
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c Sun Jul 8 21:40:03 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
+ /* System library. */
+
+ #include <sys_defs.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+@@ -110,12 +111,14 @@
+ #include <inet_addr_list.h>
+ #include <iostuff.h>
+ #include <timed_connect.h>
++#include <get_port.h>
+ #include <stringops.h>
+
+ /* Global library. */
+
+ #include <mail_params.h>
+ #include <own_inet_addr.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /* DNS library. */
+
+@@ -128,23 +131,50 @@
+
+ /* smtp_connect_addr - connect to explicit address */
+
+-static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
++static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(char *dest, DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
+ VSTRING *why)
+ {
+ char *myname = "smtp_connect_addr";
+- struct sockaddr_in sin;
+- int sock;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
++#else
++ struct sockaddr ss;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++ struct sockaddr_in *sin;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
++#endif
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++#else
++ char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++#endif
++ int sock = -1;
+ INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list;
+ int conn_stat;
+ int saved_errno;
+ VSTREAM *stream;
+ int ch;
+- unsigned long inaddr;
++ char *bind_addr;
++
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
++ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
++#ifdef INET6
++ sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity checks.
+ */
+- if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (((addr->type==T_A) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))) ||
++ ((addr->type==T_AAAA) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr))))
++#else
++ if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))
++#endif
++ {
+ msg_warn("%s: skip address with length %d", myname, addr->data_len);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ return (0);
+@@ -153,18 +183,42 @@
+ /*
+ * Initialize.
+ */
+- memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+- sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+-
+- if ((sock = socket(sin.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+- msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
+-
++ switch (addr->type) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ bind_addr = var_smtp_bind_addr6;
++ memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
++ sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin6);
++ break;
++#endif
++ default: /* T_A: */
++ bind_addr = var_smtp_bind_addr;
++ memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
++ sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin);
++ break;
++ }
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sa->sa_len = salen;
++#endif
++ if ((sock = socket(sa->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: socket: %m", myname);
++
+ /*
+ * Allow the sysadmin to specify the source address, for example, as "-o
+ * smtp_bind_address=x.x.x.x" in the master.cf file.
+ */
+- if (*var_smtp_bind_addr) {
+- sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(var_smtp_bind_addr);
++ if (*bind_addr) {
++#ifndef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
++ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
++#endif
++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(bind_addr);
+ if (sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE)
+ msg_fatal("%s: bad %s parameter: %s",
+ myname, VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, var_smtp_bind_addr);
+@@ -172,6 +226,25 @@
+ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++#else
++ char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ snprintf(hbufl, sizeof(hbufl)-1, "%s", bind_addr);
++ if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) {
++ (void)getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbufl,
++ sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
++ }
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -179,8 +252,17 @@
+ * the mail appears to come from the "right" machine address.
+ */
+ else if ((addr_list = own_inet_addr_list())->used == 1) {
++#ifndef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++ unsigned long inaddr; /*XXX BAD!*/
++
++ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
++ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
++#endif
+ memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr_list->addrs, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
+- inaddr = ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
++ inaddr = (unsigned long)ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
+ if (!IN_CLASSA(inaddr)
+ || !(((inaddr & IN_CLASSA_NET) >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IN_LOOPBACKNET)) {
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
+@@ -188,30 +270,85 @@
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+ }
++#else
++ char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL, *loopback = NULL;
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ if (getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &loopback) != 0)
++ loopback = NULL;
++
++ /*
++ * getnameinfo -> getaddrinfo loop is here so that we can
++ * get rid of port.
++ */
++ (void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs, SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs),
++ hbufl, sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++ hbufl[sizeof(hbufl)-1] = 0;
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0 &&
++ !(res->ai_addrlen == loopback->ai_addrlen &&
++ memcmp(res->ai_addr, loopback->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) == 0)) {
++ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
++ msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
++ }
++ if (res)
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ if (loopback)
++ freeaddrinfo(loopback);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Connect to the SMTP server.
+ */
+- sin.sin_port = port;
+- memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
++ switch (addr->type) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ case T_AAAA:
++ /* XXX scope unfriendly */
++ memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
++ sin6->sin6_port = port;
++ sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin6);
++ memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++ break;
++#endif
++ default: /* T_A */
++ memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
++ sin->sin_port = port;
++ sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
++ salen = sizeof(*sin);
++ memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++ break;
++ }
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sa->sa_len = salen;
++#endif
+
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: trying: %s[%s] port %d...",
+- myname, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(port));
++ myname, addr->name, hbuf, ntohs(port));
+ if (var_smtp_conn_tmout > 0) {
+ non_blocking(sock, NON_BLOCKING);
+- conn_stat = timed_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin,
+- sizeof(sin), var_smtp_conn_tmout);
++ conn_stat = timed_connect(sock, sa, salen, var_smtp_conn_tmout);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ non_blocking(sock, BLOCKING);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ } else {
+- conn_stat = connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin));
++ conn_stat = connect(sock, sa, salen);
+ }
+ if (conn_stat < 0) {
+ vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: %m",
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ addr->name, hbuf);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ close(sock);
+ return (0);
+@@ -221,8 +358,8 @@
+ * Skip this host if it takes no action within some time limit.
+ */
+ if (read_wait(sock, var_smtp_helo_tmout) < 0) {
+- vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: read timeout",
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s [%s]: read timeout",
++ addr->name, hbuf);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ close(sock);
+ return (0);
+@@ -233,8 +370,8 @@
+ */
+ stream = vstream_fdopen(sock, O_RDWR);
+ if ((ch = VSTREAM_GETC(stream)) == VSTREAM_EOF) {
+- vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server dropped connection",
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s [%s]: server dropped connection",
++ addr->name, hbuf);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ vstream_fclose(stream);
+ return (0);
+@@ -246,7 +383,7 @@
+ */
+ if (ch == '4' && var_smtp_skip_4xx_greeting) {
+ vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server refused mail service",
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ addr->name, hbuf);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ vstream_fclose(stream);
+ return (0);
+@@ -257,12 +394,12 @@
+ */
+ if (ch == '5' && var_smtp_skip_5xx_greeting) {
+ vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server refused mail service",
+- addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
++ addr->name, hbuf);
+ smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+ vstream_fclose(stream);
+ return (0);
+ }
+- return (smtp_session_alloc(stream, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr)));
++ return (smtp_session_alloc(dest, stream, addr->name, hbuf));
+ }
+
+ /* smtp_connect_host - direct connection to host */
+@@ -272,7 +409,7 @@
+ SMTP_SESSION *session = 0;
+ DNS_RR *addr_list;
+ DNS_RR *addr;
+-
++
+ /*
+ * Try each address in the specified order until we find one that works.
+ * The addresses belong to the same A record, so we have no information
+@@ -280,7 +417,7 @@
+ */
+ addr_list = smtp_host_addr(host, why);
+ for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
+- if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
++ if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(host, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+ session->best = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -309,7 +446,7 @@
+ */
+ addr_list = smtp_domain_addr(name, why, found_myself);
+ for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
+- if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
++ if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(name, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+ session->best = (addr->pref == addr_list->pref);
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -379,6 +516,7 @@
+ msg_fatal("unknown service: %s/%s", service, protocol);
+ *portp = sp->s_port;
+ }
++
+ return (buf);
+ }
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c Sat Jun 1 15:07:27 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
+ #include <quote_821_local.h>
+ #include <mail_proto.h>
+ #include <mime_state.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /* Application-specific. */
+
+@@ -170,6 +171,8 @@
+ char *words;
+ char *word;
+ int n;
++ int oldfeatures;
++ int rval;
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare for disaster.
+@@ -231,7 +234,8 @@
+ session->namaddr,
+ translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
+ }
+-
++ if (var_smtp_always_ehlo)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
+ /*
+ * Pick up some useful features offered by the SMTP server. XXX Until we
+ * have a portable routine to convert from string to off_t with proper
+@@ -243,6 +247,7 @@
+ * MicroSoft implemented AUTH based on an old draft.
+ */
+ lines = resp->str;
++ oldfeatures = state->features; /* remember */
+ while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
+ if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") && (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t=")) != 0) {
+ if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
+@@ -259,6 +264,8 @@
+ state->size_limit = off_cvt_string(word);
+ }
+ }
++ else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
+ smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
+@@ -276,6 +283,128 @@
+ msg_info("server features: 0x%x size %.0f",
+ state->features, (double) state->size_limit);
+
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
++ (var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer) &&
++ (!(session->tls_enforce_tls || session->tls_use_tls)))
++ msg_info("Host offered STARTTLS: [%s]", session->host);
++ if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) &&
++ !(state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS))
++ {
++ /*
++ * We are enforced to use TLS but it is not offered, so we will give
++ * up on this host. We won't even try STARTTLS, because we could
++ * receive a "500 command unrecognized" which would bounce the
++ * message. We instead want to delay until STARTTLS becomes
++ * available.
++ */
++ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "Could not start TLS: not offered"));
++ }
++ if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) && !pfixtls_clientengine) {
++ /*
++ * We would like to start client TLS, but our own TLS-engine is
++ * not running.
++ */
++ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
++ "Could not start TLS: our TLS-engine not running"));
++ }
++ if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
++ ((session->tls_use_tls && pfixtls_clientengine) ||
++ (session->tls_enforce_tls))) {
++ /*
++ * Try to use the TLS feature
++ */
++ smtp_chat_cmd(state, "STARTTLS");
++ if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2) {
++ state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
++ /*
++ * At this point a political decision is necessary. If we
++ * enforce usage of tls, we have to close the connection
++ * now.
++ */
++ if (session->tls_enforce_tls)
++ return (smtp_site_fail(state, resp->code,
++ "host %s refused to start TLS: %s",
++ session->host,
++ translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
++ } else {
++ if (rval = pfixtls_start_clienttls(session->stream,
++ var_smtp_starttls_tmout,
++ session->tls_enforce_peername,
++ session->host,
++ &(session->tls_info)))
++ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
++ "Could not start TLS: client failure"));
++
++
++ /*
++ * Now the connection is established and maybe we do have a
++ * validated cert with a CommonName in it.
++ * In enforce_peername state, the handshake would already have
++ * been terminated so the check here is for logging only!
++ */
++ if (session->tls_info.peer_CN != NULL) {
++ if (!session->tls_info.peer_verified) {
++ msg_info("Peer certficate could not be verified");
++ if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
++ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
++ var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
++ &(session->tls_info));
++ return(smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Could not verify certificate"));
++ }
++ }
++ } else if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
++ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
++ var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
++ &(session->tls_info));
++ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Cannot verify hostname"));
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * At this point we have to re-negotiate the "EHLO" to reget
++ * the feature-list
++ */
++ state->features = oldfeatures;
++#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
++ if (state->sasl_mechanism_list) {
++ myfree(state->sasl_mechanism_list);
++ state->sasl_mechanism_list = 0;
++ }
++#endif
++ if (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP) {
++ smtp_chat_cmd(state, "EHLO %s", var_myhostname);
++ if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2)
++ state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
++ }
++ lines = resp->str;
++ (void) mystrtok(&lines, "\n");
++ while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
++ if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") &&
++ (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t=")) != 0) {
++ if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_8BITMIME;
++ else if (strcasecmp(word, "PIPELINING") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_PIPELINING;
++ else if (strcasecmp(word, "SIZE") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_SIZE;
++ else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
++ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
++#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
++ else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable &&
++ strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
++ smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
++#endif
++ }
++ }
++ /*
++ * Actually, at this point STARTTLS should not be offered
++ * anymore, so we could check for a protocol violation, but
++ * what should we do then?
++ */
++
++ }
++ }
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_AUTH))
+ return (smtp_sasl_helo_login(state));
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_session.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_session.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_session.c Mon Nov 20 19:06:05 2000
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_session.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -42,15 +42,42 @@
+ #include <vstream.h>
+ #include <stringops.h>
+
++#include <mail_params.h>
++#include <maps.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
++
+ /* Application-specific. */
+
+ #include "smtp.h"
+
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++/* static lists */
++static MAPS *tls_per_site;
++
++/* smtp_tls_list_init - initialize lists */
++
++void smtp_tls_list_init(void)
++{
++ tls_per_site = maps_create(VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, var_smtp_tls_per_site,
++ DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* smtp_session_alloc - allocate and initialize SMTP_SESSION structure */
+
+-SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
++SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *dest, VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
+ {
+ SMTP_SESSION *session;
++ const char *lookup;
++ char *lookup_key;
++ int host_dont_use = 0;
++ int host_use = 0;
++ int host_enforce = 0;
++ int host_enforce_peername = 0;
++ int recipient_dont_use = 0;
++ int recipient_use = 0;
++ int recipient_enforce = 0;
++ int recipient_enforce_peername = 0;
+
+ session = (SMTP_SESSION *) mymalloc(sizeof(*session));
+ session->stream = stream;
+@@ -58,6 +85,61 @@
+ session->addr = mystrdup(addr);
+ session->namaddr = concatenate(host, "[", addr, "]", (char *) 0);
+ session->best = 1;
++ session->tls_use_tls = session->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
++ session->tls_enforce_peername = 0;
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(host));
++ if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, lookup_key, 0)) {
++ if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
++ host_dont_use = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
++ host_use = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
++ host_enforce = host_enforce_peername = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
++ host_enforce = 1;
++ else
++ msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for receiving host %s: '%s', using default policy", session->host, lookup);
++ }
++ myfree(lookup_key);
++ lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(dest));
++ if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, dest, 0)) {
++ if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
++ recipient_dont_use = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
++ recipient_use = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
++ recipient_enforce = recipient_enforce_peername = 1;
++ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
++ recipient_enforce = 1;
++ else
++ msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for recipient domain %s: '%s', using default policy", dest, lookup);
++ }
++ myfree(lookup_key);
++
++ if ((var_smtp_enforce_tls && !host_dont_use && !recipient_dont_use) || host_enforce ||
++ recipient_enforce)
++ session->tls_enforce_tls = session->tls_use_tls = 1;
++
++ /*
++ * Set up peername checking. We want to make sure that a MUST* entry in
++ * the tls_per_site table always has precedence. MUST always must lead to
++ * a peername check, MUST_NOPEERMATCH must always disable it. Only when
++ * no explicit setting has been found, the default will be used.
++ * There is the case left, that both "host" and "recipient" settings
++ * conflict. In this case, the "host" setting wins.
++ */
++ if (host_enforce && host_enforce_peername)
++ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
++ else if (recipient_enforce && recipient_enforce_peername)
++ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
++ else if (var_smtp_enforce_tls && var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername)
++ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
++
++ else if ((var_smtp_use_tls && !host_dont_use && !recipient_dont_use) || host_use || recipient_use)
++ session->tls_use_tls = 1;
++#endif
++ session->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+ return (session);
+ }
+
+@@ -65,6 +147,11 @@
+
+ void smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *session)
+ {
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ vstream_fflush(session->stream);
++ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream, var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 0,
++ &(session->tls_info));
++#endif
+ vstream_fclose(session->stream);
+ myfree(session->host);
+ myfree(session->addr);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c Thu Sep 28 19:06:09 2000
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -86,7 +86,11 @@
+ if ((result = htable_find(cache, name)) == 0) {
+ fqdn = vstring_alloc(10);
+ if (dns_lookup_types(name, smtp_unalias_flags, (DNS_RR **) 0,
+- fqdn, (VSTRING *) 0, T_MX, T_A, 0) != DNS_OK)
++ fqdn, (VSTRING *) 0, T_MX, T_A,
++#ifdef INET6
++ T_AAAA,
++#endif
++ 0) != DNS_OK)
+ vstring_strcpy(fqdn, name);
+ htable_enter(cache, name, result = vstring_export(fqdn));
+ }
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/Makefile.in Tue Jun 11 03:13:44 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
+ smtpd.o: ../../include/quote_flags.h
+ smtpd.o: ../../include/lex_822.h
+ smtpd.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
++smtpd.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtpd.o: smtpd_token.h
+ smtpd.o: smtpd.h
+ smtpd.o: smtpd_check.h
+@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@
+ smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
+ smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
+ smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
++smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtpd_chat.o: smtpd.h
+ smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+ smtpd_chat.o: smtpd_chat.h
+@@ -197,6 +199,7 @@
+ smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_addr_find.h
+ smtpd_check.o: ../../include/match_parent_style.h
+ smtpd_check.o: ../../include/strip_addr.h
++smtpd_check.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtpd_check.o: smtpd.h
+ smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+ smtpd_check.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
+@@ -213,6 +216,7 @@
+ smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/vstream.h
+ smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
++smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtpd_sasl_glue.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.c
+ smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+ smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/msg.h
+@@ -266,6 +270,7 @@
+ smtpd_state.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+ smtpd_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
+ smtpd_state.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
++smtpd_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+ smtpd_state.o: smtpd_chat.h
+ smtpd_state.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
+ smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.c
+@@ -275,3 +280,4 @@
+ smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.h
+ smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+ smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
++smtpd_token.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.c Tue May 28 19:08:56 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
+ #include <string_list.h>
+ #include <quote_822_local.h>
+ #include <lex_822.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /* Single-threaded server skeleton. */
+
+@@ -338,6 +339,7 @@
+ */
+ int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
+ int var_smtpd_tmout;
++char *var_relay_ccerts;
+ int var_smtpd_soft_erlim;
+ int var_smtpd_hard_erlim;
+ int var_queue_minfree; /* XXX use off_t */
+@@ -385,6 +387,15 @@
+ char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
+ char *var_smtpd_null_key;
+ int var_smtpd_hist_thrsh;
++int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
++int var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
++int var_smtpd_use_tls;
++int var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
++int var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
++int var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
++int var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
++int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
++int var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
+
+ /*
+ * Silly little macros.
+@@ -489,11 +500,21 @@
+ if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0)
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-VRFY");
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-ETRN");
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if ((state->tls_use_tls || state->tls_enforce_tls) && (!state->tls_active))
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-STARTTLS");
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) {
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (!state->tls_auth_only || state->tls_active) {
++#endif
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+ if (var_broken_auth_clients)
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ }
++#endif
+ }
+ #endif
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-%s", VERP_CMD);
+@@ -918,11 +939,76 @@
+ state->rcpt_count = 0;
+ }
+
++/* CN_sanitize - make sure, the CN-string is well behaved */
++
++static void CN_sanitize(char *CNstring)
++{
++ int i;
++ int len;
++ int parencount;
++
++ /*
++ * The information included in the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its
++ * issuer can be included into the Received: header line. The characters
++ * allowed as well as comment nesting are limited by RFC822.
++ */
++
++ len = strlen(CNstring);
++ /*
++ * The Received: header can only contain characters. Make sure that only
++ * acceptable characters are printed. Maybe we could allow more, but
++ * not everything makes sense inside a CommonName.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
++ if (!((CNstring[i] >= 'A') && (CNstring[i] <='Z')) &&
++ !((CNstring[i] >= 'a') && (CNstring[i] <='z')) &&
++ !((CNstring[i] >= '0') && (CNstring[i] <='9')) &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '(') && (CNstring[i] != ')') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '[') && (CNstring[i] != ']') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '{') && (CNstring[i] != '}') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '<') && (CNstring[i] != '>') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '?') && (CNstring[i] != '!') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != ';') && (CNstring[i] != ':') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '"') && (CNstring[i] != '\'') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '/') && (CNstring[i] != '|') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '+') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '~') && (CNstring[i] != '@') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '#') && (CNstring[i] != '$') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '%') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '^') && (CNstring[i] != '*') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '_') && (CNstring[i] != '-') &&
++ (CNstring[i] != '.') && (CNstring[i] != ' '))
++ CNstring[i] = '?';
++
++ /*
++ * This information will go into the Received: header inside a comment.
++ * Since comments can be nested, parentheses '(' and ')' must match.
++ */
++ parencount = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++ if (CNstring[i] == '(')
++ parencount++;
++ else if (CNstring[i] == ')')
++ parencount--;
++ }
++ /*
++ * The necessary condition is violated. Do YOU know, where to correct?
++ * I don't know, so I will practically remove all parentheses.
++ */
++ if (parencount != 0) {
++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
++ if ((CNstring[i] == '(') || (CNstring[i] == ')'))
++ CNstring[i] = '/';
++ }
++}
++
+ /* data_cmd - process DATA command */
+
+ static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+ {
+ char *start;
++ char *peer_CN;
++ char *issuer_CN;
+ int len;
+ int curr_rec_type;
+ int prev_rec_type;
+@@ -961,6 +1047,35 @@
+ "Received: from %s (%s [%s])",
+ state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name,
+ state->name, state->addr);
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_active) {
++ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
++ "\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits))",
++ state->tls_info.protocol, state->tls_info.cipher_name,
++ state->tls_info.cipher_usebits,
++ state->tls_info.cipher_algbits);
++ if (state->tls_info.peer_CN) {
++ peer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_CN);
++ CN_sanitize(peer_CN);
++ issuer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.issuer_CN);
++ CN_sanitize(issuer_CN);
++ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified)
++ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
++ "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (verified OK))",
++ peer_CN, issuer_CN);
++ else
++ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
++ "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (not verified))",
++ peer_CN, issuer_CN);
++ myfree(issuer_CN);
++ myfree(peer_CN);
++ }
++ else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)
++ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
++ "\t(Client did not present a certificate)");
++ else
++ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
++ "\t(No client certificate requested)");
++ }
+ if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) {
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\tby %s (%s) with %s id %s",
+@@ -1310,6 +1425,77 @@
+ }
+ }
+
++static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
++{
++ char *err;
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (argc != 1) {
++ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: STARTTLS");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (state->tls_active != 0) {
++ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 Error: TLS already active");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (state->tls_use_tls == 0) {
++ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ if (!pfixtls_serverengine) {
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 TLS not available due to temporary reason");
++ return (0);
++ }
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 Ready to start TLS");
++ vstream_fflush(state->client);
++ /*
++ * When deciding about continuing the handshake, we will stop when a
++ * client certificate was _required_ and none was presented or the
++ * verification failed. This however does only make sense when TLS is
++ * enforced. Otherwise we would happily perform perform the SMTP
++ * transaction without any STARTTLS at all! So only have the handshake
++ * fail when TLS is also enforced.
++ */
++ if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
++ state->name, state->addr, &(state->tls_info),
++ (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && state->tls_enforce_tls))) {
++ /*
++ * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
++ * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
++ * problem is not addressed in postfix!
++ */
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ state->tls_active = 1;
++ helo_reset(state);
++ mail_reset(state);
++ rcpt_reset(state);
++ return (0);
++#else
++ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
++ return (-1);
++#endif
++}
++
++static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
++{
++ int failure = 0;
++
++ if (state->reason && state->where && strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DOT))
++ failure = 1;
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ vstream_fflush(state->client);
++ if (state->tls_active)
++ pfixtls_stop_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
++ failure, &(state->tls_info));
++#endif
++ state->tls_active = 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on
+ * any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without
+@@ -1328,6 +1514,10 @@
+ "HELO", helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
+ "EHLO", ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
+
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ "STARTTLS", starttls_cmd, 0,
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ "AUTH", smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd, 0,
+ #endif
+@@ -1438,9 +1628,28 @@
+ state->error_count++;
+ continue;
+ }
++ if (state->tls_enforce_tls &&
++ !state->tls_active &&
++ cmdp->action != starttls_cmd &&
++ cmdp->action != noop_cmd &&
++ cmdp->action != ehlo_cmd &&
++ cmdp->action != quit_cmd) {
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state,
++ "530 Must issue a STARTTLS command first");
++ state->error_count++;
++ continue;
++ }
+ state->where = cmdp->name;
+- if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0)
++ if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0) {
+ state->error_count++;
++ /*
++ * Die after TLS negotiation failure, as there is no
++ * stable way to recover from a possible mixture of
++ * TLS and SMTP protocol from the client.
++ */
++ if (cmdp->action == starttls_cmd)
++ break;
++ }
+ if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT)
+ && state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
+ state->error_count++;
+@@ -1464,6 +1673,7 @@
+ * Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP
+ * dialog.
+ */
++ tls_reset(state);
+ helo_reset(state);
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable)
+@@ -1496,6 +1706,46 @@
+ * machines.
+ */
+ smtpd_state_init(&state, stream);
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state))) {
++ state.tls_use_tls = 0;
++ state.tls_enforce_tls = 0;
++ state.tls_auth_only = 0;
++ }
++ else {
++ state.tls_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls | var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
++ state.tls_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode) {
++ /*
++ * TLS has been set to wrapper mode, meaning that we run on a
++ * seperate port and we must switch to TLS layer before actually
++ * performing the SMTP protocol. This implies enforce-mode.
++ */
++ state.tls_use_tls = state.tls_enforce_tls = 1;
++ if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state.client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
++ state.name, state.addr, &state.tls_info,
++ var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)) {
++ /*
++ * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
++ * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
++ * problem is not addressed in postfix!
++ */
++ return;
++ }
++ state.tls_active = 1;
++ }
++ if (var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || state.tls_enforce_tls)
++ state.tls_auth_only = 1;
++ }
++#else
++ state.tls_use_tls = 0;
++ state.tls_enforce_tls = 0;
++ state.tls_auth_only = 0;
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Provide the SMTP service.
++ */
+
+ /*
+ * See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client.
+@@ -1513,10 +1763,6 @@
+ smtpd_chat_reply(&state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner);
+ msg_info("connect from %s[%s]", state.name, state.addr);
+ }
+-
+- /*
+- * Provide the SMTP service.
+- */
+ smtpd_proto(&state);
+
+ /*
+@@ -1542,7 +1788,6 @@
+
+ static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+ {
+-
+ /*
+ * Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in
+ * case they specify a filename pattern.
+@@ -1558,6 +1803,12 @@
+ msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
+ VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls || var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode)
++ pfixtls_init_serverengine(var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd,
++ var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* main - the main program */
+@@ -1580,6 +1831,7 @@
+ VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
+@@ -1595,6 +1847,13 @@
+ VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route,
+ VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable,
+ VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode,
++ VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
++ VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
++ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
+@@ -1623,6 +1882,7 @@
+ VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0,
++ VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_relay_ccerts, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+
+@@ -1638,3 +1898,4 @@
+ MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
+ 0);
+ }
++
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Fri Mar 29 22:10:13 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ * Global library.
+ */
+ #include <mail_stream.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Variables that keep track of conversation state. There is only one SMTP
+@@ -81,6 +82,11 @@
+ VSTRING *sasl_decoded;
+ #endif
+ int warn_if_reject;
++ int tls_active;
++ int tls_use_tls;
++ int tls_enforce_tls;
++ int tls_auth_only;
++ tls_info_t tls_info;
+ } SMTPD_STATE;
+
+ extern void smtpd_state_init(SMTPD_STATE *, VSTREAM *);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c Mon Jun 10 22:14:39 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@
+
+ #include <namadr_list.h>
+ #include <domain_list.h>
++#include <string_list.h>
+ #include <mail_params.h>
+ #include <canon_addr.h>
+ #include <resolve_clnt.h>
+@@ -345,6 +346,9 @@
+ static DOMAIN_LIST *relay_domains;
+ static NAMADR_LIST *mynetworks;
+ static NAMADR_LIST *perm_mx_networks;
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++static MAPS *relay_ccerts;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * How to do parent domain wildcard matching, if any.
+@@ -530,6 +534,10 @@
+ perm_mx_networks =
+ namadr_list_init(match_parent_style(VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS),
+ var_perm_mx_networks);
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ relay_ccerts = maps_create(VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, var_relay_ccerts,
++ DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-parse and pre-open the recipient maps.
+@@ -932,7 +940,11 @@
+ msg_info("%s: %s", myname, name);
+
+ dns_status = dns_lookup_types(name, 0, (DNS_RR **) 0, (VSTRING *) 0,
+- (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX, 0);
++ (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX,
++#ifdef INET6
++ T_AAAA,
++#endif
++ 0);
+ if (dns_status != DNS_OK)
+ return (smtpd_check_reject(state, MAIL_ERROR_POLICY,
+ "%d <%s>: %s rejected: Host not found",
+@@ -954,7 +966,11 @@
+ msg_info("%s: %s", myname, name);
+
+ dns_status = dns_lookup_types(name, 0, (DNS_RR **) 0, (VSTRING *) 0,
+- (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX, 0);
++ (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX,
++#ifdef INET6
++ T_AAAA,
++#endif
++ 0);
+ if (dns_status != DNS_OK)
+ return (smtpd_check_reject(state, MAIL_ERROR_POLICY,
+ "%d <%s>: %s rejected: Domain not found",
+@@ -966,6 +982,36 @@
+
+ static int permit_auth_destination(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient);
+
++/* permit_tls_clientcerts - OK/DUNNO for message relaying */
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++static int permit_tls_clientcerts(SMTPD_STATE *state, int permit_all_certs)
++{
++ char *low_name;
++ const char *found;
++
++ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && permit_all_certs) {
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("Relaying allowed for all verified client certificates");
++ return(SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
++ }
++
++ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint) {
++ low_name = lowercase(mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint));
++ found = maps_find(relay_ccerts, low_name, DICT_FLAG_FIXED);
++ myfree(low_name);
++ if (found) {
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("Relaying allowed for certified client: %s", found);
++ return (SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
++ } else if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("relay_clientcerts: No match for fingerprint '%s'",
++ state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint);
++ }
++ return (SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* check_relay_domains - OK/FAIL for message relaying */
+
+ static int check_relay_domains(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient,
+@@ -1145,6 +1191,49 @@
+
+ static int has_my_addr(const char *host)
+ {
++#ifdef INET6
++ char *myname = "has_my_addr";
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
++ int error;
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: host %s", myname, host);
++
++ /*
++ * If we can't lookup the host, play safe and assume it is OK.
++ */
++#define YUP 1
++#define NOPE 0
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res0);
++ if (error) {
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: host %s: %s", myname, host, gai_strerror(error));
++ return (YUP);
++ }
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if (msg_verbose) {
++ if (getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf),
++ NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
++ strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
++ }
++ msg_info("%s: addr %s", myname, hbuf);
++ }
++ if (own_inet_addr(res->ai_addr)) {
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ return (YUP);
++ }
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_info("%s: host %s: no match", myname, host);
++
++ return (NOPE);
++#else
+ char *myname = "has_my_addr";
+ struct in_addr addr;
+ char **cpp;
+@@ -1180,6 +1269,7 @@
+ msg_info("%s: host %s: no match", myname, host);
+
+ return (NOPE);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* i_am_mx - is this machine listed as MX relay */
+@@ -1834,7 +1924,7 @@
+ static int reject_maps_rbl(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+ {
+ char *myname = "reject_maps_rbl";
+- ARGV *octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
++ ARGV *octets;
+ VSTRING *query = vstring_alloc(100);
+ char *saved_domains = mystrdup(var_maps_rbl_domains);
+ char *bp = saved_domains;
+@@ -1846,17 +1936,29 @@
+ int dns_status = DNS_FAIL;
+ int i;
+ int result;
++ struct in_addr a;
+ VSTRING *why;
+
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: %s", myname, state->addr);
+
+- /*
+- * IPv4 only for now
+- */
+-#ifdef INET6
++#ifndef INET6
++ /* IPv4 only for now */
+ if (inet_pton(AF_INET, state->addr, &a) != 1)
+ return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
++ octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
++#else
++ /* IPv4 and IPv6-mapped IPv4 only for now */
++ if (inet_pton(AF_INET, state->addr, &a) == 1)
++ octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
++ else {
++ struct in6_addr a6;
++ if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, state->addr, &a6) != 1)
++ return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
++ if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6) || (strrchr(state->addr,':') == NULL))
++ return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
++ octets = argv_split(strrchr(state->addr,':')+1, ".");
++ }
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+@@ -2154,6 +2256,12 @@
+ #else
+ msg_warn("restriction `%s' ignored: no SASL support", name);
+ #endif
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ } else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
++ status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 1);
++ } else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
++ status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 0);
++#endif
+ } else if (strcasecmp(name, REJECT_UNKNOWN_RCPTDOM) == 0) {
+ if (state->recipient)
+ status = reject_unknown_address(state, state->recipient,
+@@ -2588,6 +2696,7 @@
+ char *var_rcpt_checks = "";
+ char *var_etrn_checks = "";
+ char *var_relay_domains = "";
++char *var_relay_ccerts = "";
+ char *var_mynetworks = "";
+ char *var_notify_classes = "";
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c Thu Jul 5 22:09:47 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include <msg.h>
++#include <mymalloc.h>
++#include <valid_hostname.h>
++#include <stringops.h>
++
++/* Global library. */
++
+ /*
+ * Older systems don't have h_errno. Even modern systems don't have
+ * hstrerror().
+@@ -84,16 +93,11 @@
+ )
+ #endif
+
+-/* Utility library. */
+-
+-#include <msg.h>
+-#include <mymalloc.h>
+-#include <valid_hostname.h>
+-#include <stringops.h>
+-
+-/* Global library. */
+-
+-
++#ifdef INET6
++#define GAI_STRERROR(error) \
++ ((error = EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(error) : strerror(errno))
++#endif
++
+ /* Application-specific. */
+
+ #include "smtpd.h"
+@@ -102,16 +106,23 @@
+
+ void smtpd_peer_init(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+ {
+- struct sockaddr_in sin;
+- SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
++#else
++ struct sockaddr ss;
++ struct in_addr *in;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+- int i;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE len;
++
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
++ len = sizeof(ss);
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the peer address information.
+ */
+- if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client),
+- (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) >= 0) {
++ if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client), sa, &len) >= 0) {
+ errno = 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -127,18 +138,51 @@
+ /*
+ * Look up and "verify" the client hostname.
+ */
+- else if (errno == 0 && sin.sin_family == AF_INET) {
+- state->addr = mystrdup(inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+- hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
+- sizeof(sin.sin_addr), AF_INET);
+- if (hp == 0) {
++ else if (errno == 0 && (sa->sa_family == AF_INET
++#ifdef INET6
++ || sa->sa_family == AF_INET6
++#endif
++ )) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct addrinfo hints, *rnull = NULL;
++#else
++ char abuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++ char *hbuf;
++#endif
++ int error = -1;
++
++#ifdef INET6
++ (void)getnameinfo(sa, len, abuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++#else
++ in = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
++ inet_ntop(AF_INET, in, abuf, sizeof(hbuf));
++#endif
++ state->addr = mystrdup(abuf);
++#ifdef INET6
++ error = getnameinfo(sa, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
++#else
++ hbuf = NULL;
++ hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)in, sizeof(*in), AF_INET);
++ if (hp) {
++ error = 0;
++ hbuf = mystrdup(hp->h_name);
++ } else
++ error = 1;
++#endif
++ if (error) {
+ state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
++#ifdef INET6
++ state->peer_code = (error == EAI_AGAIN ? 4 : 5);
++#else
+ state->peer_code = (h_errno == TRY_AGAIN ? 4 : 5);
+- } else if (!valid_hostname(hp->h_name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
++#endif
++ } else if (!valid_hostname(hbuf, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+ state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
+ state->peer_code = 5;
+ } else {
+- state->name = mystrdup(hp->h_name); /* hp->name is clobbered!! */
++ state->name = mystrdup(hbuf); /* hp->name is clobbered!! */
+ state->peer_code = 2;
+
+ /*
+@@ -150,16 +194,31 @@
+ state->peer_code = code; \
+ }
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(state->name, NULL, &hints, &rnull);
++ if (error) {
++ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
++ state->addr, state->name, GAI_STRERROR(error));
++ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, (error == EAI_AGAIN ? 4 : 5));
++ }
++ /* memcmp() isn't needed if we use getaddrinfo */
++ if (rnull)
++ freeaddrinfo(rnull);
++#else
+ hp = gethostbyname(state->name); /* clobbers hp->name!! */
+ if (hp == 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
+ state->addr, state->name, HSTRERROR(h_errno));
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, (h_errno == TRY_AGAIN ? 4 : 5));
+- } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
++ } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(*in)) {
+ msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: bad address size %d",
+ state->addr, state->name, hp->h_length);
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, 5);
+ } else {
++ int i;
+ for (i = 0; /* void */ ; i++) {
+ if (hp->h_addr_list[i] == 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: address not listed for hostname %s",
+@@ -167,12 +226,11 @@
+ REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, 5);
+ break;
+ }
+- if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i],
+- (char *) &sin.sin_addr,
+- sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) == 0)
++ if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], (char *)in, sizeof(*in)) == 0)
+ break; /* keep peer name */
+ }
+ }
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c Tue Sep 12 00:45:40 2000
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -128,6 +128,13 @@
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: authentication not enabled");
+ return (-1);
+ }
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ if (state->tls_auth_only && !state->tls_active) {
++ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
++ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "538 Encryption required for requested authentication mechanism");
++ return (-1);
++ }
++#endif
+ if (state->sasl_username) {
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: already authenticated");
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c Tue Nov 6 18:35:40 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@
+ state->msg_size = 0;
+ state->junk_cmds = 0;
+ state->warn_if_reject = 0;
++ state->tls_active = 0;
++ state->tls_use_tls = 0;
++ state->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
++ state->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
++ state->tls_auth_only = 0;
+
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state))
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c Sat Jun 8 20:21:41 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@
+ } else {
+ if (strncmp(argv[optind], "inet:", 5) == 0)
+ argv[optind] += 5;
+- sock = inet_listen(argv[optind], backlog, BLOCKING);
++ sock = inet_listen(argv[optind], backlog, BLOCKING, 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++SHELL = /bin/sh
++SRCS = tlsmgr.c
++OBJS = tlsmgr.o
++HDRS =
++TESTSRC =
++WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
++ -Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
++ -Wunused
++DEFS = -I. -I$(INC_DIR) -D$(SYSTYPE)
++CFLAGS = $(DEBUG) $(OPT) $(DEFS)
++TESTPROG=
++PROG = tlsmgr
++INC_DIR = ../../include
++LIBS = ../../lib/libmaster.a ../../lib/libglobal.a ../../lib/libutil.a
++
++.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
++
++$(PROG): $(OBJS) $(LIBS)
++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LIBS) $(SYSLIBS)
++
++Makefile: Makefile.in
++ (set -e; echo "# DO NOT EDIT"; $(OPTS) $(SHELL) ../../makedefs; cat $?) >$@
++
++test: $(TESTPROG)
++
++update: ../../libexec/$(PROG)
++
++../../libexec/$(PROG): $(PROG)
++ cp $(PROG) ../../libexec
++
++printfck: $(OBJS) $(PROG)
++ rm -rf printfck
++ mkdir printfck
++ cp *.h printfck
++ sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile >printfck/Makefile
++ set -e; for i in *.c; do printfck -f .printfck $$i >printfck/$$i; done
++ cd printfck; make "INC_DIR=../../../../include" `cd ../..; ls *.o`
++
++lint:
++ lint $(DEFS) $(SRCS) $(LINTFIX)
++
++clean:
++ rm -f *.o *core $(PROG) $(TESTPROG) junk
++ rm -rf printfck
++
++tidy: clean
++
++depend: $(MAKES)
++ (sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile.in; \
++ set -e; for i in [a-z][a-z0-9]*.c; do \
++ $(CC) -E $(DEFS) $(INCL) $$i | sed -n -e '/^# *1 *"\([^"]*\)".*/{' \
++ -e 's//'`echo $$i|sed 's/c$$/o/'`': \1/' -e 'p' -e '}'; \
++ done) | grep -v '[.][o][:][ ][/]' >$$$$ && mv $$$$ Makefile.in
++ @make -f Makefile.in Makefile
++
++# do not edit below this line - it is generated by 'make depend'
++tlsmgr.o: tlsmgr.c
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/msg.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/events.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstream.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/dict.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/argv.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstring.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/stringops.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/connect.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/myflock.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_conf.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/master_proto.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
++tlsmgr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* tlsmgr 8
++/* SUMMARY
++/* Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* \fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
++/* files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
++/* and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
++/*
++/* The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
++/* OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
++/* is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
++/* /dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
++/* run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
++/* using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
++/* [0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
++/* having a default of 1 hour.
++/*
++/* Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
++/* connect to the entropy source at startup.
++/*
++/* The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
++/* session cache and timevalues.
++/*
++/* Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
++/* entropy already collected during previous runs.
++/*
++/* From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
++/* sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
++/* periodically with the time changing randomly from
++/* [0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
++/* STANDARDS
++/* SECURITY
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
++/* to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
++/* cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
++/* touch the contents of the cached data.
++/* DIAGNOSTICS
++/* Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
++/* BUGS
++/* There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
++/* session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
++/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
++/* this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
++/* and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
++/* a configuration change.
++/* .SH Session Cache
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
++/* Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
++/* cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
++/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++/* Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
++/* older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
++/* performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++/* seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
++/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
++/* Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
++/* cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
++/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++/* Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
++/* older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
++/* performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
++/* seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
++/* .SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* .IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
++/* Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
++/* from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
++/* name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
++/* dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
++/* tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
++/* \fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
++/* .IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
++/* Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
++/* Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
++/* .IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
++/* Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
++/* startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
++/* /etc/postfix/prng_exch.
++/* .IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
++/* Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
++/* This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
++/* with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
++/* value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
++/* .IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
++/* Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
++/* pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
++/* in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
++/* between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
++/* SEE ALSO
++/* smtp(8) SMTP client
++/* smtpd(8) SMTP server
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/*--*/
++
++/* System library. */
++
++#include <sys_defs.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/time.h> /* gettimeofday, not POSIX */
++
++/* OpenSSL library. */
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++#include <openssl/rand.h> /* For the PRNG */
++#endif
++
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include <msg.h>
++#include <events.h>
++#include <dict.h>
++#include <stringops.h>
++#include <mymalloc.h>
++#include <connect.h>
++#include <myflock.h>
++
++/* Global library. */
++
++#include <mail_conf.h>
++#include <mail_params.h>
++#include <pfixtls.h>
++
++/* Master process interface */
++
++#include <master_proto.h>
++#include <mail_server.h>
++
++/* Application-specific. */
++
++ /*
++ * Tunables.
++ */
++char *var_tls_rand_source;
++int var_tls_rand_bytes;
++int var_tls_reseed_period;
++int var_tls_prng_upd_period;
++
++static int rand_exch_fd;
++static int rand_source_dev_fd = -1;
++static int rand_source_socket_fd = -1;
++static int srvr_scache_db_active;
++static int clnt_scache_db_active;
++static DICT *srvr_scache_db = NULL;
++static DICT *clnt_scache_db = NULL;
++
++static void tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
++{
++ struct timeval tv;
++ unsigned char buffer[1024];
++ int next_period;
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ /*
++ * It is time to update the PRNG exchange file. Since other processes might
++ * have added entropy, we do this in a read_stir-back_write cycle.
++ */
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
++ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
++
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
++ msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++
++ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
++ if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
++ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
++
++ RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
++ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
++ if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
++ msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
++
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
++ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++
++ /*
++ * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
++ * next execution randomly.
++ */
++ next_period = (var_tls_prng_upd_period * buffer[0]) / 255;
++ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_prng_upd_event, dummy, next_period);
++#endif
++}
++
++
++static void tlsmgr_reseed_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
++{
++ int egd_success;
++ int next_period;
++ int rand_bytes;
++ char buffer[255];
++ struct timeval tv;
++ unsigned char randbyte;
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ /*
++ * It is time to reseed the PRNG.
++ */
++
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
++ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
++ if (rand_source_dev_fd != -1) {
++ rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
++ if (rand_bytes > 0)
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ else if (rand_bytes < 0) {
++ msg_fatal("Read from entropy device %s failed",
++ var_tls_rand_source);
++ }
++ } else if (rand_source_socket_fd != -1) {
++ egd_success = 0;
++ buffer[0] = 1;
++ buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
++ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
++ msg_info("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
++ msg_info("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ else {
++ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
++ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
++ msg_info("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ else {
++ egd_success = 1;
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ }
++ }
++ if (!egd_success) {
++ msg_info("Lost connection to EGD-device, exiting to reconnect.");
++ exit(0);
++ }
++ } else if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
++ rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source, var_tls_rand_bytes);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
++ * next execution randomly.
++ */
++ RAND_bytes(&randbyte, 1);
++ next_period = (var_tls_reseed_period * randbyte) / 255;
++ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_reseed_event, dummy, next_period);
++#endif
++}
++
++
++static int tlsmgr_do_scache_check(DICT *scache_db, int scache_timeout,
++ int start)
++{
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ int func;
++ int len;
++ int n;
++ int delete = 0;
++ int result;
++ struct timeval tv;
++ const char *member;
++ const char *value;
++ char *member_copy;
++ unsigned char nibble, *data;
++ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
++
++ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
++ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
++
++ /*
++ * Run through the given dictionary and check the stored sessions.
++ * If "start" is set to 1, a new run is initiated, otherwise the next
++ * item is accessed. The state is internally kept in the DICT.
++ */
++ if (start)
++ func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST;
++ else
++ func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT;
++ result = dict_seq(scache_db, func, &member, &value);
++
++ if (result > 0)
++ return 0; /* End of list reached */
++ else if (result < 0)
++ msg_fatal("Database fault, should already be caught.");
++ else {
++ member_copy = mystrdup(member);
++ len = strlen(value);
++ RAND_seed(value, len); /* Use it to increase entropy */
++ if (len < 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
++ delete = 1; /* Messed up, delete */
++ else if (len > 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
++ len = 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
++ if (!delete) {
++ data = (unsigned char *)(&scache_info);
++ memset(data, 0, len / 2);
++ for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
++ if ((value[n] >= '0') && (value[n] <= '9'))
++ nibble = value[n] - '0';
++ else
++ nibble = value[n] - 'A' + 10;
++ if (n % 2)
++ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
++ else
++ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
++ }
++
++ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
++ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
++ (scache_info.timestamp + scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
++ delete = 1;
++ }
++ if (delete)
++ result = dict_del(scache_db, member_copy);
++ myfree(member_copy);
++ }
++
++ if (delete && result)
++ msg_info("Could not delete %s", member);
++ return 1;
++
++#else
++ return 0;
++#endif
++}
++
++static void tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
++{
++
++ /*
++ * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
++ * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
++ */
++ clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db,
++ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
++ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event, dummy,
++ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
++}
++
++
++static void tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
++{
++
++ /*
++ * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
++ * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
++ */
++ srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
++ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
++ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event, dummy,
++ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
++}
++
++
++static DICT *tlsmgr_cache_open(const char *dbname)
++{
++ DICT *retval;
++ char *dbpagname;
++ char *dbdirname;
++
++ /*
++ * First, try to find out the real name of the database file, so that
++ * it can be removed.
++ */
++ if (!strncmp(dbname, "sdbm:", 5)) {
++ dbpagname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".pag", NULL);
++ REMOVE(dbpagname);
++ myfree(dbpagname);
++ dbdirname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".dir", NULL);
++ REMOVE(dbdirname);
++ myfree(dbdirname);
++ }
++ else {
++ msg_warn("Only type sdbm: supported: %s", dbname);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Now open the dictionary. Do it with O_EXCL, so that we only open a
++ * fresh file. If we cannot open it with a fresh file, then we won't
++ * touch it.
++ */
++ retval = dict_open(dbname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
++ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
++ if (!retval)
++ msg_warn("Could not create dictionary %s", dbname);
++ return retval;
++}
++
++/* tlsmgr_trigger_event - respond to external trigger(s) */
++
++static void tlsmgr_trigger_event(char *buf, int len,
++ char *unused_service, char **argv)
++{
++ /*
++ * Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
++ */
++ if (argv[0])
++ msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
++
++}
++
++/* tlsmgr_loop - queue manager main loop */
++
++static int tlsmgr_loop(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
++{
++ /*
++ * This routine runs as part of the event handling loop, after the event
++ * manager has delivered a timer or I/O event (including the completion
++ * of a connection to a delivery process), or after it has waited for a
++ * specified amount of time. The result value of qmgr_loop() specifies
++ * how long the event manager should wait for the next event.
++ */
++#define DONT_WAIT 0
++#define WAIT_FOR_EVENT (-1)
++
++ if (clnt_scache_db_active)
++ clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db,
++ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
++ if (srvr_scache_db_active)
++ srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
++ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
++ if (clnt_scache_db_active || srvr_scache_db_active)
++ return (DONT_WAIT);
++ return (WAIT_FOR_EVENT);
++}
++
++/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
++
++static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
++{
++ if (dict_changed()) {
++ msg_info("table has changed -- exiting");
++ exit(0);
++ }
++}
++
++/* tlsmgr_pre_init - pre-jail initialization */
++
++static void tlsmgr_pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
++{
++ int rand_bytes;
++ unsigned char buffer[255];
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ /*
++ * Access the external sources for random seed. We may not be able to
++ * access them again if we are sent to chroot jail, so we must leave
++ * dev: and egd: type sources open.
++ */
++ if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
++ if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a random device
++ */
++ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
++ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
++ msg_fatal("Could not open entropy device %s",
++ var_tls_rand_source);
++ if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
++ rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
++ /*
++ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
++ */
++ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_rand_source +4,
++ BLOCKING, 10);
++ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
++ msg_fatal("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
++ var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
++ buffer[0] = 1;
++ buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
++ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
++ msg_fatal("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
++ msg_fatal("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
++ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
++ msg_fatal("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
++ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
++ } else {
++ rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source,
++ var_tls_rand_bytes);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Now open the PRNG exchange file
++ */
++ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
++ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally, open the session cache files. Remove old files, if still there.
++ * If we could not remove the old files, something is pretty wrong and we
++ * won't touch it!!
++ */
++ if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db)
++ clnt_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
++ if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db)
++ srvr_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
++}
++
++/* qmgr_post_init - post-jail initialization */
++
++static void tlsmgr_post_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
++{
++ unsigned char buffer[1024];
++
++ /*
++ * This routine runs after the skeleton code has entered the chroot jail.
++ * Prevent automatic process suicide after a limited number of client
++ * requests or after a limited amount of idle time.
++ */
++ var_use_limit = 0;
++ var_idle_limit = 0;
++
++#ifdef HAS_SSL
++ /*
++ * Complete thie initialization by reading the additional seed from the
++ * PRNG exchange file. Don't care how many bytes were actually read, just
++ * seed buffer into the PRNG, regardless of its contents.
++ */
++ if (rand_exch_fd >= 0) {
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) == -1)
++ msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++ read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024);
++ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) == -1)
++ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
++ tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(0, (char *) 0);
++ tlsmgr_reseed_event(0, (char *) 0);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ clnt_scache_db_active = 0;
++ srvr_scache_db_active = 0;
++ if (clnt_scache_db)
++ tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
++ if (srvr_scache_db)
++ tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
++}
++
++/* main - the main program */
++
++int main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++ static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
++ VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_rand_source, 0, 0,
++ 0,
++ };
++ static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
++ VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, &var_tls_reseed_period, 0, 0,
++ VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, &var_tls_prng_upd_period, 0, 0,
++ 0,
++ };
++ static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
++ VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
++ 0,
++ };
++
++ /*
++ * Use the trigger service skeleton, because no-one else should be
++ * monitoring our service port while this process runs, and because we do
++ * not talk back to the client.
++ */
++ trigger_server_main(argc, argv, tlsmgr_trigger_event,
++ MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE, time_table,
++ MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE, int_table,
++ MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE, str_table,
++ MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT, tlsmgr_pre_init,
++ MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT, tlsmgr_post_init,
++ MAIL_SERVER_LOOP, tlsmgr_loop,
++ MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
++ 0);
++}
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/Makefile.in
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/Makefile.in Tue Jun 11 03:12:45 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/Makefile.in Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ dict_tcp.c dict_unix.c dir_forest.c doze.c duplex_pipe.c \
+ environ.c events.c exec_command.c fifo_listen.c fifo_trigger.c \
+ file_limit.c find_inet.c fsspace.c fullname.c get_domainname.c \
+- get_hostname.c hex_quote.c htable.c inet_addr_host.c \
++ get_hostname.c get_port.c hex_quote.c htable.c inet_addr_host.c \
+ inet_addr_list.c inet_addr_local.c inet_connect.c inet_listen.c \
+ inet_trigger.c inet_util.c intv.c line_wrap.c lowercase.c \
+ lstat_as.c mac_expand.c mac_parse.c make_dirs.c match_list.c \
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
+ unix_connect.c unix_listen.c unix_trigger.c unsafe.c username.c \
+ valid_hostname.c vbuf.c vbuf_print.c vstream.c vstream_popen.c \
+ vstring.c vstring_vstream.c watchdog.c writable.c write_buf.c \
+- write_wait.c strcasecmp.c nvtable.c
++ write_wait.c strcasecmp.c nvtable.c dict_sdbm.c sdbm.c
+ OBJS = alldig.o argv.o argv_split.o attr_print0.o attr_print64.o \
+ attr_scan0.o attr_scan64.o base64_code.o basename.o binhash.o \
+ chroot_uid.o clean_env.o close_on_exec.o concatenate.o ctable.o \
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+ dict_tcp.o dict_unix.o dir_forest.o doze.o duplex_pipe.o \
+ environ.o events.o exec_command.o fifo_listen.o fifo_trigger.o \
+ file_limit.o find_inet.o fsspace.o fullname.o get_domainname.o \
+- get_hostname.o hex_quote.o htable.o inet_addr_host.o \
++ get_hostname.o get_port.o hex_quote.o htable.o inet_addr_host.o \
+ inet_addr_list.o inet_addr_local.o inet_connect.o inet_listen.o \
+ inet_trigger.o inet_util.o intv.o line_wrap.o lowercase.o \
+ lstat_as.o mac_expand.o mac_parse.o make_dirs.o match_list.o \
+@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@
+ unix_connect.o unix_listen.o unix_trigger.o unsafe.o username.o \
+ valid_hostname.o vbuf.o vbuf_print.o vstream.o vstream_popen.o \
+ vstring.o vstring_vstream.o watchdog.o writable.o write_buf.o \
+- write_wait.o nvtable.o $(STRCASE)
++ write_wait.o nvtable.o $(STRCASE) dict_sdbm.o sdbm.o
+ HDRS = argv.h attr.h base64_code.h binhash.h chroot_uid.h clean_env.h \
+ connect.h ctable.h dict.h dict_db.h dict_dbm.h dict_env.h \
+ dict_ht.h dict_ldap.h dict_mysql.h dict_ni.h dict_nis.h \
+ dict_nisplus.h dict_pcre.h dict_regexp.h dict_static.h dict_tcp.h \
+ dict_unix.h dir_forest.h events.h exec_command.h find_inet.h \
+- fsspace.h fullname.h get_domainname.h get_hostname.h hex_quote.h \
++ fsspace.h fullname.h get_domainname.h get_hostname.h get_port.h hex_quote.h \
+ htable.h inet_addr_host.h inet_addr_list.h inet_addr_local.h \
+ inet_util.h intv.h iostuff.h line_wrap.h listen.h lstat_as.h \
+ mac_expand.h mac_parse.h make_dirs.h match_list.h match_ops.h \
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
+ split_at.h stat_as.h stringops.h sys_defs.h timed_connect.h \
+ timed_wait.h trigger.h username.h valid_hostname.h vbuf.h \
+ vbuf_print.h vstream.h vstring.h vstring_vstream.h watchdog.h \
+- nvtable.h
++ nvtable.h dict_sdbm.h sdbm.h
+ TESTSRC = fifo_open.c fifo_rdwr_bug.c fifo_rdonly_bug.c select_bug.c \
+ stream_test.c dup2_pass_on_exec.c
+ WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
+@@ -591,6 +591,7 @@
+ dict_open.o: dict_unix.h
+ dict_open.o: dict_tcp.h
+ dict_open.o: dict_dbm.h
++dict_open.o: dict_sdbm.h
+ dict_open.o: dict_db.h
+ dict_open.o: dict_nis.h
+ dict_open.o: dict_nisplus.h
+@@ -725,6 +726,7 @@
+ get_domainname.o: mymalloc.h
+ get_domainname.o: get_hostname.h
+ get_domainname.o: get_domainname.h
++get_port.o: sys_defs.h
+ get_hostname.o: get_hostname.c
+ get_hostname.o: sys_defs.h
+ get_hostname.o: mymalloc.h
+@@ -841,6 +843,7 @@
+ match_list.o: stringops.h
+ match_list.o: argv.h
+ match_list.o: dict.h
++match_list.o: inet_util.h
+ match_list.o: match_ops.h
+ match_list.o: match_list.h
+ match_ops.o: match_ops.c
+@@ -1225,3 +1228,9 @@
+ write_wait.o: sys_defs.h
+ write_wait.o: msg.h
+ write_wait.o: iostuff.h
++sdbm.o: sdbm.c
++sdbm.o: sdbm.h
++dict_sdbm.o: sdbm.h
++dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.c
++dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.h
++dict_sdbm.o: sys_defs.h
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_open.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_open.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_open.c Fri Dec 21 23:18:07 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_open.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@
+ #include <dict_env.h>
+ #include <dict_unix.h>
+ #include <dict_tcp.h>
++#include <dict_sdbm.h>
+ #include <dict_dbm.h>
+ #include <dict_db.h>
+ #include <dict_nis.h>
+@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@
+ #if 0
+ DICT_TYPE_TCP, dict_tcp_open,
+ #endif
++ "sdbm", dict_sdbm_open,
+ #ifdef HAS_DBM
+ DICT_TYPE_DBM, dict_dbm_open,
+ #endif
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* dict_sdbm 3
++/* SUMMARY
++/* dictionary manager interface to SDBM files
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <dict_sdbm.h>
++/*
++/* DICT *dict_sdbm_open(path, open_flags, dict_flags)
++/* const char *name;
++/* const char *path;
++/* int open_flags;
++/* int dict_flags;
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* dict_sdbm_open() opens the named SDBM database and makes it available
++/* via the generic interface described in dict_open(3).
++/* DIAGNOSTICS
++/* Fatal errors: cannot open file, file write error, out of memory.
++/* SEE ALSO
++/* dict(3) generic dictionary manager
++/* sdbm(3) data base subroutines
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Wietse Venema
++/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
++/* P.O. Box 704
++/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
++/*--*/
++
++#include "sys_defs.h"
++
++/* System library. */
++
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include "msg.h"
++#include "mymalloc.h"
++#include "htable.h"
++#include "iostuff.h"
++#include "vstring.h"
++#include "myflock.h"
++#include "stringops.h"
++#include "dict.h"
++#include "dict_sdbm.h"
++#include "sdbm.h"
++
++/* Application-specific. */
++
++typedef struct {
++ DICT dict; /* generic members */
++ SDBM *dbm; /* open database */
++ char *path; /* pathname */
++} DICT_SDBM;
++
++/* dict_sdbm_lookup - find database entry */
++
++static const char *dict_sdbm_lookup(DICT *dict, const char *name)
++{
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
++ datum dbm_key;
++ datum dbm_value;
++ static VSTRING *buf;
++ const char *result = 0;
++
++ dict_errno = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
++ * and value.
++ */
++ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
++ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
++ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
++ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
++ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
++ result = dbm_value.dptr;
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
++ * value.
++ */
++ if (result == 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
++ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
++ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
++ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
++ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
++ if (buf == 0)
++ buf = vstring_alloc(10);
++ vstring_strncpy(buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
++ result = vstring_str(buf);
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Release the exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ return (result);
++}
++
++/* dict_sdbm_update - add or update database entry */
++
++static void dict_sdbm_update(DICT *dict, const char *name, const char *value)
++{
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
++ datum dbm_key;
++ datum dbm_value;
++ int status;
++
++ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
++ dbm_value.dptr = (void *) value;
++ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
++ dbm_value.dsize = strlen(value);
++
++ /*
++ * If undecided about appending a null byte to key and value, choose a
++ * default depending on the platform.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)
++ && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
++#ifdef DBM_NO_TRAILING_NULL
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
++#else
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
++#endif
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Optionally append a null byte to key and value.
++ */
++ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
++ dbm_key.dsize++;
++ dbm_value.dsize++;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ /*
++ * Do the update.
++ */
++ if ((status = sdbm_store(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key, dbm_value,
++ (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE) ? DBM_REPLACE : DBM_INSERT)) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("error writing SDBM database %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++ if (status) {
++ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_IGNORE)
++ /* void */ ;
++ else if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_WARN)
++ msg_warn("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
++ else
++ msg_fatal("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Release the exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++}
++
++
++/* dict_sdbm_delete - delete one entry from the dictionary */
++
++static int dict_sdbm_delete(DICT *dict, const char *name)
++{
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
++ datum dbm_key;
++ int status = 1;
++ int flags = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
++ * and value.
++ */
++ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
++ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
++ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
++ sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
++ if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
++ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0) /* fatal error */
++ msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++ status = 1; /* not found */
++ } else {
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL; /* found */
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
++ * value.
++ */
++ if (status > 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
++ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
++ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
++ sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
++ if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
++ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0) /* fatal error */
++ msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++ status = 1; /* not found */
++ } else {
++ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL; /* found */
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Release the exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ return (status);
++}
++
++/* traverse the dictionary */
++
++static int dict_sdbm_sequence(DICT *dict, const int function,
++ const char **key, const char **value)
++{
++ char *myname = "dict_sdbm_sequence";
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
++ datum dbm_key;
++ datum dbm_value;
++ int status = 0;
++ static VSTRING *key_buf;
++ static VSTRING *value_buf;
++
++ /*
++ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ /*
++ * Determine and execute the seek function. It returns the key.
++ */
++ switch (function) {
++ case DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST:
++ dbm_key = sdbm_firstkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
++ break;
++ case DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT:
++ dbm_key = sdbm_nextkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
++ break;
++ default:
++ msg_panic("%s: invalid function: %d", myname, function);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Release the exclusive lock.
++ */
++ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
++ && myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++
++ if (dbm_key.dptr != 0 && dbm_key.dsize > 0) {
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to key
++ * an d value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
++ */
++ if (((char *) dbm_key.dptr)[dbm_key.dsize - 1] == 0) {
++ *key = dbm_key.dptr;
++ } else {
++ if (key_buf == 0)
++ key_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
++ vstring_strncpy(key_buf, dbm_key.dptr, dbm_key.dsize);
++ *key = vstring_str(key_buf);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Fetch the corresponding value.
++ */
++ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
++
++ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0 && dbm_value.dsize > 0) {
++
++ /*
++ * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to
++ * key and value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
++ */
++ if (((char *) dbm_value.dptr)[dbm_value.dsize - 1] == 0) {
++ *value = dbm_value.dptr;
++ } else {
++ if (value_buf == 0)
++ value_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
++ vstring_strncpy(value_buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
++ *value = vstring_str(value_buf);
++ }
++ } else {
++
++ /*
++ * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error
++ * condition.
++ */
++ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
++ msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++ return (1); /* no error: eof/not found
++ * (should not happen!) */
++ }
++ } else {
++
++ /*
++ * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error condition.
++ */
++ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
++ msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
++ return (1); /* no error: eof/not found */
++ }
++ return (0);
++}
++
++/* dict_sdbm_close - disassociate from data base */
++
++static void dict_sdbm_close(DICT *dict)
++{
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
++
++ sdbm_close(dict_sdbm->dbm);
++ myfree(dict_sdbm->path);
++ myfree((char *) dict_sdbm);
++}
++
++/* dict_sdbm_open - open SDBM data base */
++
++DICT *dict_sdbm_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
++{
++ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm;
++ struct stat st;
++ SDBM *dbm;
++ char *dbm_path;
++ int lock_fd;
++
++ if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
++ dbm_path = concatenate(path, ".pag", (char *) 0);
++ if ((lock_fd = open(dbm_path, open_flags, 0644)) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("open database %s: %m", dbm_path);
++ if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("shared-lock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * XXX SunOS 5.x has no const in dbm_open() prototype.
++ */
++ if ((dbm = sdbm_open((char *) path, open_flags, 0644)) == 0)
++ msg_fatal("open database %s.{dir,pag}: %m", path);
++
++ if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
++ if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("unlock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
++ if (close(lock_fd) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("close database %s: %m", dbm_path);
++ myfree(dbm_path);
++ }
++ dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) mymalloc(sizeof(*dict_sdbm));
++ dict_sdbm->dict.lookup = dict_sdbm_lookup;
++ dict_sdbm->dict.update = dict_sdbm_update;
++ dict_sdbm->dict.delete = dict_sdbm_delete;
++ dict_sdbm->dict.sequence = dict_sdbm_sequence;
++ dict_sdbm->dict.close = dict_sdbm_close;
++ dict_sdbm->dict.lock_fd = sdbm_dirfno(dbm);
++ dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd = sdbm_pagfno(dbm);
++ if (fstat(dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("dict_sdbm_open: fstat: %m");
++ dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
++ close_on_exec(sdbm_pagfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
++ close_on_exec(sdbm_dirfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
++ dict_sdbm->dict.flags = dict_flags | DICT_FLAG_FIXED;
++ if ((dict_flags & (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)) == 0)
++ dict_sdbm->dict.flags |= (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL);
++ dict_sdbm->dbm = dbm;
++ dict_sdbm->path = mystrdup(path);
++
++ return (&dict_sdbm->dict);
++}
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++#ifndef _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
++#define _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
++
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* dict_dbm 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* dictionary manager interface to DBM files
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <dict_dbm.h>
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* .nf
++
++ /*
++ * Utility library.
++ */
++#include <dict.h>
++
++ /*
++ * External interface.
++ */
++extern DICT *dict_sdbm_open(const char *, int, int);
++
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Wietse Venema
++/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
++/* P.O. Box 704
++/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
++/*--*/
++
++#endif
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* get_port 3
++/* SUMMARY
++/* trivial host and port extracter
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <get_port.h>
++/*
++/* char *get_port(data)
++/* char *data;
++/*
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* get_port() extract host name or ip address from
++/* strings such as [3ffe:902:12::10]:25, [::1]
++/* or 192.168.0.1:25, and null-terminates the
++/* \fIdata\fR at the first occurrence of port separator.
++/* DIAGNOSTICS
++/* If port not found return null pointer.
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* BSD Style (or BSD like) license.
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
++/* Wroclaw, POLAND
++/*--*/
++
++/* System libraries */
++
++#include <sys_defs.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++/* Utility library. */
++
++#include "get_port.h"
++
++/* get_port - extract port number from string */
++
++char *get_port(char *data)
++{
++ const char *escl=strchr(data,'[');
++ const char *sepl=strchr(data,':');
++ char *escr=strrchr(data,']');
++ char *sepr=strrchr(data,':');
++
++ /* extract from "[address]:port" or "[address]"*/
++ if (escl && escr)
++ {
++ memmove(data, data + 1, strlen(data) - strlen(escr));
++ data[strlen(data) - strlen(escr) - 1] = 0;
++ *escr++ = 0;
++ if (*escr == ':')
++ escr++;
++ return (*escr ? escr : NULL);
++ }
++ /* extract from "address:port" or "address" */
++ if ((sepl == sepr) && sepr && sepl)
++ {
++ *sepr++ = 0;
++ return sepr;
++ }
++
++ /* return empty string */
++ return NULL;
++}
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++#ifndef _GET_PORT_H_INCLUDED_
++#define _GET_PORT_H_INCLUDED_
++
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* get_port 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* trivial host and port extracter
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* #include <get_port.h>
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* .nf
++
++ /* External interface. */
++
++extern char *get_port(char *);
++
++
++/* LICENSE
++/* .ad
++/* .fi
++/* BSD Style (or BSD like) license.
++/* AUTHOR(S)
++/* Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
++/* Wroclaw, POLAND
++/*--*/
++
++#endif
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_host.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_host.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_host.c Fri Dec 11 19:55:35 1998
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_host.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@
+ #include <sys_defs.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
+
+ #ifndef INADDR_NONE
+ #define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff
+@@ -48,15 +51,47 @@
+
+ #include <inet_addr_list.h>
+ #include <inet_addr_host.h>
++#ifdef TEST
++#include <msg.h>
++#endif
+
+ /* inet_addr_host - look up address list for host */
+
+ int inet_addr_host(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list, const char *hostname)
+ {
++#ifdef INET6
++ int s;
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res0, *res;
++#ifdef TEST
++ char buforhosta[1024];
++#endif
++ int error;
++#else
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ struct in_addr addr;
++#endif
+ int initial_count = addr_list->used;
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &res0);
++ if (error == 0) {
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if(res->ai_family != AF_INET && res->ai_family != AF_INET6)
++ continue;
++ /* filter out address families that are not supported */
++ s = socket(res->ai_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
++ if (s < 0)
++ continue;
++ close(s);
++
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, res->ai_addr);
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ }
++#else
+ if ((addr.s_addr = inet_addr(hostname)) != INADDR_NONE) {
+ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &addr);
+ } else {
+@@ -65,9 +100,12 @@
+ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list,
+ (struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++);
+ }
++#endif
++
+ return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
+ }
+
++
+ #ifdef TEST
+
+ #include <msg.h>
+@@ -78,6 +116,8 @@
+ {
+ INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
+ int i;
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
+
+@@ -89,8 +129,12 @@
+ if (inet_addr_host(&addr_list, *argv) == 0)
+ msg_fatal("not found: %s", *argv);
+
+- for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++)
+- vstream_printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(addr_list.addrs[i]));
++ for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
++ getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST);
++ vstream_printf("%s\n", hbuf);
++ }
+ vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+ }
+ inet_addr_list_free(&addr_list);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.c Tue Jul 31 20:13:41 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+
++#include <netdb.h>
++
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#endif
++
+ /* Utility library. */
+
+ #include <msg.h>
+@@ -63,12 +70,39 @@
+ {
+ list->used = 0;
+ list->size = 2;
++#ifdef INET6
++ list->addrs = (struct sockaddr_storage *)
++#else
+ list->addrs = (struct in_addr *)
++#endif
+ mymalloc(sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
+ }
+
+ /* inet_addr_list_append - append address to internet address list */
+
++#ifdef INET6
++void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *list,
++ struct sockaddr * addr)
++{
++ char *myname = "inet_addr_list_append";
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++
++ if (msg_verbose > 1) {
++ if (getnameinfo(addr, SA_LEN(addr), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
++ strncpy(hbuf, "??????", sizeof(hbuf));
++ }
++ msg_info("%s: %s", myname, hbuf);
++ }
++
++ if (list->used >= list->size)
++ list->size *= 2;
++ list->addrs = (struct sockaddr_storage *)
++ myrealloc((char *) list->addrs,
++ sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
++ memcpy(&list->addrs[list->used++], addr, SA_LEN(addr));
++}
++#else
+ void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *list, struct in_addr * addr)
+ {
+ char *myname = "inet_addr_list_append";
+@@ -83,15 +117,22 @@
+ sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
+ list->addrs[list->used++] = *addr;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ /* inet_addr_list_comp - compare addresses */
+
+ static int inet_addr_list_comp(const void *a, const void *b)
+ {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if(((struct sockaddr*)a)->sa_family != ((struct sockaddr*)b)->sa_family)
++ return ( ((struct sockaddr*)a)->sa_family - ((struct sockaddr*)b)->sa_family );
++ return memcmp(a,b,SA_LEN((struct sockaddr*)a));
++#else
+ const struct in_addr *a_addr = (const struct in_addr *) a;
+ const struct in_addr *b_addr = (const struct in_addr *) b;
+
+ return (a_addr->s_addr - b_addr->s_addr);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* inet_addr_list_uniq - weed out duplicates */
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.h Tue Jul 31 19:56:47 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -16,19 +16,42 @@
+ */
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+
++#ifndef SA_LEN
++# ifndef HAS_SA_LEN
++# define SA_LEN(x) (((x)->sa_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
++# define SS_LEN(x) (((x).ss_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
++# else
++# define SA_LEN(x) ((x)->sa_len)
++# define SS_LEN(x) ((x).ss_len)
++# endif
++#else
++# ifndef SS_LEN
++# define SS_LEN(x) (((x).ss_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
++# endif
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * External interface.
+ */
+ typedef struct INET_ADDR_LIST {
+ int used; /* nr of elements in use */
+ int size; /* actual list size */
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct sockaddr_storage *addrs; /* payload */
++#else
+ struct in_addr *addrs; /* payload */
++#endif
+ } INET_ADDR_LIST;
+
+ extern void inet_addr_list_init(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
+ extern void inet_addr_list_free(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
+ extern void inet_addr_list_uniq(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
++#ifdef INET6
++struct sockaddr;
++extern void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *, struct sockaddr *);
++#else
+ extern void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *, struct in_addr *);
++#endif
+
+ /* LICENSE
+ /* .ad
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_local.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_local.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_local.c Sun Feb 25 19:20:19 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_local.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#if defined(INET6) && (defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2))
++#include <netdb.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#endif
++#ifdef HAVE_GETIFADDRS
++#include <ifaddrs.h>
++#endif
+
+ /* Utility library. */
+
+@@ -78,18 +85,104 @@
+
+ int inet_addr_local(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list, INET_ADDR_LIST *mask_list)
+ {
++#ifdef HAVE_GETIFADDRS
++ char *myname = "inet_addr_local";
++ struct ifaddrs *ifap, *ifa;
++ int initial_count = addr_list->used;
++ struct sockaddr *sa, *sam;
++#ifdef INET6
++#ifdef __KAME__
++ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
++#endif
++#else
++ void *addr,*addrm;
++#endif
++
++ if (getifaddrs(&ifap) < 0)
++ msg_fatal("%s: getifaddrs: %m", myname);
++
++ for (ifa = ifap; ifa; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
++ if (! (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_RUNNING) || ifa->ifa_addr==NULL)
++ continue;
++ sa = ifa->ifa_addr;
++ sam = ifa->ifa_netmask;
++ switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
++ case AF_INET:
++#ifndef INET6
++ addr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
++ addrm = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
++#endif
++ break;
++#ifdef INET6
++ case AF_INET6:
++#ifdef __KAME__
++ memcpy(&addr6, ifa->ifa_addr, ifa->ifa_addr->sa_len);
++ /* decode scoped address notation */
++ if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr) ||
++ IN6_IS_ADDR_SITELOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr)) &&
++ addr6.sin6_scope_id == 0) {
++ addr6.sin6_scope_id = ntohs(addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] |
++ (unsigned int)addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] << 8);
++ addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] = addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] = 0;
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
++ }
++#endif
++ break;
++#endif
++ default:
++ continue;
++ }
++
++#ifdef INET6
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, sa);
++ if (mask_list != NULL)
++ inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, sam);
++#else
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, (struct in_addr *)addr);
++ if (mask_list != NULL)
++ inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, (struct in_addr *)addrm);
++#endif
++ }
++
++ freeifaddrs(ifap);
++ return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
++#else
+ char *myname = "inet_addr_local";
+ struct ifconf ifc;
+ struct ifreq *ifr;
+ struct ifreq *the_end;
+ int sock;
+- VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(1024);
++ VSTRING *buf;
+ int initial_count = addr_list->used;
+ struct in_addr addr;
+ struct ifreq *ifr_mask;
++ int af = AF_INET;
++#ifdef INET6
++#if defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2)
++#define _PATH_PROCNET_IFINET6 "/proc/net/if_inet6"
++ FILE *f;
++ char addr6p[8][5], addr6res[40], devname[20];
++ int plen, scope, dad_status, if_idx, gaierror;
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
++#endif
++ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+
+- if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
++other_socket_type:
++#endif
++ buf = vstring_alloc(1024);
++
++ if ((sock = socket(af, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (af == AF_INET6)
++ {
++ if (msg_verbose)
++ msg_warn("%s: socket: %m", myname);
++ goto end;
++ }
++ else
++#endif
+ msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the network interface list. XXX The socket API appears to have no
+@@ -126,10 +219,15 @@
+ */
+ the_end = (struct ifreq *) (ifc.ifc_buf + ifc.ifc_len);
+ for (ifr = ifc.ifc_req; ifr < the_end;) {
+- if (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET) { /* IP interface */
++ if ((ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET) &&
++ (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == af)) { /* IP interface */
+ addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) & ifr->ifr_addr)->sin_addr;
+ if (addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY) { /* has IP address */
++#ifdef INET6
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &ifr->ifr_addr);
++#else
+ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &addr);
++#endif
+ if (mask_list) {
+ ifr_mask = (struct ifreq *) mymalloc(IFREQ_SIZE(ifr));
+ memcpy((char *) ifr_mask, (char *) ifr, IFREQ_SIZE(ifr));
+@@ -141,11 +239,61 @@
+ }
+ }
+ }
++#ifdef INET6
++ else if ((ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
++ (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == af)) { /* IPv6 interface */
++ addr6 = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) & ifr->ifr_addr);
++#ifdef __KAME__
++ /* decode scoped address notation */
++ if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr) ||
++ IN6_IS_ADDR_SITELOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr)) &&
++ addr6.sin6_scope_id == 0) {
++ addr6.sin6_scope_id = ntohs(addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] |
++ (unsigned int)addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] << 8);
++ addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] = addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] = 0;
++ }
++#endif
++ if (!(IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&addr6.sin6_addr)))
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, (struct sockaddr *)&addr6);
++ }
++#endif
+ ifr = NEXT_INTERFACE(ifr);
+ }
+ vstring_free(buf);
+ (void) close(sock);
++#ifdef INET6
++end:
++ if (af != AF_INET6) {
++ af = AF_INET6;
++ goto other_socket_type;
++ }
++#if defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2)
++ if ((f = fopen(_PATH_PROCNET_IFINET6, "r")) != NULL) {
++ while (fscanf(f, "%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s %02x %02x %02x %02x %20s\n",
++ addr6p[0], addr6p[1], addr6p[2], addr6p[3], addr6p[4],
++ addr6p[5], addr6p[6], addr6p[7],
++ &if_idx, &plen, &scope, &dad_status, devname) != EOF) {
++ sprintf(addr6res, "%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s",
++ addr6p[0], addr6p[1], addr6p[2], addr6p[3],
++ addr6p[4], addr6p[5], addr6p[6], addr6p[7]);
++ addr6res[sizeof(addr6res) - 1] = 0;
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
++ gaierror = getaddrinfo(addr6res, NULL, &hints, &res0);
++ if (!gaierror) {
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, res->ai_addr);
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ }
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* linux */
++#endif
+ return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ #ifdef TEST
+@@ -158,6 +306,8 @@
+ INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
+ INET_ADDR_LIST mask_list;
+ int i;
++ char abuf[NI_MAXHOST], mbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
++ struct sockaddr *sa;
+
+ msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
+
+@@ -172,8 +322,17 @@
+ msg_warn("found only one active network interface");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
+- vstream_printf("%s/", inet_ntoa(addr_list.addrs[i]));
+- vstream_printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(mask_list.addrs[i]));
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
++ if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), abuf, sizeof(abuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
++ strncpy(abuf, "???", sizeof(abuf));
++ }
++ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&mask_list.addrs[i];
++ if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), mbuf, sizeof(mbuf), NULL, 0,
++ NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
++ strncpy(mbuf, "???", sizeof(mbuf));
++ }
++ vstream_printf("%s/%s\n", abuf, mbuf);
+ }
+ vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+ inet_addr_list_free(&addr_list);
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_connect.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_connect.c Mon Nov 20 19:06:31 2000
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_connect.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <netdb.h>
++#endif
+
+ /* Utility library. */
+
+@@ -73,7 +76,12 @@
+ char *buf;
+ char *host;
+ char *port;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
++ int error;
++#else
+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++#endif
+ int sock;
+
+ /*
+@@ -81,14 +89,58 @@
+ * the local host.
+ */
+ buf = inet_parse(addr, &host, &port);
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (*host == 0)
++ host = NULL;
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; /* find_inet_addr is numeric only */
++ if (getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res0))
++ msg_fatal("host not found: %s", host);
++#else
+ if (*host == 0)
+ host = "localhost";
+ memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = find_inet_addr(host);
+ sin.sin_port = find_inet_port(port, "tcp");
++#endif
+ myfree(buf);
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ sock = -1;
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if ((res->ai_family != AF_INET) && (res->ai_family != AF_INET6))
++ continue;
++
++ sock = socket(res->ai_family, res->ai_socktype, res->ai_protocol);
++ if (sock < 0)
++ continue;
++ if (timeout > 0) {
++ non_blocking(sock, NON_BLOCKING);
++ if (timed_connect(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, timeout) < 0) {
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (block_mode != NON_BLOCKING)
++ non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
++ break;
++ } else {
++ non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
++ if (connect(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0
++ && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ continue;
++ }
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++ return sock;
++#else
+ /*
+ * Create a client socket.
+ */
+@@ -121,4 +173,5 @@
+ }
+ return (sock);
+ }
++#endif
+ }
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_listen.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_listen.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_listen.c Mon Nov 20 19:06:32 2000
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_listen.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ /* SYNOPSIS
+ /* #include <listen.h>
+ /*
+-/* int inet_listen(addr, backlog, block_mode)
++/* int inet_listen(addr, backlog, block_mode, addinuse_fatal)
+ /* const char *addr;
+ /* int backlog;
+ /* int block_mode;
+@@ -51,11 +51,17 @@
+ #include <sys_defs.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
++#ifdef INET6
++#if (! __GLIBC__ >= 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ >=1 )
++#include <netinet6/in6.h>
++#endif
++#endif
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+ #endif
++#include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+@@ -77,35 +83,116 @@
+
+ /* inet_listen - create inet-domain listener */
+
+-int inet_listen(const char *addr, int backlog, int block_mode)
++int inet_listen(const char *addr, int backlog, int block_mode, int addrinuse_fatal)
+ {
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct addrinfo *res, *res0, hints;
++ int error;
++#else
++ struct ai {
++ int ai_family;
++ int ai_socktype;
++ int ai_protocol;
++ struct sockaddr *ai_addr;
++ SOCKADDR_SIZE ai_addrlen;
++ struct ai *ai_next;
++ } *res, *res0, resbody;
+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++#endif
+ int sock;
+ int t = 1;
++ int addrinuse = 0;
+ char *buf;
+ char *host;
+ char *port;
++#ifdef INET6
++ char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST], pbuf[NI_MAXSERV];
++#else
++ char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++ char pbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
++#endif
++ char *cause = "unknown";
+
+ /*
+ * Translate address information to internal form.
+ */
+ buf = inet_parse(addr, &host, &port);
+- memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
++ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ error = getaddrinfo(*host ? host : NULL, *port ? port : "0", &hints, &res0);
++ if (error) {
++ msg_fatal("getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
++ }
++ myfree(buf);
++#else
++ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
++#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
++ sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
++#endif
+ sin.sin_port = find_inet_port(port, "tcp");
+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = (*host ? find_inet_addr(host) : INADDR_ANY);
+- myfree(buf);
+
+- /*
+- * Create a listener socket.
+- */
+- if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+- msg_fatal("socket: %m");
+- if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0)
+- msg_fatal("setsockopt: %m");
+- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
+- msg_fatal("bind %s port %d: %m", sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY ?
+- "INADDR_ANY" : inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(sin.sin_port));
++ memset(&resbody, 0, sizeof(resbody));
++ resbody.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ resbody.ai_family = AF_INET;
++ resbody.ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
++ resbody.ai_addrlen = sizeof(sin);
++
++ res0 = &resbody;
++#endif
++
++ sock = -1;
++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
++ if ((res->ai_family != AF_INET) && (res->ai_family != AF_INET6))
++ continue;
++
++ /*
++ * Create a listener socket.
++ */
++ if ((sock = socket(res->ai_family, res->ai_socktype, 0)) < 0) {
++ cause = "socket";
++ continue;
++ }
++#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
++ if (res->ai_family == AF_INET6 &&
++ setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0) {
++ /* if kernel/libc don't support this simple ignore it
++ cause = "setsockopt(IPV6_V6ONLY)";
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ continue;
++ */
++ ;
++ }
++#endif
++ if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0) {
++ cause = "setsockopt(SO_REUSEADDR)";
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
++ cause = "bind";
++ if (errno == EADDRINUSE)
++ addrinuse = 1;
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ continue;
++ }
++ break;
++ }
++ if (sock < 0 && (addrinuse_fatal || !addrinuse))
++ msg_fatal("%s: %m", cause);
++#ifdef INET6
++ freeaddrinfo(res0);
++#endif
++ if (sock < 0)
++ return -1;
+ non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
+ if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("listen: %m");
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/listen.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/listen.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/listen.h Mon Mar 22 02:57:11 1999
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/listen.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ * Listener external interface.
+ */
+ extern int unix_listen(const char *, int, int);
+-extern int inet_listen(const char *, int, int);
++extern int inet_listen(const char *, int, int, int);
+ extern int fifo_listen(const char *, int, int);
+ extern int stream_listen(const char *, int, int);
+
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_list.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_list.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_list.c Tue Nov 20 21:07:15 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_list.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
+ list = match_list_parse(list, vstring_str(buf));
+ if (vstream_fclose(fp))
+ msg_fatal("%s: read file %s: %m", myname, pattern);
+- } else if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0) { /* type:table */
++ } else if ((strchr(pattern, ']') == 0) && (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)) { /* type:table */
+ for (cp = pattern; *cp == '!'; cp++)
+ /* void */ ;
+ if (dict_handle(pattern) == 0)
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_ops.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_ops.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_ops.c Tue Nov 20 21:16:10 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_ops.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -81,6 +81,307 @@
+ #include <match_ops.h>
+ #include <stringops.h>
+
++#ifdef INET6
++/*
++ * $Id: tls+ipv6.diff,v 1.1 2002/07/22 23:09:48 raker Exp $
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
++ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * Authors: Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
++ *
++ * Modifications:
++ * Artur Frysiak <wiget@pld.org.pl>
++ * Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
++#include <arpa/inet.h>
++#include <resolv.h>
++
++#ifndef AF_DECnet
++#define AF_DECnet 12
++#endif
++
++#ifndef PF_PACKET
++#define PF_PACKET 17
++#endif
++
++typedef struct
++{
++ unsigned char family;
++ unsigned char bytelen;
++ signed short bitlen;
++ unsigned int data[4];
++} inet_prefix;
++
++/* prototypes */
++int masked_match(char *, char *, char *);
++int get_integer(int *, char *, int);
++int get_addr_1(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
++int get_prefix_1(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
++int get_addr(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
++int get_prefix(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
++unsigned int get_addr32(char *);
++int matches(char *, char *);
++int inet_addr_match(inet_prefix *, inet_prefix *, int);
++int mask_match(char *, char *, char *);
++
++int get_integer(int *val, char *arg, int base)
++{
++ long res;
++ char *ptr;
++
++ if (!arg || !*arg)
++ return -1;
++ res = strtol(arg, &ptr, base);
++ if (!ptr || ptr == arg || *ptr || res > INT_MAX || res < INT_MIN)
++ return -1;
++ *val = res;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int get_addr_1(inet_prefix *addr, char *name, int family)
++{
++ char *cp;
++ unsigned char *ap = (unsigned char*)addr->data;
++ int i;
++
++ memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
++
++ if (strcmp(name, "default") == 0 || strcmp(name, "any") == 0) {
++ if (family == AF_DECnet)
++ return -1;
++ addr->family = family;
++ addr->bytelen = (family == AF_INET6 ? 16 : 4);
++ addr->bitlen = -1;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (strchr(name, ':')) {
++ addr->family = AF_INET6;
++ if (family != AF_UNSPEC && family != AF_INET6)
++ return -1;
++ if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, name, addr->data) <= 0)
++ return -1;
++ addr->bytelen = 16;
++ addr->bitlen = -1;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ addr->family = AF_INET;
++ if (family != AF_UNSPEC && family != AF_INET)
++ return -1;
++ addr->bytelen = 4;
++ addr->bitlen = -1;
++ for (cp = name, i = 0; *cp; cp++) {
++ if (*cp <= '9' && *cp >= '0') {
++ ap[i] = 10*ap[i] + (*cp-'0');
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (*cp == '.' && ++i <= 3)
++ continue;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int get_prefix_1(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
++{
++ int err;
++ unsigned plen;
++ char *slash;
++
++ memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));
++
++ if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
++ if (family == AF_DECnet)
++ return -1;
++ dst->family = family;
++ dst->bytelen = 0;
++ dst->bitlen = 0;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ slash = strchr(arg, '/');
++ if (slash)
++ *slash = 0;
++ err = get_addr_1(dst, arg, family);
++ if (err == 0) {
++ switch(dst->family) {
++ case AF_INET6:
++ dst->bitlen = 128;
++ break;
++ case AF_DECnet:
++ dst->bitlen = 16;
++ break;
++ default:
++ case AF_INET:
++ dst->bitlen = 32;
++ }
++ if (slash) {
++ if (get_integer(&plen, slash+1, 0) || plen > dst->bitlen) {
++ err = -1;
++ goto done;
++ }
++ dst->bitlen = plen;
++ }
++ }
++done:
++ if (slash)
++ *slash = '/';
++ return err;
++}
++
++int get_addr(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
++{
++#ifdef AF_PACKET
++ if (family == AF_PACKET)
++ return -1;
++#endif
++ if (get_addr_1(dst, arg, family))
++ return -1;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int get_prefix(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
++{
++#ifdef AF_PACKET
++ if (family == AF_PACKET)
++ return -1;
++#endif
++ if (get_prefix_1(dst, arg, family))
++ return -1;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++unsigned int get_addr32(char *name)
++{
++ inet_prefix addr;
++ if (get_addr_1(&addr, name, AF_INET))
++ return -1;
++ return addr.data[0];
++}
++
++int matches(char *cmd, char *pattern)
++{
++ int len = strlen(cmd);
++ if (len > strlen(pattern))
++ return -1;
++ return memcmp(pattern, cmd, len);
++}
++
++int inet_addr_match(inet_prefix *a, inet_prefix *b, int bits)
++{
++ unsigned int *a1 = a->data;
++ unsigned int *a2 = b->data;
++ int words = bits >> 0x05;
++
++ bits &= 0x1f;
++
++ if (words)
++ if (memcmp(a1, a2, words << 2))
++ return -1;
++
++ if (bits) {
++ unsigned int w1, w2;
++ unsigned int mask;
++
++ w1 = a1[words];
++ w2 = a2[words];
++
++ mask = htonl((0xffffffff) << (0x20 - bits));
++
++ if ((w1 ^ w2) & mask)
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/* zero if matches */
++int mask_match(char *network, char *cprefix, char *address)
++{
++ inet_prefix *inetwork;
++ inet_prefix *iaddress;
++ int ret, prefix;
++
++ if (!(network && address && cprefix))
++ return -1;
++ prefix = strtol(cprefix, (char **)NULL, 10);
++ if ((prefix < 0) || (prefix > 128))
++ return -1;
++ if ((strlen(network) == 0) || (strlen(address) == 0))
++ return -1;
++
++ inetwork = malloc(sizeof(inet_prefix));
++ iaddress = malloc(sizeof(inet_prefix));
++
++ if ((get_addr(iaddress, address, AF_UNSPEC) >= 0)
++ && (get_addr(inetwork, network, AF_UNSPEC) >= 0))
++ ret = inet_addr_match(inetwork, iaddress, prefix);
++ else
++ ret = -1;
++ free(inetwork);
++ free(iaddress);
++
++ /* 1 if matches */
++ /* return (!ret); */
++ /* 0 if matches */
++ return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * masked_match() - universal for IPv4 and IPv6 - 1 if matches
++ */
++int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
++char *net_tok;
++char *mask_tok;
++char *string;
++{
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct in6_addr in6[2];
++ char v4addr[2][INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
++ char newmask[6];
++ int plen;
++#endif
++
++ /* Check for NULL */
++ if (!(net_tok && mask_tok && string))
++ return 0; /* doesn't match!!! */
++
++ /* If IPv6 mapped convert to native-IPv4 */
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, net_tok, &in6[0]) == 1 &&
++ inet_pton(AF_INET6, string, &in6[1]) == 1 &&
++ IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6[0]) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6[1])) {
++ plen = atoi(mask_tok);
++ if (32 < plen && plen < 129) {
++ sprintf(newmask, "%d", plen - 96);
++ mask_tok = newmask;
++ }
++
++ (void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6[0].s6_addr[12], v4addr[0],
++ sizeof(v4addr[0]));
++ net_tok = v4addr[0];
++ (void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6[1].s6_addr[12], v4addr[1],
++ sizeof(v4addr[1]));
++ string = v4addr[1];
++ }
++#endif
++ return (!mask_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string));
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* match_string - match a string literal */
+
+ int match_string(int unused_flags, const char *string, const char *pattern)
+@@ -177,6 +478,7 @@
+ return (0);
+ }
+
++#ifndef INET6
+ /* match_parse_mask - parse net/mask pattern */
+
+ static int match_parse_mask(const char *pattern, unsigned long *net_bits,
+@@ -198,27 +500,55 @@
+ return (mask != 0);
+ }
+
++#endif
++
+ /* match_hostaddr - match host by address */
+
+ int match_hostaddr(int unused_flags, const char *addr, const char *pattern)
+ {
+ char *myname = "match_hostaddr";
++#ifdef INET6
++ char *network, *mask, *escl, *escr, *patternx;
++ struct in6_addr in6;
++ char v4addr[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
++#else
+ int mask_shift;
+ unsigned long mask_bits;
+ unsigned long net_bits;
+ unsigned long addr_bits;
++#endif
+
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s: %s ~? %s", myname, addr, pattern);
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (addr[strspn(addr, "01234567890./:abcdef")] != 0)
++#else
+ if (addr[strspn(addr, "01234567890./:")] != 0)
++#endif
+ return (0);
+
++#ifdef INET6
++ patternx = mystrdup(pattern);
++ escl = strchr(patternx,'[');
++ escr = strrchr(patternx,']');
++ if (escl && escr) {
++ *escr = 0;
++ sprintf(patternx, "%s%s", escl + 1, escr + 1);
++ pattern = patternx;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Try dictionary lookup. This can be case insensitive. XXX Probably
+ * should also try again after stripping least significant octets.
+ */
+- if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0) {
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (!(escl && escr) && strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)
++#else
++ if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)
++#endif
++ {
+ if (dict_lookup(pattern, addr) != 0)
+ return (1);
+ if (dict_errno != 0)
+@@ -229,6 +559,12 @@
+ /*
+ * Try an exact match with the host address.
+ */
++#ifdef INET6
++ if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, addr, &in6) == 1 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6)) {
++ (void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6.s6_addr[12], v4addr, sizeof(v4addr));
++ addr = v4addr;
++ }
++#endif
+ if (strcasecmp(addr, pattern) == 0) {
+ return (1);
+ }
+@@ -237,6 +573,20 @@
+ * In a net/mask pattern, the mask is specified as the number of bits of
+ * the network part.
+ */
++#ifdef INET6
++ network = mystrdup(patternx);
++ mask = split_at(network, '/');
++
++ if (masked_match(network, mask, (char *)addr)) {
++ myfree(network);
++ myfree(patternx);
++ return (1);
++ } else {
++ myfree(network);
++ myfree(patternx);
++ }
++#else
++
+ if (match_parse_mask(pattern, &net_bits, &mask_shift)) {
+ addr_bits = inet_addr(addr);
+ if (addr_bits == INADDR_NONE)
+@@ -244,5 +594,6 @@
+ mask_bits = htonl((0xffffffff) << (BITS_PER_ADDR - mask_shift));
+ return ((addr_bits & mask_bits) == (net_bits & mask_bits));
+ }
++#endif
+ return (0);
+ }
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,971 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* sdbm 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* include "sdbm.h"
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* This file includes the public domain SDBM (ndbm work-alike hashed
++/* database library), based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing
++/* algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
++/* author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++/* status: public domain
++/* The file has been patched following the advice of Uwe Ohse
++/* <uwe@ohse.de>:
++/* --------------------------------------------------------------
++/* this patch fixes a problem with sdbms .dir file, which arrises when
++/* a second .dir block is needed for the first time. read() returns 0
++/* in that case, and the library forgot to initialize that new block.
++/*
++/* A related problem is that the calculation of db->maxbno is wrong.
++/* It just appends 4096*BYTESIZ bits, which is not enough except for
++/* small databases (.dir basically doubles everytime it's too small).
++/* --------------------------------------------------------------
++/* According to Uwe Ohse, the patch has also been submitted to the
++/* author of SDBM. (The 4096*BYTESIZ bits comment may apply with a
++/* different size for Postfix/TLS, as the patch was sent against the
++/* original SDBM distributiona and for Postfix/TLS I have changed the
++/* default sizes.
++/* .nf
++/*--*/
++
++/*
++ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
++ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++ * status: public domain.
++ *
++ * core routines
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#ifdef WIN32
++#include <io.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#else
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#ifdef __STDC__
++#include <stddef.h>
++#endif
++
++#include <sdbm.h>
++
++/*
++ * useful macros
++ */
++#define bad(x) ((x).dptr == NULL || (x).dsize <= 0)
++#define exhash(item) sdbm_hash((item).dptr, (item).dsize)
++#define ioerr(db) ((db)->flags |= DBM_IOERR)
++
++#define OFF_PAG(off) (long) (off) * PBLKSIZ
++#define OFF_DIR(off) (long) (off) * DBLKSIZ
++
++static long masks[] =
++{
++ 000000000000, 000000000001, 000000000003, 000000000007,
++ 000000000017, 000000000037, 000000000077, 000000000177,
++ 000000000377, 000000000777, 000000001777, 000000003777,
++ 000000007777, 000000017777, 000000037777, 000000077777,
++ 000000177777, 000000377777, 000000777777, 000001777777,
++ 000003777777, 000007777777, 000017777777, 000037777777,
++ 000077777777, 000177777777, 000377777777, 000777777777,
++ 001777777777, 003777777777, 007777777777, 017777777777
++};
++
++datum nullitem =
++{NULL, 0};
++
++typedef struct
++{
++ int dirf; /* directory file descriptor */
++ int pagf; /* page file descriptor */
++ int flags; /* status/error flags, see below */
++ long maxbno; /* size of dirfile in bits */
++ long curbit; /* current bit number */
++ long hmask; /* current hash mask */
++ long blkptr; /* current block for nextkey */
++ int keyptr; /* current key for nextkey */
++ long blkno; /* current page to read/write */
++ long pagbno; /* current page in pagbuf */
++ char *pagbuf; /* page file block buffer */
++ long dirbno; /* current block in dirbuf */
++ char *dirbuf; /* directory file block buffer */
++} DBM;
++
++
++/* ************************* */
++
++/*
++ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
++ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++ * status: public domain. keep it that way.
++ *
++ * hashing routine
++ */
++
++/*
++ * polynomial conversion ignoring overflows
++ * [this seems to work remarkably well, in fact better
++ * then the ndbm hash function. Replace at your own risk]
++ * use: 65599 nice.
++ * 65587 even better.
++ */
++static long sdbm_hash (char *str, int len)
++{
++ unsigned long n = 0;
++
++#ifdef DUFF
++#define HASHC n = *str++ + 65599 * n
++ if (len > 0)
++ {
++ int loop = (len + 8 - 1) >> 3;
++
++ switch (len & (8 - 1))
++ {
++ case 0:
++ do
++ {
++ HASHC;
++ case 7:
++ HASHC;
++ case 6:
++ HASHC;
++ case 5:
++ HASHC;
++ case 4:
++ HASHC;
++ case 3:
++ HASHC;
++ case 2:
++ HASHC;
++ case 1:
++ HASHC;
++ }
++ while (--loop);
++ }
++
++ }
++#else
++ while (len--)
++ n = *str++ + 65599 * n;
++#endif
++ return n;
++}
++
++/*
++ * check page sanity:
++ * number of entries should be something
++ * reasonable, and all offsets in the index should be in order.
++ * this could be made more rigorous.
++ */
++static int chkpage (char *pag)
++{
++ int n;
++ int off;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ if ((n = ino[0]) < 0 || n > PBLKSIZ / sizeof (short))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (n > 0)
++ {
++ off = PBLKSIZ;
++ for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
++ {
++ if (ino[0] > off || ino[1] > off ||
++ ino[1] > ino[0])
++ return 0;
++ off = ino[1];
++ n -= 2;
++ }
++ }
++ return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * search for the key in the page.
++ * return offset index in the range 0 < i < n.
++ * return 0 if not found.
++ */
++static int seepair (char *pag, int n, char *key, int siz)
++{
++ int i;
++ int off = PBLKSIZ;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ for (i = 1; i < n; i += 2)
++ {
++ if (siz == off - ino[i] &&
++ memcmp (key, pag + ino[i], siz) == 0)
++ return i;
++ off = ino[i + 1];
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++
++#ifdef SEEDUPS
++static int duppair (char *pag, datum key)
++{
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ return ino[0] > 0 && seepair (pag, ino[0], key.dptr, key.dsize) > 0;
++}
++
++#endif
++
++/* ************************* */
++
++/*
++ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
++ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++ * status: public domain.
++ *
++ * page-level routines
++ */
++
++/*
++ * page format:
++ * +------------------------------+
++ * ino | n | keyoff | datoff | keyoff |
++ * +------------+--------+--------+
++ * | datoff | - - - ----> |
++ * +--------+---------------------+
++ * | F R E E A R E A |
++ * +--------------+---------------+
++ * | <---- - - - | data |
++ * +--------+-----+----+----------+
++ * | key | data | key |
++ * +--------+----------+----------+
++ *
++ * calculating the offsets for free area: if the number
++ * of entries (ino[0]) is zero, the offset to the END of
++ * the free area is the block size. Otherwise, it is the
++ * nth (ino[ino[0]]) entry's offset.
++ */
++
++static int fitpair (char *pag, int need)
++{
++ int n;
++ int off;
++ int avail;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
++ avail = off - (n + 1) * sizeof (short);
++ need += 2 * sizeof (short);
++
++ return need <= avail;
++}
++
++static void putpair (char *pag, datum key, datum val)
++{
++ int n;
++ int off;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
++/*
++ * enter the key first
++ */
++ off -= key.dsize;
++ (void) memcpy (pag + off, key.dptr, key.dsize);
++ ino[n + 1] = off;
++/*
++ * now the data
++ */
++ off -= val.dsize;
++ (void) memcpy (pag + off, val.dptr, val.dsize);
++ ino[n + 2] = off;
++/*
++ * adjust item count
++ */
++ ino[0] += 2;
++}
++
++static datum getpair (char *pag, datum key)
++{
++ int i;
++ int n;
++ datum val;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
++ return nullitem;
++
++ if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
++ return nullitem;
++
++ val.dptr = pag + ino[i + 1];
++ val.dsize = ino[i] - ino[i + 1];
++ return val;
++}
++
++static datum getnkey (char *pag, int num)
++{
++ datum key;
++ int off;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ num = num * 2 - 1;
++ if (ino[0] == 0 || num > ino[0])
++ return nullitem;
++
++ off = (num > 1) ? ino[num - 1] : PBLKSIZ;
++
++ key.dptr = pag + ino[num];
++ key.dsize = off - ino[num];
++
++ return key;
++}
++
++static int delpair (char *pag, datum key)
++{
++ int n;
++ int i;
++ short *ino = (short *) pag;
++
++ if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
++ return 0;
++/*
++ * found the key. if it is the last entry
++ * [i.e. i == n - 1] we just adjust the entry count.
++ * hard case: move all data down onto the deleted pair,
++ * shift offsets onto deleted offsets, and adjust them.
++ * [note: 0 < i < n]
++ */
++ if (i < n - 1)
++ {
++ int m;
++ char *dst = pag + (i == 1 ? PBLKSIZ : ino[i - 1]);
++ char *src = pag + ino[i + 1];
++ int zoo = dst - src;
++
++/*
++ * shift data/keys down
++ */
++ m = ino[i + 1] - ino[n];
++#ifdef DUFF
++#define MOVB *--dst = *--src
++ if (m > 0)
++ {
++ int loop = (m + 8 - 1) >> 3;
++
++ switch (m & (8 - 1))
++ {
++ case 0:
++ do
++ {
++ MOVB;
++ case 7:
++ MOVB;
++ case 6:
++ MOVB;
++ case 5:
++ MOVB;
++ case 4:
++ MOVB;
++ case 3:
++ MOVB;
++ case 2:
++ MOVB;
++ case 1:
++ MOVB;
++ }
++ while (--loop);
++ }
++ }
++#else
++ dst -= m;
++ src -= m;
++ memmove (dst, src, m);
++#endif
++/*
++ * adjust offset index up
++ */
++ while (i < n - 1)
++ {
++ ino[i] = ino[i + 2] + zoo;
++ i++;
++ }
++ }
++ ino[0] -= 2;
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static void splpage (char *pag, char *new, long sbit)
++{
++ datum key;
++ datum val;
++
++ int n;
++ int off = PBLKSIZ;
++ char cur[PBLKSIZ];
++ short *ino = (short *) cur;
++
++ (void) memcpy (cur, pag, PBLKSIZ);
++ (void) memset (pag, 0, PBLKSIZ);
++ (void) memset (new, 0, PBLKSIZ);
++
++ n = ino[0];
++ for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
++ {
++ key.dptr = cur + ino[0];
++ key.dsize = off - ino[0];
++ val.dptr = cur + ino[1];
++ val.dsize = ino[0] - ino[1];
++/*
++ * select the page pointer (by looking at sbit) and insert
++ */
++ (void) putpair ((exhash (key) & sbit) ? new : pag, key, val);
++
++ off = ino[1];
++ n -= 2;
++ }
++}
++
++static int getdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
++{
++ long c;
++ long dirb;
++
++ c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
++ dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
++
++ if (dirb != db->dirbno)
++ {
++ int got;
++ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
++ return 0;
++ if (got==0)
++ memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
++ db->dirbno = dirb;
++ }
++
++ return db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] & (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
++}
++
++static int setdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
++{
++ long c;
++ long dirb;
++
++ c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
++ dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
++
++ if (dirb != db->dirbno)
++ {
++ int got;
++ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
++ return 0;
++ if (got==0)
++ memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
++ db->dirbno = dirb;
++ }
++
++ db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] |= (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
++
++#if 0
++ if (dbit >= db->maxbno)
++ db->maxbno += DBLKSIZ * BYTESIZ;
++#else
++ if (OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ > db->maxbno)
++ db->maxbno=OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ;
++#endif
++
++ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * getnext - get the next key in the page, and if done with
++ * the page, try the next page in sequence
++ */
++static datum getnext (DBM * db)
++{
++ datum key;
++
++ for (;;)
++ {
++ db->keyptr++;
++ key = getnkey (db->pagbuf, db->keyptr);
++ if (key.dptr != NULL)
++ return key;
++/*
++ * we either run out, or there is nothing on this page..
++ * try the next one... If we lost our position on the
++ * file, we will have to seek.
++ */
++ db->keyptr = 0;
++ if (db->pagbno != db->blkptr++)
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->blkptr), SEEK_SET) < 0)
++ break;
++ db->pagbno = db->blkptr;
++ if (read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) <= 0)
++ break;
++ if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
++ break;
++ }
++
++ return ioerr (db), nullitem;
++}
++
++/*
++ * all important binary trie traversal
++ */
++static int getpage (DBM * db, long hash)
++{
++ int hbit;
++ long dbit;
++ long pagb;
++
++ dbit = 0;
++ hbit = 0;
++ while (dbit < db->maxbno && getdbit (db, dbit))
++ dbit = 2 * dbit + ((hash & (1 << hbit++)) ? 2 : 1);
++
++ db->curbit = dbit;
++ db->hmask = masks[hbit];
++
++ pagb = hash & db->hmask;
++/*
++ * see if the block we need is already in memory.
++ * note: this lookaside cache has about 10% hit rate.
++ */
++ if (pagb != db->pagbno)
++ {
++/*
++ * note: here, we assume a "hole" is read as 0s.
++ * if not, must zero pagbuf first.
++ */
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (pagb), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ return 0;
++ if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
++ return 0;
++ db->pagbno = pagb;
++ }
++ return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * makroom - make room by splitting the overfull page
++ * this routine will attempt to make room for SPLTMAX times before
++ * giving up.
++ */
++static int makroom (DBM * db, long hash, int need)
++{
++ long newp;
++ char twin[PBLKSIZ];
++ char *pag = db->pagbuf;
++ char *new = twin;
++ int smax = SPLTMAX;
++
++ do
++ {
++/*
++ * split the current page
++ */
++ (void) splpage (pag, new, db->hmask + 1);
++/*
++ * address of the new page
++ */
++ newp = (hash & db->hmask) | (db->hmask + 1);
++
++/*
++ * write delay, read avoidence/cache shuffle:
++ * select the page for incoming pair: if key is to go to the new page,
++ * write out the previous one, and copy the new one over, thus making
++ * it the current page. If not, simply write the new page, and we are
++ * still looking at the page of interest. current page is not updated
++ * here, as sdbm_store will do so, after it inserts the incoming pair.
++ */
++ if (hash & (db->hmask + 1))
++ {
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ return 0;
++ db->pagbno = newp;
++ (void) memcpy (pag, new, PBLKSIZ);
++ }
++ else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (newp), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->pagf, new, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (!setdbit (db, db->curbit))
++ return 0;
++/*
++ * see if we have enough room now
++ */
++ if (fitpair (pag, need))
++ return 1;
++/*
++ * try again... update curbit and hmask as getpage would have
++ * done. because of our update of the current page, we do not
++ * need to read in anything. BUT we have to write the current
++ * [deferred] page out, as the window of failure is too great.
++ */
++ db->curbit = 2 * db->curbit +
++ ((hash & (db->hmask + 1)) ? 2 : 1);
++ db->hmask |= db->hmask + 1;
++
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ }
++ while (--smax);
++/*
++ * if we are here, this is real bad news. After SPLTMAX splits,
++ * we still cannot fit the key. say goodnight.
++ */
++#ifdef BADMESS
++ (void) write (2, "sdbm: cannot insert after SPLTMAX attempts.\n", 44);
++#endif
++ return 0;
++
++}
++
++static SDBM *sdbm_prep (char *dirname, char *pagname, int flags, int mode)
++{
++ SDBM *db;
++ struct stat dstat;
++
++ if ((db = (SDBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (SDBM))) == NULL)
++ return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
++
++ db->flags = 0;
++ db->blkptr = 0;
++ db->keyptr = 0;
++/*
++ * adjust user flags so that WRONLY becomes RDWR,
++ * as required by this package. Also set our internal
++ * flag for RDONLY if needed.
++ */
++ if (flags & O_WRONLY)
++ flags = (flags & ~O_WRONLY) | O_RDWR;
++ else if ((flags & 03) == O_RDONLY)
++ db->flags = DBM_RDONLY;
++#if defined(OS2) || defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
++ flags |= O_BINARY;
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Make sure to ignore the O_EXCL option, as the file might exist due
++ * to the locking.
++ */
++ flags &= ~O_EXCL;
++
++/*
++ * open the files in sequence, and stat the dirfile.
++ * If we fail anywhere, undo everything, return NULL.
++ */
++
++ if ((db->pagf = open (pagname, flags, mode)) > -1)
++ {
++ if ((db->dirf = open (dirname, flags, mode)) > -1)
++ {
++/*
++ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
++ */
++ if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
++ {
++ /*
++ * success
++ */
++ return db;
++ }
++ msg_info ("closing dirf");
++ (void) close (db->dirf);
++ }
++ msg_info ("closing pagf");
++ (void) close (db->pagf);
++ }
++ myfree ((char *) db);
++ return (SDBM *) NULL;
++}
++
++static DBM *sdbm_internal_open (SDBM * sdbm)
++{
++ DBM *db;
++ struct stat dstat;
++
++ if ((db = (DBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (DBM))) == NULL)
++ return errno = ENOMEM, (DBM *) NULL;
++
++ db->flags = sdbm->flags;
++ db->hmask = 0;
++ db->blkptr = sdbm->blkptr;
++ db->keyptr = sdbm->keyptr;
++ db->pagf = sdbm->pagf;
++ db->dirf = sdbm->dirf;
++ db->pagbuf = sdbm->pagbuf;
++ db->dirbuf = sdbm->dirbuf;
++
++/*
++ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
++ */
++ if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
++ {
++/*
++ * zero size: either a fresh database, or one with a single,
++ * unsplit data page: dirpage is all zeros.
++ */
++ db->dirbno = (!dstat.st_size) ? 0 : -1;
++ db->pagbno = -1;
++ db->maxbno = dstat.st_size * BYTESIZ;
++
++ (void) memset (db->pagbuf, 0, PBLKSIZ);
++ (void) memset (db->dirbuf, 0, DBLKSIZ);
++ return db;
++ }
++ myfree ((char *) db);
++ return (DBM *) NULL;
++}
++
++static void sdbm_internal_close (DBM * db)
++{
++ if (db == NULL)
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ else
++ {
++ myfree ((char *) db);
++ }
++}
++
++datum sdbm_fetch (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
++{
++ datum retval;
++ DBM *db;
++
++ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++ if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
++ {
++ retval = getpair (db->pagbuf, key);
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return retval;
++ }
++
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++
++ return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
++}
++
++int sdbm_delete (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
++{
++ int retval;
++ DBM *db;
++
++ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
++ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
++ if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
++ return errno = EPERM, -1;
++
++ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
++ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
++
++ if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
++ {
++ if (!delpair (db->pagbuf, key))
++ retval = -1;
++/*
++ * update the page file
++ */
++ else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
++ else
++ retval = 0;
++ }
++ else
++ retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
++
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++
++ return retval;
++}
++
++int sdbm_store (SDBM * sdb, datum key, datum val, int flags)
++{
++ int need;
++ int retval;
++ long hash;
++ DBM *db;
++
++ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
++ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
++ if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
++ return errno = EPERM, -1;
++
++ need = key.dsize + val.dsize;
++/*
++ * is the pair too big (or too small) for this database ??
++ */
++ if (need < 0 || need > PAIRMAX)
++ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
++
++ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
++ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
++
++ if (getpage (db, (hash = exhash (key))))
++ {
++/*
++ * if we need to replace, delete the key/data pair
++ * first. If it is not there, ignore.
++ */
++ if (flags == DBM_REPLACE)
++ (void) delpair (db->pagbuf, key);
++#ifdef SEEDUPS
++ else if (duppair (db->pagbuf, key))
++ {
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
++/*
++ * if we do not have enough room, we have to split.
++ */
++ if (!fitpair (db->pagbuf, need))
++ if (!makroom (db, hash, need))
++ {
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return ioerr (db), -1;
++ }
++/*
++ * we have enough room or split is successful. insert the key,
++ * and update the page file.
++ */
++ (void) putpair (db->pagbuf, key, val);
++
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ {
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return ioerr (db), -1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * success
++ */
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return ioerr (sdb), -1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * the following two routines will break if
++ * deletions aren't taken into account. (ndbm bug)
++ */
++datum sdbm_firstkey (SDBM * sdb)
++{
++ datum retval;
++ DBM *db;
++
++ if (sdb == NULL)
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++/*
++ * start at page 0
++ */
++ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (0), SEEK_SET) < 0
++ || read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
++ {
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
++ }
++ db->pagbno = 0;
++ db->blkptr = 0;
++ db->keyptr = 0;
++
++ retval = getnext (db);
++ sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
++ sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return retval;
++}
++
++datum sdbm_nextkey (SDBM * sdb)
++{
++ datum retval;
++ DBM *db;
++
++ if (sdb == NULL)
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
++ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
++
++ retval = getnext (db);
++ sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
++ sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
++ sdbm_internal_close (db);
++ return retval;
++}
++
++void sdbm_close (SDBM * db)
++{
++ if (db == NULL)
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ else
++ {
++ (void) close (db->dirf);
++ (void) close (db->pagf);
++ myfree ((char *) db);
++ }
++}
++
++SDBM *sdbm_open (char *file, int flags, int mode)
++{
++ SDBM *db;
++ char *dirname;
++ char *pagname;
++ int n;
++
++ if (file == NULL || !*file)
++ return errno = EINVAL, (SDBM *) NULL;
++/*
++ * need space for two seperate filenames
++ */
++ n = strlen (file) * 2 + strlen (DIRFEXT) + strlen (PAGFEXT) + 2;
++
++ if ((dirname = (char *) mymalloc ((unsigned) n)) == NULL)
++ return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
++/*
++ * build the file names
++ */
++ dirname = strcat (strcpy (dirname, file), DIRFEXT);
++ pagname = strcpy (dirname + strlen (dirname) + 1, file);
++ pagname = strcat (pagname, PAGFEXT);
++
++ db = sdbm_prep (dirname, pagname, flags, mode);
++ myfree ((char *) dirname);
++ return db;
++}
++
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++/*++
++/* NAME
++/* sdbm 3h
++/* SUMMARY
++/* SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++/* SYNOPSIS
++/* include "sdbm.h"
++/* DESCRIPTION
++/* .nf
++/*--*/
++
++#ifndef UTIL_SDBM_H
++#define UTIL_SDBM_H
++
++/*
++ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++ * based on Per-Ake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
++ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++ * status: public domain.
++ */
++
++#define DUFF /* go ahead and use the loop-unrolled version */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++#define DBLKSIZ 16384 /* SSL cert chains require more */
++#define PBLKSIZ 8192 /* SSL cert chains require more */
++#define PAIRMAX 8008 /* arbitrary on PBLKSIZ-N */
++#define SPLTMAX 10 /* maximum allowed splits */
++ /* for a single insertion */
++#define DIRFEXT ".dir"
++#define PAGFEXT ".pag"
++
++typedef struct {
++ int dirf; /* directory file descriptor */
++ int pagf; /* page file descriptor */
++ int flags; /* status/error flags, see below */
++ long blkptr; /* current block for nextkey */
++ int keyptr; /* current key for nextkey */
++ char pagbuf[PBLKSIZ]; /* page file block buffer */
++ char dirbuf[DBLKSIZ]; /* directory file block buffer */
++} SDBM;
++
++#define DBM_RDONLY 0x1 /* data base open read-only */
++#define DBM_IOERR 0x2 /* data base I/O error */
++
++/*
++ * utility macros
++ */
++#define sdbm_rdonly(db) ((db)->flags & DBM_RDONLY)
++#define sdbm_error(db) ((db)->flags & DBM_IOERR)
++
++#define sdbm_clearerr(db) ((db)->flags &= ~DBM_IOERR) /* ouch */
++
++#define sdbm_dirfno(db) ((db)->dirf)
++#define sdbm_pagfno(db) ((db)->pagf)
++
++typedef struct {
++ char *dptr;
++ int dsize;
++} datum;
++
++extern datum nullitem;
++
++/*
++ * flags to sdbm_store
++ */
++#define DBM_INSERT 0
++#define DBM_REPLACE 1
++
++/*
++ * ndbm interface
++ */
++extern SDBM *sdbm_open(char *, int, int);
++extern void sdbm_close(SDBM *);
++extern datum sdbm_fetch(SDBM *, datum);
++extern int sdbm_delete(SDBM *, datum);
++extern int sdbm_store(SDBM *, datum, datum, int);
++extern datum sdbm_firstkey(SDBM *);
++extern datum sdbm_nextkey(SDBM *);
++
++/*
++ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
++ * tuning and portability constructs [not nearly enough]
++ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
++ */
++
++#define BYTESIZ 8
++
++/*
++ * important tuning parms (hah)
++ */
++
++#define SEEDUPS /* always detect duplicates */
++#define BADMESS /* generate a message for worst case:
++ cannot make room after SPLTMAX splits */
++#endif /* UTIL_SDBM_H */
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sys_defs.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sys_defs.h
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sys_defs.h Mon Apr 15 23:56:08 2002
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sys_defs.h Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@
+ #define DEF_MAILBOX_LOCK "flock, dotlock"
+ #endif
+
++#if ((defined(__NetBSD_Version__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105000000) || defined(USAGI_LIBINET6))
++#define HAVE_GETIFADDRS
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * UNIX on MAC.
+ */
+diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/valid_hostname.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/valid_hostname.c
+--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/valid_hostname.c Sun Jan 28 15:10:18 2001
++++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/valid_hostname.c Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
+@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <ctype.h>
+
++#ifdef INET6
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <arpa/inet.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
++#endif
++
+ /* Utility library. */
+
+ #include "msg.h"
+@@ -103,7 +110,23 @@
+ msg_warn("%s: misplaced hyphen: %.100s", myname, name);
+ return (0);
+ }
+- } else {
++ }
++#ifdef INET6
++ else if (ch == ':') {
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
++
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; /*dummy*/
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ if (getaddrinfo(name, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ return 1;
++ } else
++ return 0;
++ }
++#endif
++ else {
+ if (gripe)
+ msg_warn("%s: invalid character %d(decimal): %.100s",
+ myname, ch, name);
+@@ -135,6 +158,9 @@
+ int byte_count = 0;
+ int byte_val = 0;
+ int ch;
++#ifdef INET6
++ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
++#endif
+
+ #define BYTES_NEEDED 4
+
+@@ -146,6 +172,17 @@
+ msg_warn("%s: empty address", myname);
+ return (0);
+ }
++
++#ifdef INET6
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; /*dummy*/
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ if (getaddrinfo(addr, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
++ freeaddrinfo(res);
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Scary code to avoid sscanf() overflow nasties.
diff --git a/net-mail/postfix/postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild b/net-mail/postfix/postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e2e69a64eb12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-mail/postfix/postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2002 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-mail/postfix/postfix-1.1.11.20020613.ebuild,v 1.1 2002/07/22 23:09:48 raker Exp $
+
+DESCRIPTION="A fast and secure drop-in replacement for sendmail"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.postfix.org/"
+
+POSTFIX_VER="1.1.11-20020613"
+S=${WORKDIR}/postfix-${POSTFIX_VER}
+SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/mirrors/postfix-release/experimental/postfix-${POSTFIX_VER}.tar.gz"
+
+PROVIDE="virtual/mta"
+DEPEND=">=sys-libs/db-3.2
+ >=dev-libs/libpcre-3.4
+ sasl? ( >=dev-libs/cyrus-sasl-2.1.6 )
+ ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-1.2 )
+ mysql? ( >=dev-db/mysql-3.23.28 )
+ ssl? ( >=dev-libs/openssl-0.9.6d )"
+RDEPEND="${DEPEND}
+ >=net-mail/mailbase-0.00
+ !virtual/mta"
+LICENSE="IPL-1"
+SLOT="0"
+
+pkg_setup() {
+ if ! grep -q ^postdrop: /etc/group ; then
+ groupadd postdrop || die "problem adding group postdrop"
+ fi
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+ unpack ${A}
+
+ if [ "`use ipv6`" ]
+ then
+ cd ${S}
+ patch -p1 < ${FILESDIR}/tls+ipv6.diff || die
+ cd ${WORKDIR}
+ fi
+
+ cd ${S}/conf
+ cp main.cf main.cf.orig
+ sed -e "s:/usr/libexec/postfix:/usr/lib/postfix:" main.cf.orig > main.cf
+
+ cd ${S}/src/global
+ cp mail_params.h mail_params.h.orig
+ sed -e "s:/usr/libexec/postfix:/usr/lib/postfix:" mail_params.h.orig > mail_params.h
+
+ use mysql \
+ && CCARGS="${CCARGS} -DHAS_MYSQL -I/usr/include/mysql" \
+ && AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -lmysqlclient -lm"
+
+ use ldap \
+ && CCARGS="${CCARGS} -DHAS_LDAP" \
+ && AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -lldap -llber"
+
+ use ssl \
+ && CCARGS="${CCARGS} -DHAS_SSL" \
+ && AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -lssl"
+
+ # note: if sasl is built w/ pam, then postfix _MUST_ be built w/ pam
+ use pam && AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -lpam"
+
+ # stuff we always want...
+ CCARGS="${CCARGS} -I/usr/include -DHAS_PCRE"
+ AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -L/usr/lib -lpcre -ldl -lcrypt"
+
+ if [ "`use sasl`" ]
+ then
+ AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS} -lsasl2"
+ CCARGS="${CCARGS} -DUSE_SASL_AUTH"
+ cd ${S}
+ patch -p1 < ${FILESDIR}/saslv2.diff
+ fi
+
+ DEBUG=""
+
+ cd ${S}
+ make tidy || die
+ make makefiles CC="cc" OPT="${CFLAGS}" DEBUG="${DEBUG}" \
+ CCARGS="${CCARGS}" AUXLIBS="${AUXLIBS}" || die
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+ make || die "oooops"
+}
+
+src_install () {
+ dodir /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/lib/postfix /etc/postfix/sample
+
+ cd ${S}/bin
+ dosbin post* sendmail
+ chown root.postdrop ${D}/usr/sbin/{postdrop,postqueue}
+ chmod 2755 ${D}/usr/sbin/{postdrop,postqueue}
+
+ dosym /usr/sbin/sendmail /usr/bin/mail
+ dosym /usr/sbin/sendmail /usr/bin/mailq
+ dosym /usr/sbin/sendmail /usr/bin/newaliases
+ dosym /usr/sbin/sendmail /usr/lib/sendmail
+
+ cd ${S}/libexec
+ exeinto /usr/lib/postfix
+ doexe *
+
+ cd ${S}/man
+ doman man*/*
+
+ cd ${S}
+ dodoc *README COMPATIBILITY HISTORY LICENSE PORTING RELEASE_NOTES INSTALL
+ dohtml html/*
+
+ cd ${S}/conf
+ insinto /etc/postfix/sample
+ doins access aliases canonical relocated transport \
+ pcre_table regexp_table postfix-script* *.cf
+
+ exeinto /etc/postfix
+ doexe postfix-script post-install postfix-files || die
+
+ insinto /etc/postfix
+ doins ${FILESDIR}/main.cf master.cf || die
+
+ exeinto /etc/init.d ; newexe ${FILESDIR}/postfix.rc6 postfix
+ insinto /etc/pam.d ; newins ${FILESDIR}/smtp.pam smtp
+ insinto /etc/sasl ; doins ${FILESDIR}/smtpd.conf
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+ install -d 0755 ${ROOT}/var/spool/postfix
+
+ einfo "***************************************************************"
+ einfo "* NOTE: If config file protection is enabled and you upgraded *"
+ einfo "* from an earlier version of postfix you must update *"
+ einfo "* /etc/postfix/master.cf to the latest version *"
+ einfo "* (/etc/postfix/._cfg????_master.cf). Otherwise postfix *"
+ einfo "* will not work correctly. *"
+ einfo "***************************************************************"
+}